Outsourcing of Policing Tasks: Scope and Prospects

Report to the Australian Security Industry Association Limited

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Outsourcing of Policing Tasks: Scope and Prospects

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Executive Summary

This report examines developments internationally in private security, including the role of security in crime reduction. The review also examines forms of privatised and outsourced policing, and crime prevention partnerships between government and private security.

Available evidence indicates that the current downward trend in crime internationally is largely attributable to the wide-scale uptake of security services across a range of institutional, commercial and domestic settings. Rising crime rates globally, and in Australia, appear to have been turned around, and long-term downward trends have set in across numerous offence categories.

Growth in the security industry has included a variety of forms of outsourced and partnership policing. There is little evidence, internationally, of any deliberate and thorough-ongoing policies of privatisation of police departments. ‘Privatisation’ has, instead, occurred primarily through market-driven growth in security. Growth has occurred in consumption by government, as well as private sector in-house and contract security.

Despite the turnaround in crime rates, crime victimisation remains at high levels in many countries, including Australia. To address this problem, the traditional separation of police and private security needs to be systematically overcome through more organised and active partnerships. There are numerous case studies available of police working closely and successfully with private security, primarily through forms of crime prevention partnerships. These often involve local government and local business associations.

Governments also need to make more of opportunities to reduce crime and reduce costs by installing advanced security systems and outsourcing security where a business case can be mounted.

Governments also need to facilitate the general uptake of security in commercial, institutional and residential settings.

This report concludes that there are enormous opportunities for governments, police and private security to achieve a synergetic effect in crime prevention. Although police and private security operate on different principles of private and public interests, contract arrangements and partnerships can be managed in ways that meet public interest criteria and satisfy democratic principles of accountability.
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Section 1

Growth in Private Security and the Implications for Policing and Crime Prevention

Historical Perspective

Over much of their history, Australians have looked to the public police for protection from crime and violence. Reliance on police was part of a normative outlook in many countries. Government was seen as the natural monopoly, or primary provider, of many basic services, including health, education and policing (Swanton, 1993). Improvements in communications and transport in the twentieth century supported the idea that police could minimise crime through a protective presence and a rapid response to calls for assistance (Bayley, 1998). However, this period of the apparent dominance of public police, from the early-19th century to the 1960s, now appears as an historical aberration – as indicated by the title of a key book on the subject, *The Rebirth of Private Policing* (Johnston, 1992). The field of private security history shows that private and other forms of ‘non-police’ security have tended to dominate community, business and individual forms of protection in the face of a common situation of absent or inadequate state provision (Johnston, 1992; McCrie, 2006).

The growth of professional policing was certainly a key element in the spread of modern civilisation; and police remain a cornerstone of democratic and market freedoms (Prenzler, 2010). Police are essential to the rule of law, the exercise of human rights, and enjoyment of economic prosperity. Nonetheless, as shown below, despite continued growth in police numbers, police have achieved only a very limited penetration of the crime problem. The idea that public police could provide adequate security is now widely understood to be a completely false hope. The police role is probably best described in terms of ‘crime containment’, and they have a very limited capacity to contribute on their own to large-scale reductions in crime.

The growth of private security is widely recognized as one of the most significant social developments since World War II (Bayley & Shearing, 2001). Nonetheless, rates of industry growth have varied widely. In the United States, it was estimated that private security overtook police in sheer numbers in the 1960s and in expenditure in the 1970s (Cunningham, et al., 1990). Reports indicate that security personnel now outnumber police by two or more to one in many countries, including the US, China, India and South Africa (Small Arms Survey, 2011). Elsewhere, such as in Europe, private security numbers have generally remained below those of police, although differential trends have favoured growth in the private sector (van Steden & Sarre, 2007). A study in the mid-2000s estimated that, ‘worldwide, more people are employed as a private security officer (348 per 100,000) than as a police officer (318 per 100,000)’ (van Dijk, 2008, p. 15). A 2011 survey across 70 countries estimated there were 19.5 million people employed in private security – with a projected total of 25.5 million across all countries (Small Arms Survey, 2011). Also for 2011, the whole industry was valued at $US100-165 billion per annum, with an annual growth rate of 7-8%. Across the 70 countries surveyed, private security personnel were estimated to outnumber police by a ratio of 1.8:1. One of the effects of this growth is that ordinary people are much more likely to encounter private security officers than police in their
day-to-day lives, especially at ‘mass private property’ venues such as shopping centres and sporting venues (Crawford, et al., 2005; Jones & Newburn, 2006).

Growth in a variety of security services, including guarding and investigations, has not been confined to the private sector. Governments have also tended to enlarge the capacity of in-house protective security, and there has been significant growth in specialist public sector crime fighting agencies. Various terms have been introduced to capture this phenomenon, including ‘plural policing’, ‘hybrid policing’ and a ‘mixed economy of policing’ (Newburn, 2003; van Buuren & den Boer, 2009). Over time, police in many countries have also shed ‘non-core’ regulatory tasks, such as government licensing and inspection services. They have also sought to extend their reach and reduce costs through civilianisation of their staff profile, and through the establishment of police auxiliaries – including uniformed liaison officers and ‘community support officers’ – and by making ‘special constable’ powers available on a temporary basis (Childs, 2002; Sarre & Prenzler, 2009). Police have also come under increasing pressure to work more closely with their local communities and engage local residents and business owners in crime prevention. Philosophies of ‘community policing’ and ‘problem oriented policing’ required police to be more consultative and creative in addressing crime problems.

Expansion in all these areas has been associated with numerous influences, including the modern terrorist threat, health and safety legislation, increased litigation, victims’ rights movements, recognition of the negative impacts of fear of crime, more sophisticated crime, and government policies of privatisation. The much lower costs of security guards vis-à-vis police personnel, and the potential omnipresence of technologies such as intruder alarms and CCTV, have been major attractors. Local governments also became involved in crime prevention in countries – such as Britain and Australia – where this has not been a traditional task of local authorities. The local government response has often included outsourcing security operations to private contractors (Wilson & Sutton, 2003).

It is likely, however, that the large increases in crime that occurred in many countries from the 1960s to the 1990s were the strongest influence on pluralisation and the growth of private security. This period was marked by a decisive shift in consciousness, away from reliance on police towards the self-provision of protection through the management of tailor-made, site-specific, security (van Dijk, 2008). Private and public security services have continued to grow under the influence of this philosophy, despite stable or declining crime rates in many locations from the turn of the century. At the same time, despite enormous growth and a significant convergence of roles, security is still largely focused on crime prevention; while police retain the primary role in arrests, investigations and prosecutions, including interdictions in crisis situations (Pastor, 2003; Sarre & Prenzler, 2011).

**Security and Crime Prevention**

The increases in crime that were especially marked in democratic countries in the 1970s and 1980s have been most closely associated with the prosperity and freer lifestyles that went with the post-War economic boom (Clarke, 1997; Cohen & Felson, 1979). In this period there were enormous increases in the number of light-weight,
high-value, easily transportable goods that could be stolen. There was much more cash in circulation and more valuables in the possession of more people. The rapid growth in motor vehicle ownership created a major new target for thieves and a means of accessing targets and escaping crime scenes. In addition, more people worked away from home during the day, while workplaces were abandoned at night in the commute back to the suburbs. People also went out more and travelled more, exposing themselves to robbery and assault.

This separation of guardians from targets was a key factor in the escalating crime problem. In many countries, crimes reported to police increased three- and four-fold between the 1960s and 1990s (van Dijk, 2008, 2012). In Australia, between 1973/74 and 1995/96, the total volume of crime reported to police increased by 121% as a rate per 100,000 population, while violent crime increased by 373% (Makkai & Prenzler, 2012, p. 56). The crisis in crime prompted numerous calls for more police and more punitive sentencing, and these calls were reflected in a general trend towards increased police-population ratios and harsher sentences (Pratt, 2005). In the UK, for example,

by 2010 the police service had reached a record number of staff (244,497 full-time equivalent staff (including police officers and civilians). Police expenditure had increased by 48 per cent in real terms between 1998 and 2009. It was a seemingly forever growing industry. (Silvestri, 2012, p. 3)

Property crime rates then began to fall consistently in many countries from the late-1980s into the 1990s; followed by falls in violent crimes around the turn of the century (van Dijk, 2008, 2012). Falls in crimes reported to police were reflected in crime experience surveys. Australia followed a similar pattern, slightly delayed, with property crime rates peaking around the turn of the century and violent crime rates peaking around the middle and latter part of the 2000s (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012, pp. 6 & 7).

A variety of theories have been put forward to explain these trends, including economic theories and theories related to improved policing and greater imprisonment. From a global perspective, van Dijk (2012) argues that the trends appear to operate largely independently of economic cycles, police innovations, and imprisonment rates. While changes in policing and imprisonment may have relevance in specific locations – e.g., the alleged 80% crime drop in New York City (Zimring, 2012) – they do not provide an explanation for crime trends at the global level. The most likely explanation for reduced crime rates relates to the impact of ‘self protection’ measures and ‘responsive securitization’. In van Dijk’s words (2012, p. 11):

Investments in self protection have since the 1970s been a mass phenomenon, impacting on almost all aspects of society. A prime example is the huge increases in private security guards and alarm centres... But responsive securitization is not limited to human surveillance by security guards. Measures to prevent crime have become ubiquitous in all corners of modern society. Harnessing new technology, security provisions have been built into homes, cars, stores and parking lots, public transport and public/social housing, schools
and hospitals, offices and other work places, entertainment venues and sports stadiums, airports and seaports, and to warehouses and transportation terminals.

Van Dijk elaborates on this thesis by examining how specific crimes – such as motor vehicle theft and household burglary – have been significantly reduced where security devices have been utilised – such as steering column locks, immobilisers and alarms. Government mandating of security devices appears to have been particularly effective, and studies also show that ‘the one off costs of the security measures were found to be a fraction of the benefits in terms of losses prevented over the years’ (2012, p. 14; see also van Volland & van Ours, 2011).

Similarly, Hakim & Shachmurove (1996a), in the US, compared the financial costs of alarms against the potential savings from reduced burglaries and concluded that alarms were cost-effective in residential and commercial settings. Another US study of commercial burglary found that the probability of a property without an alarm being burgled was 4.57 times that of an alarmed property (Hakim & Shachmurove, 1996b, p. 43). Security devices in combination have also been shown to substantially reduce residential burglary. For example, the authors of the 2009-10 British Crime Survey reported that:

Households with ‘less than basic’ home security measures were six times more likely to have been victims of burglary (5.8%) than households with ‘basic’ security (0.9%) and ten times more likely than households with ‘enhanced’ home security measures (0.6%) (Flatley, et al., 2010, pp. 2-3).

‘Basic security’ included ‘windows and double/deadlocks’; while ‘enhanced’ security included these and one other device, such as sensor lights, security grills or an alarm.

In Australia, there have been some unsuccessful attempts to relate the downward trend in crime to changes in police practices – such as ‘CompStat’-style management accountability for crime rates (Chilvers & Weatherburn, 2004; Mazerolle, Rombouts & McBroom, 2006). In the area of investigations, the statistics show that police have only a limited penetration of the crime problem. While police in Australia obtain high clearance rates for murder – in the order of 80% – this drops significantly for crimes such as robbery – around one third of reported offences – down to 20% for motor vehicle theft and 10% for burglary. At least 70% of crimes reported to police usually remain unsolved (Mukherjee & Graycar, 1997; Sarre & Prenzler, 2012). At the same time, there have been Australian studies showing that modified policing practices can strongly influence specific crimes – although the more successful policing operations have involved partnerships with security firms or the uptake of security technology (e.g., Bates, Soole & Watson, 2012; Prenzler, 2009a, 2011).

In Australia, the largest falls in crime have been in property offences (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012, p. 4). Incidents of unlawful entry with intent reported to police decreased 50% from 436,968 in 2000 to 216,886 in 2010. Motor vehicle thefts decreased 61% from 139,894 in 2001 to 54,736 in 2010. ‘Other theft’ decreased 34% from 700,137 in 2001 to 461,169 in 2010. Fraud offences reported to police peaked in 1999/10 at 112,264 and fell to 95,032 in 2008/09 (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011, p. 34). Nonetheless, while police received reports of 216,886 cases of unlawful
entry with intent in 2010, an Australian Bureau of Statistics’ survey estimated that, in
the financial year 2010/11, households experienced 343,400 break-ins. In addition, there were:

- 257,400 attempted break-ins,
- 79,800 motor vehicle thefts,
- 361,700 incidents of theft from a motor vehicle,
- 1.1 million incidents of ‘malicious property damage’, and
- 403,400 cases of ‘other theft’.

Rates for violent crime in Australia have been much more resistant to positive change,
with the exception of robbery (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012, pp. 2 & 6). The
number of robberies reported to police peaked at 26,591 in 2001 and fell 45% to
14,582 in 2010. However, the number of reported assaults peaked at 176,077 in 2007,
with only minor falls to 175,277 in 2009 and 171,083 in 2010 (p. 2). Sexual assaults
peaked at 19,992 in 2008 and fell marginally to 17,757 in 2010. Kidnapping and
abduction numbers have changed only slightly from a peak of 788 in 2008 to 603 in
individuals were victims of robbery. With repeat victimisations, it was estimated there
were 126,300 incidents. The Bureau also estimated that 486,500 persons were victims
of assault. With repeat victimisations, it was likely there were about 1.5 million
incidents. The survey also estimated that 54,900 persons were victims of sexual
assault.

The Security Gap

Despite the alleged omnipresence of security, research indicates that many
businesses and households lack adequate security. A common finding of business
crime surveys is that there is a low rate of adoption of security measures – with as
many as half or more of all businesses lacking the most basic security, such as bars
and shutters, toughened glass, and alarm systems (Bowers, 2001; van Dijk, 1997). A
recent British Chambers of Commerce survey found that 44% of respondents had
never sought advice about how to reduce crime (2008, p. 20). Research also shows
that most businesses upgrade security or obtain security advice only after they have
123). Furthermore, international surveys indicate that insurance against losses from
crime is generally inadequate (Alvazzi del Frate, 2004; Shury, et al., 2005, p. 13). A
survey of Australian businesses in the mid-1990s also found a low uptake of security.
Only 47.2% of respondents had spent money on crime prevention. Of these, 46.7%
invested in ‘special lighting’, 43.4% in ‘after-hours security’, 40.8% in ‘window
protection’ and 36.0% on ‘alarm systems’ (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2002, p.
48).

The risk of victimisation remains a constant negative feature of modern life – for
ordinary citizens as well as businesses and public sector organisations. Australia has
had amongst the highest rates of victimisation reported in the International Crime
Victims Survey of 17 industrialised nations. Rates peaked at 25.2% in 2000 (van Dijk,
van Kesteren & Smit, 2007; p. 237). The most recent survey showed Australia still
holding a high position – 16.3% of people were victimised at least once in 2004/05 –
compared to an average of 15.7% (p. 43). England and Wales had the highest rate at 21.8%, and the United States had 17.5%. An analysis within the ICVS of the average number of persons victimised for 10 crimes over five years, conducted in 2000, showed Australia at 59.6%, compared to an average of 46.0%, with the UK at 50.9% and the US at 41.8% (van Dijk, et al., 2007, p. 243).

Some types of crime victimisation are also much higher in particular sectors. For example, the first International Crimes against Business Survey, conducted in 1994, found that retail premises experienced overall burglary rates (including attempted burglary) 10 times those of households (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 115). The average was 30.7% (p. 116). The British Chambers of Commerce (2008) survey found that 58% of businesses had experienced one or more incidents of crime in the previous year. The total estimated cost to business was £12.6 billion. Burglary was the third most common crime (19%) after ‘damage to vehicles’ (24%) and ‘vandalism and graffiti’ (20%), and above the fourth most common crime of ‘attempted burglary’ (12%). In Australia, in the 1990s, small businesses experienced burglary rates around 27% – over five times the household rate at 5% (Taylor & Mayhew, 2002, p. 1). Victimisation rates for other crime included 26% for ‘theft from premises’, 15% ‘theft by customers’, 17% ‘fraud by outsider’ and 10% ‘employees assaulted’ (Ross, 1998, p. 7).

The most recent costs of crime survey in Australia showed that crime continued to constitute an enormous financial drain on society. The Australian Institute of Criminology (Rollings, 2008) estimated that, in 2005, the direct costs of crime – in areas such as property loss, lost output and medical costs – amounted to $21.3 billion. The cost of responding to crime – including policing, security, courts and corrections – was put at $14.5 billion. The total cost was therefore estimated to be around $35.8 billion.

Compliance with road rules is another area of major concern. Police have achieved considerable success in reducing motor vehicle crashes since the 1970s, through enlarged enforcement strategies and in association with improvements in road design and vehicle design (Bates, et al., 2012). However, nationally, the road toll has been stuck around 1,500 per year – the equivalent of about four fatal jumbo jet crashes. Another 35,000 victims are hospitalised each year (Prenzler, 2010, p. 182). Public opinion surveys also show that upwards of 90% of citizens see speeding and dangerous driving as major problems (p. 182). Police continue to engage in inefficient and dangerous practices in traffic law enforcement, such as pulling over offending drivers and questioning them about the offence (Allard & Prenzler, 2009). There are solutions to the carnage on the roads, and better use of private security is one important option that remains under-developed.

Security services are particularly well suited to addressing the problem of repeat victimisation and concentrations of crime in particular localities. Crime rates across nations and jurisdictions are often inflated by multiple offences committed against the same businesses, schools, clubs, and other locations. The phenomenon has led researchers to coin the term ‘risky facilities’. Researchers such as Eck, Clarke and Guerette (2007) have focused on the concept of ‘place management’ as a major explanation for this phenomenon. Place managers can be responsible, often unconsciously, for management practices that are ‘crime enablers’.
The concentration of crime at a few facilities can seldom be dismissed as a random fluke or ‘just a lot of targets’ or active offenders... Comparing the way similar facilities with different crime levels are managed can test crime enabling. If compared to low crime facilities, the high crime locations have fewer rules, lax enforcement, easy access, poor security, and other features that help offenders detect targets, commit crimes, and get away... If the high crime facilities have many targets or more highly desirable targets (either hot products or repeat victims) compared to low crime facilities, but managers do little to enhance target protection, this also suggests place management is at the heart of the problem (Eck, et al., 2007, p. 240).

Research has identified many dramatic cases of repeat victimisation. Eck, et al. (2007) cited examples such as motel crimes in Chula Vista California, where 19% of local motels were responsible for 51% of calls to police; and shoplifting in Danvers Connecticut, where 20% of stores were responsible for 85% of incidents. Similarly, a UK study in Merseyside found that 43 schools were subject to eight or more burglaries in one year, and 57 retail/manufacturing facilities were subject to four or more burglaries (Bowers, Hirschfield & Johnson, 1998). The problem of repeat victimisation is also apparent in crimes against households and individuals. In Australia, as one example from the statistics cited above, repeat victimisation means that there are more than three times as many incidents of assault as individual victims (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Repeat victimization occurs in part because a successful crime will motivate offenders to return to the same location; often with a short time frame, such as a month (Bowers, et al., 1998).

Of particular concern is the widening gap world-wide between victimisation of the rich and poor relative to their ability to afford security, with little or no prospect of the public police bridging the gap. Van Dijk (2012, p. 17) has stated that:

The results of the ICVS (International Crime Victim Survey) show that across twelve Western nations the lowest income groups have stepped up their household security to a lesser extent than the middle and upper classes. They cannot afford to. As was expected, the survey also shows that the lowest quartile have benefitted less from the falls in burglary victimisation than the rest of the population.

With this phenomenon in mind, van Dijk argues that ‘situational crime prevention is not just a matter of efficiency. It is also a matter of social justice’ (2012, p. 17). The private security industry can make a major contribution in this area – through subsidised security, for example; as well as in government housing, public transport, public hospitals and public schools.

In Australia, there have been a number of surveys that include questions about the use of security devices. A 1999 survey in New South Wales found that only 47% of dwellings could properly secure their entrances (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2000, p. 5). While 65% had some type of door security – such as a deadlock or security screen – only 38% had security on windows. Twenty percent of dwellings had a burglar alarm. Significantly, 'lone parent households and persons living alone were the
household types least likely to live in a dwelling in which all entrances could be secured’ (p. 3). A survey in Western Australia, in 2004, found that only 42% of households had deadlocks and 45% had security screens on all external doors (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2005, p. 4). Rented dwellings generally had lower levels of security. For example, 53% of owner occupied homes had security shutters or window locks on all windows, compared to 48% renting privately and 37% renting publicly (p. 4). The 2004 Australian component of the International Crime Victimisation Survey found that 66% of households had ‘special door locks’, and 58% had ‘window locks, window grilles or door grilles’ (Johnson, 2005, p. 48). However, the extent of coverage of these devices was not recorded.

The issue of security and social justice involves a number of dimensions. Of particular interest is van Dijk’s idea of the role of security in preventing the escalation of crime and the development of criminal careers. This includes a social justice outcome for potential offenders as well as victims. Car theft and burglary, for example, often serve as ‘stepping stones’ to more serious crimes for young males (2012, p. 17). The fact that relatively minor crimes like ‘joy riding’ and domestic burglary are the entrée to more serious crimes and criminal careers is common knowledge in criminology. However, what has received much less attention is the fact that the prevention of these crimes can steer young people away from a criminal lifestyle.

Property crime prevention by security services therefore has an often unacknowledged role in preventing more serious property crimes, and also preventing crimes of violence such as robbery and armed robbery. Security can therefore have a positive ‘multiplier’ or ‘halo’ effect (van Dijk, 2012, p. 17). The concept of a halo effect – or a ‘diffusion of benefits’ (Clarke, 1997) – is relevant to the concern that situational crime prevention measures may simply displace crime to other locations or other types of crime. Research on this issue has shown that displacement can occur. However, it is more often the case that there is no evidence of displacement, as offenders are often limited in their scope and easily discouraged. Research has also shown a ‘halo effect’ in some cases, where the crime reduction effects of an intervention are extended to neighbouring areas (Clarke & Weisburd, 1994). Offenders may be concerned that interventions are more widely distributed than is the case or they might not be bothered travelling further to new targets.

Relations between Police and Private Security

Policing and the criminal courts are areas of government service delivery that have largely been shielded from full privatisation. In criminal justice, the main area of partial privatisation has been in prison management and related custody functions, including prisoner transport (Sarre & Prenzler, 2012). As noted, the ‘privatisation of policing’ has primarily occurred through growth in demand for private security – as opposed to deliberate policies of reducing police numbers and selling off or outsourcing police services (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011; van Steden, 2007). In many countries, including Australia, the ratio of police to population increased during the period of rapid growth in private security (Cunningham, et al., 1990; van Steden & Sarre, 2007). It was simply the case that the rate of growth of private security was greater than the rate of growth of public police.
Despite this situation, many police, and police union officials in particular, have seen private security as a threat. Private security has been characterised in negative terms as ‘encroaching’ on police employment. This can include a tacit assumption that private security threatens hard won police employment conditions (Swanton, 1993). However, to-date, as discussed, there appears to be little or no evidence of governments cutting the numbers of sworn officers and hiring private security officers in their place, or cutting police employment conditions in order to spend the savings on private security. (But see below on current developments in the United Kingdom.)

Police also at times argue that more police are needed, as opposed to more private security personnel. This is a complex issue, and very much subject to local issues and local crime rates. ‘More police’ might result in less crime at certain times and places (Kovandzic & Sloan, 2002). However, there does appear to be a ceiling to the crime containment effect of public policing. This point was demonstrated in a study by Felson (1998) in Los Angeles County. Felson estimated the extent of police coverage of premises if each patrol officer were deployed to the maximum capacity. He concluded that this would give each location fifteen seconds of protection a day. Consequently, doubling the number of police would provide 30 seconds of coverage in each 24 hour period. This explains why even large increases in police numbers may have little effect on crime. It also helps to understand why intensified police patrols have at times been shown to have no significant impact on crime rates (e.g., Kelling, et al., 1983).

A further argument made against private security is that policing in a democracy is an egalitarian service, rationed on the basis of need and harm, while private security is entirely partial to the requirements of clients. For example, the limits of private security have at times been highlighted in the media, who have reported cases where private guards have refused to come to the aid of citizens endangered outside the guards’ proprietorial zone (Sarre & Prenzler, 2009, p. 225). Policing, therefore, allegedly operates by general ‘moral authority’, and public policing is a natural monopoly because of the obligation of governments to protect citizens’ rights.

A key problem with the idea of a natural police monopoly is that a large volume of crime occurs outside public spaces, like streets and footpaths; and police are severely restricted in their authority to enter private property (Sarre & Prenzler, 2009). Routine crime prevention work is therefore largely beyond the legal capacity of police in many locations. One example is the proactive use of sniffer dogs for drug detection in schools (Murray, Chamberlin & Cornish, 2012). Generally speaking, the permission of owners is required for police to provide a preventive presence, or to engage in more proactive crime prevention measures such as searching for contraband, and there would be various practical problems with access, logistics and continuity. But, even with permission, it is simply not possible for police to provide adequate coverage of potential crime targets and manage the crime problem alone – as we have seen. Citizens and property owners must take some responsibility for engaging in behaviours that protect themselves and their assets – i.e., ‘responsible citizenship’ (Johnston, 1992, p. 137) – as well as exercising a duty of care towards persons visiting their premises or in their employment (Prenzler, 2004).
Police concerns about their future are perhaps not without some justification. There are groups that advocate radical privatisation of government services. Full implementation of such policies would make ‘public policing’ almost unrecognisable. Within an extreme privatisation agenda there is potential for police to become little more than managers of private contracts. In this view:

Few if any functions performed by police agencies cannot either be competently performed in a commercial environment or contracted out to private organisations (Swanton, 1993, p. 3).

Concerns about equity, it is argued, can be addressed by placing the right conditions and obligations in the terms of contracts, and properly monitoring and enforcing contracts. The wholesale privatisation of policing, however, remains largely theoretical, with no prospect of advocates obtaining government in Australia. Conservative parties, which are most likely to advocate privatisation and small government, tend to support large police forces.

There is also little evidence that private security firms are lobbying to take on the more complex and high-risk operations currently undertaken by police. One partial exception to this is Ross McLeod, the founder of the high profile Intelligarde company in Canada. McLeod has championed a new age of “parapolicing” or private law enforcement, in which private security ‘intervene and resolve rather than observe and report’ (McLeod, 2002, p. 32). Intelligarde gained a controversial reputation for cleaning out drug dealers, drug users, other criminals and trespassers from public housing projects in Toronto. McLeod has described traditional policing as essentially lazy, inflexible and unproductive; and he cites cases where his security crews were more responsive and effective than police in dealing with violent offenders. He describes the staple two-person police patrol as ‘an egregious example of featherbedding’ (p. 74); and he has claimed that Intelligarde ‘has had 20,000 arrests in twenty years’ (p. 67). McLeod has defined core policing tasks that should stay with public police as “major crime investigation and the use of armed personnel” (p. 113). This is despite the widespread use of armed private security. In McLeod’s estimation, ‘non-core’ tasks leave ‘60% of police operations ... open to tender by private security organisations’ (p. 113).

Leaving aside the issue of appropriate policing domains, there is also a long history of cultural alienation between police and private security. Differences in selection and training standards have at times generated animosity, with police often adopting an antagonistic and superior attitude to security officers (Shearing, Stenning & Addario, 1985). An early report by the US Private Security Advisory Council (1977) identified a number of points of conflict. These were categorised in terms of the following (pp. 11-20):

A. lack of mutual respect
B. lack of communication
C. lack of [formal] cooperation
D. lack of law enforcement knowledge of private security
E. perceived competition
F. lack of standards [in private security]
G. perceived corruption [for both].

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These views have been echoed in numerous locations (Swanton, 1993). A number of other factors went into the mix, such as the waste of police resources responding to false alarms and violence by crowd controllers (Prenzler, 2004).

There are signs that there has been a considerable thawing in relations between the two groups in the last few decades. This is evident in part in the many policy advances and successful partnerships outlined in sections 2 and 3 of this report; as well as in opinion surveys of police and security (e.g., Golsby O’Brien, 1996; Nalla & Hummer, 1999). Police and security providers have also been subject to expanded regulation to reduce the misconduct problem and improve ethical standards in both sectors. In general, security industry associations have strongly supported improved regulation; and survey research also shows strong support for effective regulation amongst security firm owners, and security managers and operatives (Crawford, et al., 2005, p. 16; Prenzler, 1995; Prenzler & Hayes, 1999; Sarre & Prenzler, 2011). Regulation of the industry is supported by industry members, partly, it appears, as a general commitment to professionalism but also to ensure a ‘level playing field’ to protect law-abiding and ethical companies from undercutting in tendering – leading to substandard service delivery.

Regulatory reform in security internationally has included a range of disqualifying offences that exclude convicted persons from employment in the field (Button, 2012). Regulation has also included mandatory pre-employment training with prescribed content covering basic elements of security work. In many jurisdictions, police and security providers have never been better educated and trained. The common education and training advocated by some has not been realised (e.g., Law Commission of Canada, 2002; Swanton, 1993), but there is certainly evidence of significant improvements in professionalism and some commonalities in training across both sectors (Button, 2012; Sarre & Prenzler, 2011). Significant improvements are also evident in areas such as alarm responses procedures (Sampson, 2001).

Public Perceptions of Private Security

The way the public perceive private security is important in relation to confidence in their role in protection and in helping people feel safe. There have been a number of overseas surveys of perceptions of security. One unusual survey in seven African countries in the late-2000s asked the question, ‘Do you think that policing functions performed by private security is a good development?’ (Small Arms Survey, 2011, p. 106). Responses were generally positive. At the lowest end, 57% of respondents in Kenya replied ‘yes’ and 62% in Cape Verde. At the highest end, 93% said ‘yes’ in Ghana and 88% in Uganda.

Surveys that ask questions about the image and reputation of security providers have obtained fairly mixed results but, on the whole, they ‘refute what is commonly assumed to be a negative image of private security, because most respondents held a positive attitude toward private security personnel’ (van Steden & Nalla, 2010, p. 218; see also Crawford, et al., 2005, pp. 65-67). The studies have, however, tended to find that respondents often had negative personal experiences of security officers, which
then detracted from their overall view of the industry (Nalla & Heraux, 2003; Nalla & Lim, 2003; Shearing, Stenning & Addario, 1985).

One of the most recent surveys from Holland is worth examining more closely. Van Steden & Nalla (2010) found respondents’ opinions divided across positive, negative and neutral responses, but overall tending towards the positive. Some highlights include the following:

- 45% described their contact with private security officers as positive, 37% as neutral and 18% as negative.
- Security guard behaviour was described as ‘courteous/polite’ by 57%, ‘neutral’ by 26% and ‘impolite/rude’ by 16%.
- 31% agreed ‘security guards are well trained’, 39% were neutral and 30% disagreed.
- 33% agreed that ‘security guards, in general, are able to handle complex situations’, 44% were neutral and 22% disagreed.
- 33% agreed that ‘security guards are generally honest’, 53% were neutral and 13% disagreed.
- 41% agreed with the statement, ‘I feel safe when I see security guards around’, 28% were neutral and 31% disagreed.
- 53% agreed that ‘security guards are generally helpful’, 28% were neutral and 19% disagreed.
- 12% agreed that ‘security work is paid well’, 42% were neutral and 46% disagreed.

The researchers found that persons seeking information or assistance from security officers were most likely to be satisfied with their experience, whereas the small proportion of persons (9%) who reported receiving a ‘remark from a security guard about conduct’ were generally dissatisfied (p. 230).

In their review of this and other surveys, van Steden & Nalla (2010) make the point that the findings are similar to those for police. People hold generally positive views and, for the majority of people, these views are enhanced through personal contact. At the same time, some people will have an encounter where they are subject to some form of law enforcement, and they will tend to have negative views about police or security officers as a result. Of course, police and security guards cannot be a friend to everyone. Some negative reactions ‘come with the territory’. However, it is often the case that the behaviour and demeanor of police can mediate the experience; and improved training and supervision can significantly improve citizens’ experiences of law enforcement personnel (Davis, Mateu-Gelabert & Miller, 2005). For example, a study in the UK, in a community where contract security guards had provided frontline police services over an eight year period, found that 92% of subscribers were satisfied with service (Noaks, 2008, p. 162). Positive personal contact appeared to be a key ingredient (see also Sharp & Wilson, 2000).

As a result of their research, van Steden & Nalla (2010, p. 219) note that:
The industry needs to incorporate elements that heighten the security guards’ image, as well as their utility to be an effective and trusted presence in quasi-public spaces where a large amount of public life takes part.

In that regard, a more consistent standard of conduct can be obtained by government regulation that supports industry efforts at self-regulation. This view is evidenced in a public opinion survey conducted in Australia in 2004; which found the following (Newspoll, 2004, pp. 12 & 23):

- 95.2% of respondents thought security guards should be licensed,
- 81.4% thought alarm installers should be licensed,
- 82.5% thought locksmiths should be licensed,
- 90.1% thought crowd controllers should be licensed, and
- 94.8% thought security companies should be regularly checked or audited.

The survey also found a fairly high level of faith in the probity of security firms and industry associations, evidenced by the fact that 66.0% of respondents felt that ‘government and the security industry working together’ was the best way to regulate the industry. This compared to 15.4% who supported a ‘government body’ alone and 10.3% who supported an ‘accredited security industry body’ alone (p. 25).
Section 2

Global Perspectives on Partnership and Outsourced Policing

Privatisation and Outsourcing in Government

In many countries, the period following World War II was marked by the growth of the welfare state and an emphasis on 'big government' – with public sector responsibility for directly providing basic services such as electricity, education and transport. As prosperity increased, demands on government expanded to an ever-widening array of services. There was then a marked backlash against this trend, primarily from the 1980s, under pressure from neoconservative ideologies of self-provision (Nellis, 2012). From this point of view, big government was seen as unproductive, encouraging dependency and laziness. In the 1990s, the Australian Federal Government adopted a national competition policy that encouraged privatisation and obliged state and local governments to make greater use of competitive contracting (Quiggin 1996). Both Labor and conservative governments have pushed a privatisation agenda. Notable changes have included the sale or part-sale of major government assets, including in electricity and water supply, and involving iconic entities such as Qantas, the Commonwealth Bank and Telstra.

Evaluations of the effects of privatisation tend to be dogged by conflicting evidence. In some cases, governments push ahead with privatisation despite strong public opposition. Public assets are sold to plug a budget gap or as part of a dogmatic ideological agenda. Privatisation enthusiasts have boldly predicted dramatic improvements to efficiency and reduced costs to consumers. However, such assertions are often made in the face of a scarcity of rigorous evaluative studies (Nellis, 2012). Part of the problem is that privatisation can be carried out across a wide spectrum of forms, including partial privatisation and selective outsourcing. Governments at times set conditions on privatised entities that significantly reduce their competitiveness. And there are cases where assets have been sold at discount rates to government cronies. Studies have identified a range of significant risks, including the following (Hodge 1996, Quiggin 1996):

- hidden costs and difficulties in monitoring the quality of service delivery,
- corruption in tendering,
- blurring of accountability,
- reductions in employment and conditions of employment, and
- centralisation and the loss of local input.

A recent large-scale review by Nellis (2012) identified highly diverse outcomes from privatisation programs internationally. Nellis found that, up to the turn of the century, evaluations were generally positive in terms of improved efficiency and better services, with minimal overall impacts on employment and welfare. However, the 2000s saw a retreat from the scale of previous privatisations, with greater consideration of the benefits of government ownership of basic infrastructure. Governments have been on a learning curve across these periods, and there is a general recognition that many privatisations were badly managed and, at times, unjustified. It would seem that the
most important lesson is that privatised services need to be effectively regulated, especially if the benefits of privatisation are to be ‘more evenly distributed’ (Nellis, 2012, p. 24).

Criminal justice tends to be ignored in privatisation reviews. As noted, the main area of privatisation has been in prison management. This topic is also marked by claim and counter-claim, and ideological agendas. In many countries, such as Australia and the United Kingdom, prison privatisation is limited in scope but very much an established practice. Overall, evaluations overseas and in Australia indicate that properly managed contracts can be deemed effective across a range of criteria, including cost, security and delivery of prisoner programs (Gaes, 2012; Harding, 1997; Segal & Moore, 2002). Overall performance is not necessarily better in private prisons but it can be as good as in public prisons, and possibly delivered at a lower cost. One possible benefit is the competition and benchmarking that occurs by having both forms of prison management in place. The main lesson, it appears, is that the drive to increase profit through private sector cost cutting needs to be countered by strong performance management and accountability standards (Gaes, 2012).

Privatisation remains a deeply controversial topic. One of the outcomes of decades of debate appears to be a preference for the more acceptable term ‘partnerships’ (van Buuren & den Boer, 2009). A partnership approach to service delivery carries scope for the ‘best of both worlds’, mixing the democratic and egalitarian aspects of government with the drive, innovation and flexibility of the private sector. Furthermore, public-private partnerships can be highly adaptable and come in many forms, including operating leases on government-owned infrastructure or simple contractual arrangements for direct service delivery. Partners can be businesses, concerned with profit, or community-based groups, concerned with non-profit service delivery. Benefits to governments and the public which have been attributed to partnerships include the following (Commission of the European Communities, 2009; van Buuren & den Boer, 2009):

- buying in expertise to meet a temporary or urgent need,
- addressing a service delivery deficit by augmenting the work of established organisations,
- ensuring compliance through enforceable contracts,
- spreading risk,
- obtaining investment without burdening taxpayers, and
- stimulating employment.

**Partnership and Outsourced Policing: General Trends**

Various forms of partnership and outsourcing are also evident in policing. Venue security and mass-transit security are arguably the types of public-private crime prevention partnerships experienced by most people. Both formats now cover many decades of experience, and there are well-established contractual arrangements, divisions of labour, and protocols for cooperation between police and security. This is an area of limited evaluative research, however. There are certainly many cases where it appears that arrangements work optimally with very few adverse incidents (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011, chapter 3). But this is often the result of learning from
decades of negative experience. Many major sporting events have been marred by riots, brawls and assaults, related to poor security and police management. Stadium security has, however, becoming increasingly effective with police adopting a back-up role to security personnel. Closer planning between police and security is also evident, with review and feedback procedures, significant use of CCTV and plain clothes ‘spotters’ to remove troublemakers, better use of point-of-entry bag searches to exclude contraband, and the shared use of intelligence databases (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011, pp. 84-91; van Steden, 2007, chapter 9).

The on-going problem of alcohol-related violence has also shown the need for a more coordinated partnership approach to policing clubs and pubs. Significant learning has taken place, showing the need for specialist training for security officers, mandated patron-security officer ratios, and diversion from binge drinking (Graham & Homel, 2008). However, alcohol-related violence in entertainment areas remains a major problem internationally, due primarily to the failure to implement evidence-based policy (Graham & Homel, 2008).

Airport security arrangements have often been effective in many locations. At the same time, security breaches have led to audits which have revealed numerous vulnerabilities in areas such as criminal infiltration of security staff, inadequate system tests, outdated security technology, and poor communication between partners (e.g., Button, 2008, p. 29ff; Prenzler, Lowden & Sarre, 2010; Wheeler, 2005).

Learning about the value of partnerships and how best to manage them is an ongoing process. At the policy level, this evolution has reached a point where it is almost de rigueur for governments to officially promote crime prevention partnerships that include private security. In fact, many governments cite cooperation between police and private security as ‘one of their main contributions to crime prevention and/or public safety’ (UNODC, 2011, p. 12). The 2002 United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime state that:

Cooperation/partnerships should be an integral part of effective crime prevention, given the wide-ranging nature of the causes of crime and the skills and responsibilities required to address them. This includes partnerships working across ministries and between authorities, community organizations, nongovernmental organizations, the business sector and private citizens (United Nations, 2010, p. 24).

The UN promotes government engagement with private security as one way of addressing deficits and inequalities in public policing (2010, p. 103):

Private security needs to be considered in national and local government plans and partnership consultation for a number of reasons, but especially to ensure the inclusiveness of prevention strategies and interventions and the equality of security provision.

In regions such as Africa there are likely to be fewer public police per head of the population than elsewhere, and both state and non-state policing may be necessary to provide security for different communities. Many communities may
rely on informal and private police systems in the absence of state police, or because they are fearful or are mistrustful of state police. The challenge in both high, medium and low income countries is to ensure regulation and oversight mechanisms for both public and private policing, so that they are equitable, and accountable.

An example of further policy development in this area is the recent report, *Civilian Private Security Services: Their Role, Oversight and Contribution to Crime Prevention and Community Safety*, by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The report recommended better regulation of the industry as one mechanism for supporting crime reduction. It also recommended governments consider better strategic use of private security in frontline roles. For example: ‘responding to incidents... depending on their severity ... as primary responder before the State actors arrive or to provide additional resources to support State actors’ (UNODC, 2011, p. 11). Other recommendations included the following (p. 13):

53(b) CPSS (civilian private security services) should be recognized as having an important complementary role in crime prevention and community safety and representatives should be involved in partnerships at all levels and in all sectors where they operate in a significant capacity...

54. States may:

(a) Encourage strategic partnerships between CPSS and public security organs;

(b) Provide funding for research about collaboration between the CPSS and the public security sector and for the evaluation of such cooperation;

(c) Establish and encourage specific training programmes focusing on cooperation and collaboration;

(d) Establish an appropriate body to oversee the implementation of cooperation and collaboration between State security organs and CPSS.

55. strengthen information-sharing between CPSS and public security organs;

(b) Aim to set up secure information sharing networks;

(c) Enact laws that protect information provided by the CPSS.

But while the idea of crime prevention partnerships has been widely adopted at the policy level, in many cases there are no opportunities to access them. The 2000 International Crimes Against Business Survey found that only 11% of respondents were aware of ‘any kind of co-operative action against crime’, while half said they would be interested in participating in such schemes (Alvazzi del Frate, 2004, pp. 145 & 155).
The following subsections provide more in-depth accounts of policy developments and practice in this area in Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States and South Africa. This includes attention to measures and methods of success, and to outsourcing where information is available.

Europe

As noted above, private security numbers in Europe have tended to remain below those of police, although they have been increasing at a faster rate. A 2011 estimate put the financial turnover in the industry at €35 billion, with an average market growth of 13.3% per year (CoESS, 2011, p. 143). The number of private security companies was put at 52,300, with 2,170,589 security guards. In 2008 the Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS) released a discussion paper and set of guidelines titled *Critical Infrastructure Security and Protection: The Public-Private Opportunity*, which sought to promote partnerships well beyond basic counter-terrorism operations. The report identified a number of obstacles to partnerships (CoESS, 2008). These included excessive competition and undercutting in private security; unsocial working hours and low salaries that reduced the labour pool; high staff turnover; regulatory fragmentation with highly variable standards; and government tenders that favoured price over quality and supported the less reputable end of the market.

Despite the range of obstacles to partnerships, there is a variety of success stories from Europe. The Netherlands was a notable leader in the area of formal security partnerships. Rising crime rates and the failure of traditional policing methods prompted the establishment of the ‘Roethof Committee’ of experts in 1983 to review policy in the area (Willemse, 1994, p. 34). The committee recommended a strengthening of the national government’s commitment to crime prevention, the involvement of private citizens and businesses, and the encouragement of interagency cooperation at the local level (p. 34). In response, the Interdepartmental Committee for Social Crime Prevention was established in 1985 with a budget of $US27 million over five years to support locally-based crime prevention projects. Interventions supported by the committee included situational measures. In addition, “new emphasis was given to less formal social control within the community, e.g., by means of neighbourhood watch, caretakers in building estates and surveillance by security firms” (Willemse, 1994, p. 35). In 1989, the achievements of the Committee were considered sufficient to justify the establishment of a permanent Directorate for Crime Prevention, within the Ministry of Justice (p. 43).

The Directorate – or ‘Department for Crime Prevention’ – adopted a policy of initiating and supporting partnerships that included security firms (van den Berg, 1995). A three-step process was developed, as follows (p. 32):

Step one: ideas are generated, a feasibility study is made and a survey is taken as to whether there is public support for the project. Step two: preparation of the implementation, looking for a security firm, drawing up a master contract and establishing a foundation in which police, management and businesses are represented. Finally, step three (after the master contract has been concluded
and the effective surveillance has definitively started): implementation, operation and management by the foundation has been established.

In an early example, in the late-1980s, the Area Entrepreneur Association of the Dutch Enschede-Haven industrial site requested police provide increased patrols to counter criminal activity (van den Berg, 1995). The police produced a crime profile for the area and suggested a partnership arrangement in which they supported private security patrols. The Association established a cooperative with membership from the majority of the 410 companies on the site, and police set up a ‘Project Agency’ to coordinate the work of the cooperative, the police and the local government. A submission was successful in securing start-up funds from the national government. Further assistance was provided by a government employment agency, which subsidised the appointment of unemployed people as security guards, with training provided by police. The key element of the project was the stationing of a security guard on the estate outside business hours, who checked alarm activations before contacting police. The local council also improved lighting and the amenity of the area, while signage about the project was designed to deter offenders.

A formal evaluation of the Enschede-Haven project found that security incidents were reduced by 72%, from 90 per month in the 18 months before the project to 25 per month in the 18 months after it was established. The partnership continued as a self-funded project once the initial subsidy expired (van den Berg, 1995). A similar project on the Dutch Vianen Industrial Site saw commercial burglary reduced by 52% from 75 incidents in the year before the project to 36 in the year after the project's commencement. All crime incidents were reduced by 41% from 133 to 78 (Van den Berg, 1995). A project in a shopping centre in Utrecht was focused on the employment of security officers and led to reductions in shoplifting, burglary and vandalism (Willemse, 1994). The project proved to be cost effective in terms of savings on losses from crime exceeding the cost of security staff. Consequently, the Retailers’ Association maintained the project once the government start up grant came to an end.

A notable social justice or social welfare aspect of the Enschede-Haven project was that a government employment agency subsidised the appointment of unemployed people as security guards, with training provided by police. In another example, a successful Dutch program to reduce disorder on public transport engaged unemployed persons as conductors and guardians (van Andel, 1997). The employees, known as VICs (an acronym in Dutch for ‘Security, Information and Surveillance’), were introduced to underground rail systems and tramways, and were responsible for significantly curbing fare evasion, vandalism, threatening behaviour and assaults. In addition,

The VIC project created approximately 1,200 new jobs, which had the additional social benefit of reducing unemployment [and unemployment benefit payments]. Many of these jobs were given to disadvantaged groups in the labour market, such as young people, women and individuals from ethnic minority groups with a low level of education (Willemse, 1994, pp. 36-37).
The development of legislated security standards in housing has been another significant dimension of Dutch crime prevention policy. In 1999, the government introduced minimum security standards for doors and windows in newly built homes. Allowing for a transition period, van Vollard & van Ours (2011) compared burglary rates between 1993/2000 and 2001/05, and found that the regulations were associated with a 26% reduction in burglary. The study also concluded there was no evidence of displacement to other locations or other types of crime.

The Europeans were also leaders in motor vehicle security. West Germany first mandated steering column locks in 1961. A comparison of motor vehicle theft rates in West Germany, the US and UK concluded that sustained reductions in Germany, vis-a-vis more fluctuating trends in the US and UK, resulted from the requirement that all cars were fitted with steering column locks (Webb, 1994).

One European study worth noting concerns a Spanish initiative to facilitate cooperation between police and private security. Gimenez-Salinas (2004) found that police and private security could productively share information through a communications coordination room. Areas of work facilitated through the communications room included licence checks on suspect vehicles, information about suspect persons, recovery of stolen vehicles, back-up assistance to security officers, and intelligence about organised crime.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has seen enormous growth in private security. One estimate, for 2009, put the number of police at 140,000 and the number of private security officers at 120,000 (Small Arms Survey, 2011, p. 106). It has also been estimated that financial turnover in the manned security sector increased 14 fold over twenty years to £1.8 billion in 2003 (Crawford, et al., 2005, p. 13). A survey of security firms in 2003 found that 30% were involved in public sector contracting involving more than 30% of their work (Crawford, et al., 2005, p. 15).

The UK was one of the last democratic countries to adopt specific security industry regulation. One of the impetuses behind the introduction of regulation in 2003 was the ongoing high rates of crime. The Security Industry Authority was charged with improving conduct and competency in the industry, and also facilitating public-private cooperation in crime prevention. In the words of the Foundation Chairman of the Authority:

One of the reasons we came into being was to contribute as effectively as possible to a fundamental Government objective – reducing crime and the fear of crime … But there is still a long way to go before the private security industry is viewed with trust by the general public, as a partner by other law enforcement authorities, and as making a real contribution to the fight against crime (Security Industry Authority, 2004, p. 2).

In the UK, the formal involvement of private security in public law enforcement has been given support through legislation – at least in principle. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 emphasised local problem solving and the need for partnerships against
crime; while the *Police Reform Act 2002* acknowledged a greater role for ‘third parties’ in crime prevention (Childs, 2002, p. 10). The Act introduced community support officers (CSOs) with authority to issue penalty notices and detain suspects for a period until police arrive. The Act:

also enables chief police officers to establish and maintain schemes that accredit suitably skilled and trained non-police employees to undertake specific support functions and issue penalty notices for disorder. Accredited community safety officers may be local authority, housing association or private security employees (Crawford, et al., 2005, p. 9).

The deployment of security officers in public places, whether private or public sector, has been encouraged by the ‘reassurance policing’ agenda and public expectations about visible authority and protection (Crawford, et al., 2005). A 2005 report, *Plural Policing: The Mixed Economy of Visible Patrols in England and Wales*, included case studies accounts of five major partnership policing programs that included private security officers in ‘visible patrols’ in public areas (Crawford, et al., 2005; see also Wakefield, 2003, chapter 6). There are also cases in the UK of private security guards playing a major role in order maintenance at demonstrations; and of private investigators playing a major role in criminal investigations, especially in relation to fraud (Button, 2008, pp. 106-108).

The UK has also seen considerable innovation and experimentation in crime prevention partnerships, and in security standards. For example, like the Netherlands home security project, Secured by Design in the UK has shown successes in reducing residential burglary (Teedon, et al., 2010). One of the features of public-private crime prevention partnerships in the UK is the involvement of multiple groups, including police, local government and local business associations (Prenzler, 2009). Police often play a key coordinating role in projects. Many successful projects also involve the contracting in of security hardware installations, security alarm monitoring and/or security advice. Financial support for security upgrades has also been a feature. Another feature is the targeting of premises subject to repeat offences. A final key feature, as in the Dutch industrial estates, is the idea of ‘clubbing’ or ‘the club good’ – where collective security can be provided to all members at a common standard and cost (Crawford, et al., 2005, p. 78). Police can act as ‘honest brokers’ in negotiating the formation of clubs (p. 80).

**Case studies**

In the Safer Merseyside Partnership, as one example, 105 businesses received free security audits and advice, and were offered subsidised security (Bowers, 2001). Some businesses improved lighting. Others installed ‘target hardening’ devices, such as window locks and roller shutters. Amongst participating businesses, attempted burglaries declined from 49% to 25% between survey periods. Successful burglaries were reduced from 31% (33 burglaries) to 13% (14 burglaries) – representing a 58% reduction in offences. No significant changes were recorded in offences against non-participating businesses.
The Leicester Small Business and Crime Initiative provides another example, this time focusing specifically on reducing repeat commercial burglaries (Taylor, 1999; Tilley & Hopkins, 1998). The initiative was managed by a committee that included members of the City Council, Police and Chamber of Commerce; and was funded by a charity trust. Security audits were carried out by a project officer following a police burglary report. A mix of security measures was usually recommended, including alarms and CCTV. Portable alarms could be shared with other premises once risk periods for repeat offences had expired. Silent alarms were selected with a view to capturing and incapacitating offenders after research found numerous offenders could complete a burglary following the activation of an audible alarm. The project resulted in very few arrests but offences in the target areas were reduced by 41% from the year before the project to the final year of evaluation.

A similar project targeting prolific burglars in Boggart Hill (near Leeds) was more successful in arresting repeat offenders in an initial ‘crackdown’ period, using profiling techniques that matched known offender methods with offence characteristics. According to the evaluation authors, in a traditional police operation, ‘the response to the burglary problem would have ended there’ (Farrell, Chenery & Pease, 1998, p. 7). However, the project included a ‘consolidation phase’ that saw the installation of security hardware on burgled homes. The approach generated a 60% reduction in burglaries from an average 44.9 per month pre-project to 18.5 in the consolidation phase. A ‘halo effect’ was evident in a 36% drop in burglaries in adjoining areas.

The UK has also seen the site of major CCTV initiatives. In 2011, the number of CCTV cameras in the country was estimated at 1.85 million (Reeve, 2011). CCTV systems have received very mixed reviews in terms of their crime prevention effects. Review of CCTV projects found that many were unable to demonstrate effectiveness (e.g., Farrington, et al., 2007). It appears that systems are ‘most effective when the degree of coverage by CCTV was high and when CCTV was combined with other interventions’. The latter included improved lighting and communication with police (Farrington, et al., 2007, p. 21). These principles were illustrated in the Newcastle upon Tyne City Centre Partnership Security Initiative, which was set up with a combination of local private sector money and a government grant (Brown, 1997). The system was managed by police, and linked control room operators to patrol officers and retailers. Cameras were located according to crime concentrations. The evaluation identified a 57% reduction in burglary, a 50% reduction in theft from motor vehicles, a 47% reduction in theft of motor vehicles, and a 34% reduction in criminal damage – for the 15 months following installation. In the same study, smaller reductions in burglary and other crimes were also associated with CCTV in King’s Lynn and Birmingham. The success of the Newcastle project was related to the more concentrated nature of the business district, allowing better camera coverage and better coordination of police responses.

In the UK, another area of cooperation between police and private security involves specialist training for major incidents. Established by the London Metropolitan Police in 2004, ‘Project Griffin’ involves specialist ‘Griffin-trained’ security officers available to assist police in the event of a terrorist attack or other major critical events, in areas such as perimeter access control (CoESS, 2010). Refresher training and intelligence
updates are designed to maintain interest and preparedness, and the model has been adopted widely in the UK and overseas (http://www.projectgriffin.org.uk/).

The Police outsourcing agenda post-2010

Outsourced security has been a topic of some controversy in the UK in recent years. The post-2007 world financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis triggered major cuts to public expenditure. In 2010, the government announced a 20% cut to police funding and required police demonstrate savings, including through outsourcing and strategies for ‘freeing up the police to fight crime more effectively and efficiently’ (Home Office, 2011, p. 5). It was projected that Forces will reduce their sworn strength by approximately 15,000 officers by 2015 (HMIC, 2012b, p. 4). Headlines widely declared that a program of ‘police privatisation’ was underway (e.g., Travis & Williams, 2012, p. 1).

Lincolnshire Police were one of the first forces to outsource work, with a £200 million ten year contract with G4S. In 2012, approximately 600 non-sworn staff from the Lincolnshire Police Authority were transferred to G4S, continuing to work in areas such as custody, enquiry positions and control room operations (BBC News, 2012; Rhodes, 2012). The Lincolnshire Chief Constable described the extension of private security services into more traditional areas of policing:

Transformation has already commenced with the introduction of new services such as a G4S prisoner escort services (‘Street to Suite’) that enables officers to remain on patrol or to secure and preserve evidence at a scene whilst persons arrested are transported to police custody by the partner’s personnel (Rhodes, 2012, p. 20).

The Chief Constable also claimed that he was expecting to save £12 million over ten years without any diminution in service to the public and without cutting the number of sworn officers.

Also in 2012, two of the UK’s largest forces, West Midlands and Surrey Police, announced a £1.5 billion contract for security firms to take on investigations and patrols. The contract was seen as a lead model for the future of policing in the UK, described by *The Guardian* in the following terms (Travis & Williams, 2012, p. 1):

The joint West Midlands/Surrey ‘transformation’ programme, which has strong backing from the Home Office, looks set to redraw the accepted boundaries between public and private and the definition of frontline and back-office policing.

The programme has the potential to become the main vehicle for outsourcing police services in England and Wales...

The breathtaking list of policing activities up for grabs includes investigating crimes, detaining suspects, developing cases, responding to and investigating incidents, supporting victims and witnesses, managing high-risk individuals, patrolling neighbourhoods, managing intelligence, managing engagement with the public, as well as more traditional back-office functions, such as managing
forensics, providing legal services, managing the vehicle fleet, finance, and human resources.

A West Midlands police authority spokesman said: ‘The areas of service listed in this notice are deliberately broad to allow the force to explore the skills, expertise and solutions a partnership could bring.’

There has been widespread criticism of these moves. Police unions hit out at alleged confusion over the powers of contract staff and lack of accountability to the public. The Home Office was accused of keeping secret its business case for privatisation, and there were concerns that the Independent Police Complaints Commission would not have jurisdiction over private contract staff (Travis & Williams, 2012).

To-date, it appears that the ‘privatisation’ of policing has not been as transformative as alleged. A 2012 report on Increasing Efficiency in the Police Service: The Role of Collaboration, by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary found that ‘collaboration’ across the 43 forces was largely between public sector agencies, as shown in the following summary (HMIC, 2012a, pp. 5-6):

Forces identified 543 collaboration projects as either planned (62%), or already up and running (38%). These ranged from small collaborations to large-scale programmes which will transform the way police services are delivered.

The projects can be divided into four models of collaboration:

- More than two-thirds (381) of projects are collaborations between forces – for example, Kent Police and Essex Police have joint directorates for serious crime and for information and communication technology (ICT);
- One-fifth (116) of projects are collaborations with the public sector – for instance, Hampshire Constabulary is working with the county council and fire and rescue service to collaborate on a range of non-frontline functions;
- Thirty-four are collaborations with the private sector – for instance, Lincolnshire Police is working jointly with the private sector for its back and middle office functions; and
- Twelve projects comprise collaborations with both the private and public sector – for example, Avon and Somerset Constabulary work jointly with a consortium of county and borough councils and private sector organisations to deliver a range of support services.

The exact number of partnerships with private security firms was not specified. The report went on to state that (HMIC, 2012a, p. 32):

Nearly one in 10 collaboration projects (46) involve the private sector, with 14 forces engaged in one form or another. Based on the data provided by forces, only one of these 14 does not also collaborate with the public sector.

Thirty-four projects only involve the private sector. They include collaboration in back office functions (such as ICT and finance), and in the middle office (such as custody, call handling, intelligence and fraud). A few force to private sector
projects are of a substantial size, with baseline budgets between £600k and £8.6m and significant outsourcing or shared services. Only three forces provided full savings data for their planned or established collaborations involving the private sector.

The HMIC also found that the austerity drive in policing had shown few negative effects on measurable police performance areas. Overall, crime continued to decline – by 3% from 2010 to 2011 – and public satisfaction and police response times showed modest increases (HMIC, 2012b).

**G4S and the London Olympics**

The issue of outsourcing policing tasks in the UK was coloured by controversy over security at the 2012 London Olympics. G4S won the £284 million security contract, but two weeks out from the start date it announced it was unable to recruit sufficient guards to fulfil the contract (Hinton, 2012). As a result, military officers were deployed, along with extra police. There were also allegations of inadequate training and rotation of some baggage screening staff, and excessive hours. The case showed that there are potential limits to the flexibility of security firms in meeting a temporary security need, especially for major events. However, it emerged that retired police officers could have been employed as security officers. In addition, in the final wash up, the two weeks of competition were considered to be well managed from a security standpoint, with no major adverse incidents and excellent cooperation between sectors (Hinton, 2012; House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2012).

**United States**

The United States has had a relatively long history of government support for public-private crime prevention partnerships. This is consistent with a cultural tendency towards small government and private enterprise in many areas. The frontier environment of nineteenth century America saw significant growth in various forms of private security, including in investigations, recovery of stolen goods, and bounty hunting; and the US was a leader in the adoption of corporate security (Johnston 1992). The most recent estimate for the size of the industry was for 2007. It estimated there were approximately 2 million private security personnel compared to 883,600 police (Small Arms Survey, 2011, p. 106).

In 1971, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, within the US Department of Justice, convened a meeting of private security representatives to discuss issues in the private security sector and the role of private security in crime prevention. The meeting led to the establishment, in 1972, of the Private Security Advisory Council, which operated until 1977. The council produced a number of reports designed to improve standards and the effectiveness of the industry. In 1977, the council produced a major report, *Law Enforcement and Private Security: Sources and Areas of Conflict and Strategies for Conflict Resolution*, aimed at improving cooperation in the fight against crime. The report argued that:

> The problems of crime are too great and the resources too limited for these groups to continue to operate on a mutually exclusive or negative basis. Law
enforcement and private security both have significant responsibilities in crime prevention and reduction, but their most effective role will be one that combines their respective talents and resources in a complimentary and coordinated attack on crime (Private Security Advisory Council, 1977, p. 3).

Strategies recommended to improve cooperation included significant improvements in security industry licensing (including minimum training and criminal history checks) and higher level professional certification, greater cooperation between security industry associations, regulating alarm responses, and communication on ‘hot sheets for stolen vehicles, wanted persons, suspects, (and) crime rings’ (p. A-4). The report also recommended the promotion of case studies of successful partnerships and a partnerships awards scheme, establishment of high level liaison positions, and training for each group on public-private roles and protocols for interaction.

In this period, and soon after, a number of programs were set up to advance cooperation in public and private policing. These included the Washington Law Enforcement Executive Forum, the Dallas Police/Private Security Joint Information Council, and various liaison committees attached to agencies such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriff’s Association and the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) (Connors, Cunningham & Ohlhausen, 1999). There was also a joint training program, called Operation Partnership, set up by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centre.

In 1987, in a report Public Policing – Privately Provided, the National Institute of Justice listed 61 examples of ‘private provision of police services’, most of which involved security at government facilities, with a few cases of parking enforcement and school crossing security (Chaiken & Chaiken, 1987, Appendix D). Unfortunately, no details were provided on these projects, including any evaluation outcomes.

In the late-1990s, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, in the Department of Justice, funded a project – Operation Cooperation – also aimed at documenting successful practices. The examples mainly involved liaison committees, information exchange, ‘familiarity and goodwill programs’, creation of directories, and joint training (Connors, et al., 1999). Several brief accounts were provided of cases of outsourcing of traditional police tasks:

To relieve its police department from the burden of investigating some 500 bad-check complaints each year, the city of Kentwood, Michigan, contracted with a private firm to do the work. The result is that investigations are no longer backlogged, merchants have an effective means for recovering their losses, and police have more time for their other duties (p. 11).

Instead of using regular police officers for security and crowd control at its civic center and other city-owned buildings, Phoenix contracts that service to Anderson Agency, Inc. . . . The company’s marketing director says lower costs are not the only benefit the city receives from its private security force. ‘Our men are trained to prevent things from happening, while police officers are trained to stop crimes in progress or solve them after they have happened’ (pp. 19-20).
In New York City, badge-wearing employees of a private company patrol streets in search of cars with outstanding parking tickets (p. 20).

**Aviation security**

The terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 provided a major impetus for public-private security partnerships. Terrorists breached security at three US international airports, enabling an orchestrated hijacking of four commercial airliner flights. Two of the planes were crashed into the World Trade Centre in New York City and one into the Pentagon in the capital. Passengers took security measures into their own hands on the fourth plane, and it crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. In all, the attacks resulted in the deaths of almost 3,000 people. The 9/11 Commission report detailed a series of major security failures, both in terms of national security intelligence and airport security procedures (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

The attacks led to an enormous investment in airport security in the US and internationally (Kilcullen, 2005). The need for basic labour-intensive front-line measures against terrorism at critical infrastructure locations was recognised as a major factor in favour of private security, along with the need for innovative and advanced screening technologies. The 9/11 Commission report noted that ‘85 percent of our nation’s critical infrastructure is controlled not by government but by the private sector’ (2004, p. 317), and recommended much greater consideration of the private sector in anti-terrorist planning.

There have been a number of responses to this aspect of the 9/11 Commission report. The Department of Homeland Security – created after 9/11 – includes a Private Sector Office, which is dedicated to involving the private sector in terrorism prevention, including by promoting public-private partnerships (http://www.dhs.gov/private-sector-office). In 2005, the United States Department of Justice issued a report, *Engaging the Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security: Law Enforcement-Private Security Relationships*. The report argued strongly that public law enforcement and private security could not effectively protect vital infrastructure when working separately. It articulated a number of benefits for both parties, including the following (National Institute of Justice, 2005, p. 6):

creative problem solving; increased training opportunities; information, data, and intelligence sharing; ‘force multiplier’ opportunities; access to the community through private sector communications technology; and reduced recovery time following disasters.

The major recommendations from the report were that (2005, p. 6):

Public and private agencies (1) prepare memorandums of understanding and formal coordination agreements describing mechanisms for exchanging information regarding vulnerabilities and risks; (2) use community policing initiatives, strategies, and tactics to identify suspicious activities related to terrorism; (3) establish a regional prevention information command center; and (4) coordinate the flow of information regarding infrastructure.
Police chiefs and sheriffs should consider formalizing relationships with their private security counterparts. Formalization shows both law enforcement and private security employees that the partnership is an organizational priority. Law enforcement-private security partnerships tend to revolve around networking, information sharing, crime prevention, resource sharing, training, legislation, operations, and research and guidelines. Each of these areas contains a homeland security and terrorism prevention element.

The report also emphasised the importance of promoting partnerships by appointing liaison officers, and appointing the right persons for the liaison role. Nine case studies from the across the US were included in the report to demonstrate forms of productive partnerships in preventing and responding to crime. These included SCAN – Security Communications Assistance Network – run by the Law Enforcement and Private Security Council of Northeast Florida, which manages, among other things, radio frequencies for direct communications between private security and police. Another noteworthy example is the Las Vegas Police Department’s Tourist Safety Unit, which targets fraudsters and pickpockets through agreements between police and hotel security to share information and communicate about suspects and arrests.

Despite reports like Engaging the Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security, there is limited information available on the nature of public-private arrangements in aviation security, especially the role of private security at airports. Nonetheless, despite ongoing controversies and a number of ‘close calls’, it is clear that post-9/11 initiatives in aviation security have been largely successful in stopping attacks on US aviation and flights to and from the US (Government Accountability Office, 2011; United States Department of State, 2012).

Business Improvement Districts

‘Business Improvement Districts’ or BIDs are an area of public-private cooperation where there has been considerable innovation in the US. BIDs involve focused efforts to improve commerce by enhancing the amenity and civility of an area. Funds from government and/or business groups are used to upgrade open areas, remove graffiti, repair vandalised property, improve lighting, and enlarge police and security patrols in order to attract legitimate users and deter criminals. Cook and MacDonald (2011, p. 448) observe that ‘the number of BIDs is growing rapidly in the United States, from about 400 in 1999 to something like 1,000 in 2010’.

Evaluations of BIDs have shown highly variable results, but a number of successes in reducing crime without displacement effects (Brooks, 2008; Hoyt, 2005; MacDonald, et al., 2009). One review asserted that:

Based on available statistics, most neighbourhoods with established BID security programs have experienced double-digit reductions in crime rates (sometimes up to 60 percent) in the years following their creation (Vindevogel, 2005, p. 237).
Police back up is considered essential to the success of security operations in BIDs (Vindevogel, 2005, p. 249). A recent evaluation also noted additional requirements for wider success:

BIDs that are active and have enough capital to hire private security, clean streets of trash and debris, and organize with city service agencies to address merchant or property-owner concerns about community needs are more effective agents of community-level change (MacDonald, et al., 2009, p. xv).

A recent economic assessment of the impact of BIDs found that they could provide significant public value, apart from reducing victimisation. By reducing crime they also reduced the costs of criminal justice processing of arrested offenders (Cook & MacDonald, 2011). BIDs also tend to make police more accountable by focusing business owners’ expectations of a police response, and by channelling calls for assistance through one link. At the same time, the evidence appears to support the idea that BIDs will ultimately reduce calls to police and demands on police time. The process, along with associated benefits, is described by Vindevogel (2005, p. 250):

Even if police officers in the field do have to respond to the solicitations of the BIDs and react to such problems as disorderly youths or street peddling, there is no doubt that BID security officers take appropriate measures more often. They not only take on a whole array of responsibilities that police officers have to assume in the absence of other easily identifiable ‘guardians’ (they give directions, help find lost property, assist lost children, etc.) but they also take charge of all these quality-of-life violations that police officers traditionally dislike handling because, as they argue, it diverts them from ‘real police work’. More importantly, thanks to their deterrent visibility and communication skills these security officers also anticipate problems and prevent tensions from escalating: they stop disputes before they degenerate into fights, create safety corridors between high schools and subway stations, etc. Finally, BIDs centralize requests: when local retailers or corporate security directors have safety-related concerns, they frequently solicit BID instead of calling 911 or their precinct.

This can all be done without the security officers taking on any powers beyond those of ordinary citizens (Vindevogel, 2005).

Los Angeles has seen the creation of a large number of BIDs. These are generally ‘chartered and regulated’ by local government, and ‘managed and operated by private non-profit organisations’ (Cook & MacDonald, 2011, p. 448). Levies are often compulsorily obtained from all property owners and/or business within a BID. However, extensive consultation occurs before BIDs are established, and significant support must be expressed through signed petitions. In the Los Angeles case, the city government provides financial assistance for planning. BIDs in the city tend to be focused on sanitation and crime: “‘Clean’ and “safe” are common terms used by BIDs in LA’ (p. 448). Cook and MacDonald reported that, ‘Eleven of the 30 BIDs operating in LA in 2005 spent more than $200,000 a year on private security operations, with nearly equal amounts being spent on sanitation services’ (2011, p. 448). The researchers also provided some detail on the Figueroa Corridor BID in Downtown Los Angeles and the Hollywood Entertainment BID:
The Figueroa Corridor BID was formed in 1998 by business property owners in direct response to economic decline and a concern with area crime. From the outset its efforts were focused on improving community safety by employing uniformed private security workers (Safety Ambassadors) who patrol the district on foot, bike and evening vehicle patrols and assist in keeping order. It spends close to $500,000 a year, or almost half of its operational budget, on these officers. This BID also employs cleaning crews that remove trash, debris and graffiti (p. 449).

The Hollywood Entertainment BID employs armed private security officers who are retired law enforcement officers. These officers patrol the Hollywood district seven days a week during evening hours, initiate citizen arrests when they observe violations of the law and work closely with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). It spends just over $1 million a year on private security, or approximately 47% of its operating budget. It has also installed eight CCTV cameras at intersections in the district for use by the LAPD (p. 449).

Vindevogel (2005) argues that the growth in BIDs in the late-1980s and early-1990s was responsible for making private security guards ‘part of the north-American urban street landscape’ – in a way similar to their familiar presence on private property established in previous decades (p. 235).

**Public space CCTV systems**

Public space CCTV systems have been a popular anti-crime measure in many locations in the US, often as part of a BID development. As in other countries, evaluations have shown very mixed results, with some successful case studies and others showing static or increased crime rates (La Vigne, et al., 2011). A recent evaluation of camera programs in Baltimore, Chicago and Washington DC re-affirmed previous findings about factors that make for success in public space CCTV. The evaluation (La Vigne, et al., 2011) found that, in downtown Baltimore, total crime in the camera areas was reduced by 24.8% four months after installation (p. vii). In Chicago, in the Humboldt Park area, all crime was reduced by 19.1% following installation of cameras. However, there were no notable changes in crime rates in the West Garfield Park area; nor were there reductions in crime rates in Washington (pp. x-xi). The researchers identified concentration of cameras and active monitoring as key factors in success.

Efforts to include financial cost-benefit analyses also produced mixed results. For Baltimore, it was estimated that, for every $1 spent, $1.06 was saved in costs associated with crime. The results were more positive in Chicago (La Vigne, et al., 2011, p xi):

The results of the Chicago cost-benefit analysis suggest that the city’s investment in cameras is well justified, despite the fact that significant reductions were only detected in one camera area. In fact, because crime reductions in the Humboldt Park area included costly violent crimes, the societal benefits of preventing those crimes were significant: for every dollar spent on cameras in both Humboldt Park
and West Garfield Park areas, the crimes prevented in Humboldt Park alone yielded a societal savings of over four dollars. Even when excluding victimization costs from the analysis, the benefits of camera use in Chicago still outweighed the costs, at a ratio of $2.81 in benefits for every dollar spent on cameras. These results provide compelling support for the implementation and use of public surveillance cameras by the Chicago Police Department.

The La Vigne et al. (2011) evaluation of CCTV programs was vague about the role of private security companies. It appeared that private firms were responsible for the supply and installation of equipment, but their role in monitoring and patrol were unclear. The evaluation, nonetheless, provided some important lessons related to process aspects of CCTV programs. It identified the need to cover for the costs of unexpected maintenance and upgrade costs. It also emphasised the fact that community consultation was essential to ensure community support.

South Africa

South Africa is renowned for its large private security sector. It was estimated there were 387,273 private security personnel and 150,513 police in 2010 (Small Arms Survey, 2011, p. 106). In South Africa the issue of outsourcing policing tasks appears to have been given the most serious and systematic consideration at the national level, including within the police department. Minnaar & Ngoveni (2004, p. 45) report that 'during the 1990s a vigorous debate erupted in South Africa regarding the pros and cons of “privatizing” certain functions of the SAPS' (South Africa Police Service). The case for granting selected police functions and powers to the private sector was supported by the inability of police to address the enormous crime problem in post-Apartheid South Africa, combined with the rapid and prominent development of the industry.

One argument put forward was that the previously biased police services should shift their focus away from wealthy white suburbs, who could afford security, to the impoverished black townships suffering from a heavy burden of crime. It was argued that private security guards could replace many lower level policing duties at a lower cost – such as prisoner transport, guarding government facilities, and patron protection at sporting events – while releasing police for more challenging crime control tasks. Private security would serve as a ‘force multiplier’ in preventing and solving crime (2004, p. 57). Security firms could also provide a first response to alarm activations, provide technical advice on security equipment, and report issues directly to police. Police could assist security firms with training and provide some access to crime information.

However, various obstacles and difficulties associated with outsourcing were also envisaged. These included concerns about legal liabilities of private providers, potential abuses of authority by security officers, lack of stability in the industry (with numerous firms closing down and ‘fly-by-night’ operations), inadequate training and professional standards in the industry, inadequate control of firearms, favouritism or corruption in tendering, and misuse of information. The latter included concerns about ‘the selling of information on alarms; putting the police in a bad light; using information
against rival firms; blackmailing clients; selling information to criminals/gangs etcetera’ (p. 60).

In the face of eventual resistance from police, the push for explicit forms of privatisation and outsourcing was largely unsuccessful. The outcome of the debate was the adoption of a more moderate ‘partnership policing’ policy (Minnaar & Ngoveni, 2004, p. 49). A key concern was that public confidence in the justice system required maintenance of a substantial and direct role for police in crime prevention and law enforcement, including public declarations to that effect:

SAPS made a principled decision … that no strictly policing functions (as determined by SAPS themselves) would either be outsourced or privatised. In other words, only those non-policing functions, which could be safely outsourced without affecting the policing activities of the SAPS, would be outsourced (2004, p. 49).

This inevitably led to debate within SAPS about what were core policing functions – which could not be outsourced – and what were non-core functions – which could be ‘safely’ outsourced (p. 50). Minnaar & Ngoveni (2004) report that these core and non-core functions were never specified. The issue devolved into ad hoc consideration of options on a case-by-case basis, with a priority given to cost-effectiveness. However, most of the functions considered for privatization were rejected, in large part because of the apparent destabilizing effect on SAPS and reduced morale amongst officers.

The consequence of this was that most outsourcing of work in SAPS occurred in service areas, such as cleaning and catering. The only clear outsourcing of more traditional police work occurred in guarding services for police and other government buildings. At the same time, there was a move by SAPS to facilitate the uptake of security services through better regulation. Amendments to legislation in the late-1990s and early-2000s related to the registration of companies and personnel in areas such as fingerprinting and criminal history checks, training standards, wider coverage of industry sectors, and powers for the regulator to investigate and prosecute misconduct and inspect security firms.

At the level of explicit policy, the compromise concept of ‘partnerships’ was embodied in the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (South African Government, 1996). The document made some general declarations about the desirability of public-private crime prevention partnerships. However, it did not include any guidelines on how partnerships should be managed, and there were no legislative amendments to support the policy (Minnaar & Ngoveni, 2004, p. 54). It also appears that SAPS senior management did not take any action to promote partnerships. Approaches came primarily from security firms:

While successful partnerships were launched in a number of areas these were on an ad hoc basis and dealt largely with co-ordinating response to alarms, sharing information coming to security company control rooms, operating CCTVs in CBDs … and in some cases providing transport for the shared visible police patrolling of residential neighbourhoods (Minnaar & Ngoveni, 2004, p. 55).
Despite this very limited implementation of the partnerships policy, South Africa presents as a major case of 'outsourcing by default' (Minnaar & Ngoveni, 2004, p. 47). Security guards are estimated to outnumber police by three to one (p. 55) as the size of the crime problem continues to force those who can afford to pay to adopt their own protection. In their account of the outsourcing issue in South Africa, Schönteich, et. al. argued that SAPS could have gone much further (2004, p. 4):

A multitude of non-core policing functions are still being performed by an overworked police service. These include transporting and guarding prisoners, court orderly duties, running state mortuaries, managing the Firearms Register and Criminal Records Centre, and providing VIP protection services to parliamentarians and politicians. The provision of these non-core policing functions could, with the proper controls and police oversight, be outsourced to the private sector.
Section 3

Partnership and Outsourced Policing: Australian Policy and Practice

General Trends

In Australia, the most recent comprehensive study of the industry estimated that, in the years 2006-08, there were on average 45,000 police and 112,000 licensed security providers – although many security providers were part-time (Prenzler, Earle & Sarre, 2009). Private security personnel appear to have been growing at a faster rate than both the police and the population. Industry growth has at times been viewed with suspicion and even alarm by police. The following view was put forward by a police union official in 1994:

There has been an abrogation of responsibility by governments of all political colours right across Australia away from their responsibility to provide the basics for the community to live in a safe and secure environment. The private sector has taken up the lag and the public is paying twice for what governments should provide (Lateline, 1994).

However, a 1996 report, A Co-operative Approach to Crime Prevention: Police and Security Working Together, observed that,

[There has been] a concern by some police that their role and functions were being eroded by the growth of private security. However, this view has matured over a period of time and police are now recognising that there are opportunities for the police and private security industry to work together (Golsby & O’Brien, 1996, p. 15).

The report cited an address by Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Peter McAulay, to the 1994 Conference of Commissioners of Police of Australasia and the South West Pacific, as a key turning point. McAulay declared that the mutual exclusivity of private and public policing needed to come to an end. Since both services have common goals, he argued, a formal relationship was needed (in Golsby & O’Brien, 1996). The address led to the 1995 conference adopting a recommendation that police develop partnerships with private security, including through ‘high levels of liaison’ and ‘protocols or guidelines for cooperation’ (Minutes, 1995, item 44, p. 2).

This view has now been adopted as standard by senior police. In 2004, for example, New South Wales Police Commissioner Ken Moroney recommended closer cooperation between police and security providers, emphasising that private security is ‘an important part of providing [a] law enforcement approach, not only in the terrorism context but in the prevention of crime generally’ (in Petersen, 2004, p. 11). These views were echoed recently in a speech by New South Wales Police Assistant Commissioner Nick Kaldas (2012):
It is obvious that the need for police and private security to work together is growing, and not only for special events and public occasions, but also in protecting public spaces and working on targeted areas of crime…

It is entirely possible to use public/private police cooperation to deliver safe and secure environments.

Indeed, you could argue such cooperation is imperative.

Despite such pronouncements, official crime prevention policies in Australia tend to remain behind policy developments in other countries. For example, the National Crime Prevention Framework encourages cooperation and partnerships ‘between government organizations, civil society (and the) business sector’ but does not specifically mention private security (Australian and New Zealand Crime Prevention Senior Officers’ Group, 2012, p. 4). The same neglect is evident in the key policy paper Directions in Australia New Zealand Policing 2012-2015 by the Standing Council on Police and Emergency Management (2012).

Nonetheless, there does appear to be a clear trend in Australia towards greater cooperation between police and private security. The post-9/11 international security agenda was one factor. For example, expenditure on security at Sydney airport was estimated to have increased from $16.6 million in 2001 to $48 million in 2007, including police and private security (Yates, 2007, p. 3). Undoubtedly, the lower cost of security personnel is also major factor, as in other locations. A study of data from the 2006 Australian census found that salaries and wages of security providers were approximately half those of police (Prenzler, et al., 2009).

Routine and successful partnerships are now a feature of a variety of activities involving mass private property in Australia, including sporting events and airport security – where cooperative relationships are often managed through memoranda of understanding (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011). The 2000 Sydney Olympics provided a high point in the effective deployment of mixed-source security services. Overall command was held by the NSW Police Service, with 4,000 security officers working a combined total of 27,000 shifts with police and security volunteers over a two-week period. Coverage went beyond Olympic venues to 600 non-competition sites around the country (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011, p. 84). Success in security at the 2005 Melbourne Commonwealth Games was another case in point.

The Golsby and O'Brien study on police-security co-operation in the mid-1990s included a survey which found that co-operation was rated as ‘good’ or ‘very good’ by 52% of police and 67% of private security respondents. However, only few police were positive about divesting functions to the private sector, and then only in areas such as operating speed cameras. About half the police saw ‘reporting problems whilst on patrol’ as a key area for co-operation; although, surprisingly perhaps, neither group appeared interested in a shared communications system.

There is certainly no real evidence of a strong push for crime prevention partnerships by state governments, who control the bulk of policing in Australia. Partnership arrangements have largely occurred on an ad hoc basis (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011).
Shared communications systems, or large-scale outsourcing, appear to be off the agenda on the whole. As in many locations, the ‘privatisation of policing’ has occurred largely through market forces and industry growth. There is evidence, nonetheless, of facilitation of private security operations by governments, and also some cases of contracting out.

In terms of facilitating private security, Australian law gives extensive powers to the agents of property owners to defend property and persons, and also to deny entry and evict people (Sarre & Prenzler, 2009). All state and territory governments have enacted industry-specific legislation that requires licensing of firms and operatives and underwrites competency and integrity. Weapons legislation includes provisions for private security providers to deploy weapons where there is a justification, under stringent conditions (Sarre & Prenzler, 2009). ‘Special constable’ provisions also allow for some police-like powers to be granted to private security for special events or special purposes. In the mid-2000s, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) facilitated the introduction of a national qualifications framework for security operatives. This was in the context of moves to strengthen Australia’s anti-terrorism efforts, and in recognition of ‘the important contribution the private security industry makes in supporting Australia’s counter-terrorism arrangements’ (COAG, 2005, p. 5). There are various other examples of government departments supporting private security. One promising recent development is that in 2012 the South Australian Police planned to introduce a component on private security into its recruit training program (Byrnes, 2012).

Governments, and corporate government entities, have also outsourced some traditional policing activities, most notably in the areas of open mall CCTV systems, traffic control at roadworks, and crowd control at sporting stadiums and major events (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011). Security at open mall CCTV systems and sporting events would appear to be the areas where there have been some of the most developed forms of partnership. Mall security is usually initiated by local governments, which operate a contract for CCTV installation. Private security can also be contracted in for camera monitoring and patrol and response. Police then provide the third arm of a tri-partite arrangement, including selected sharing of intelligence, some joint patrolling, and back up to security guards. One study of local government sponsored CCTV systems in Australia found that the number of installations had increased from 12 in 1996 to 33 in 2002. Of the 33, 13 (or 40%) were monitored by private security personnel (Wilson & Sutton, 2003, p. 92).

There are a number of other types of public-private crime preventions partnerships in Australia that involve private security companies. Unfortunately, these partnerships have rarely been properly evaluated in terms of both process and impact, especially in relation to impacts on crime rates. For example, systematic evaluations of local government CCTV systems in Australia have been very mixed, with little evidence of a positive crime reduction effect (e.g., Fairfield City Council, 2002; Wilson & Wells, 2007). (One potential exception to this might be the Bunbury CCTV system (Amlec House (2012)).) CCTV programs should show results, given they often involve quite sophisticated, high quality, camera systems; with extensive coverage of crime hot spots, and with
rapid response capability from security officers and police on the ground. In various cases it is possible, or probable, that camera programs have contributed to crime reduction, but the absence of controlled experimental conditions, and lack of specific data from locations covered by cameras, limits the ability to properly evaluate programs.

Program evaluations generally make more positive findings for criteria such as greater feelings of safety, more arrests, enhanced forensic values, and faster emergency response times (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011). One of the more developed programs – Ipswich ‘Safe City’ – includes an environmental design advisory service for businesses; and provides welfare referrals, including for young people, drug affected persons and missing persons (Prenzler & Sarre, 2012).

There is very little material on street patrols by contract guards in Australia. There have been accounts of residential groups hiring private security patrols, including claims of crime reductions, but without details (e.g., Haxton, 1998; Johnston, 1992, p. 103). In 2011, a plan by nightclub owners and the local council to introduce private security patrols at Sydney’s Kings Cross entertainment precinct was granted financial support by the state government. However, the opportunity for evaluation of a demonstration project in this important field was lost when a change of government led to cancellation of funding (Fife-Yeomans, 2011; Howden, 2011).

Overall, there is evidence that Australian governments have supported the private security industry. At the same time, there are arguments that governments could go further in supporting a larger role for the industry in law enforcement and crime prevention, including through law reform. Examples include specifying legal protections for licensed security providers, allowing access to information in certain circumstances, and the capacity to apply for warrants (Hardy & Prenzler, 2002; Sarre, 2008; Sarre & Prenzler, 2009, pp 224-225).

**Case Studies**

The following subsections examine a variety of forms of public-private crime prevention partnerships in Australia in more detail, including cases with some outsourcing of security and policing tasks. The accounts focus on issues of evaluation because of the particular public interest criterion of crime reduction.

**Perth’s Eyes on the Street Program**

The ‘Eyes on the Street’ program in Perth is a partnership between the Western Australia Police, local government, businesses and the security industry, focused on businesses and staff reporting suspicious persons and events to police (Crime Research Centre, 2008). Security personnel are considered key players, and can report to an Eyes on the Street Team or directly to police (Crime Research Centre, 2008). A formal evaluation of the program found strong support from participants, and that between 2004 and 2007 there were over 200 arrests attributable to Eyes on the Street intelligence. However, there was no evidence from police crime data of a specific crime reduction effect from the program (Crime Research Centre, 2008).
The Beenleigh Break and Enter Reduction Project

The ‘Beenleigh Break and Enter Reduction Project’ sought to apply a number of lessons from the successful UK projects reported above (National Crime Prevention, 2001). The project was focused on protecting repeat victims through free security advice, property marking, the loan of intruder alarms, and enhanced police patrols. Some basic evaluation protocols were also included in the form of pre- and in-project data, and two comparison areas. The evaluation identified a 15.6% decrease in repeat victimisations (from 45 victims to 38), but overall incidents of burglary increased in the experimental site. One partial explanation for the disappointing result was the activity of a ‘prolific offender’ during the intervention period (2001, p. 18). However, a number of other design and implementation problems were apparent. For example, the project was short – confined to only one year – with no follow up evaluation. The evaluation also made no mention of private security, although there must have been some involvement from at least one alarm company. It appears though that the uptake of alarms was minimal – between two and five installations – and these did not involve security firm monitoring. There was also no evidence of the installation of target hardening devices or the availability of a financial subsidy – a common feature in the UK projects.

Airport Security

Partnership arrangements at Australian airports and seaports have gone through considerable evolution, especially in the post-9/11 counter-terrorism environment. The most prominent critique was made by the ‘Wheeler Review’ in 2005. Sir John Wheeler (2005) identified serious inadequacies in security that made regional and capital city airports highly vulnerable to theft, terrorism, trafficking in illicit goods and infiltration by organised crime. Wheeler described a complex set of problems, including inadequate screening and supervision of personnel in security and baggage handling; lack of entry and exit controls at key points, especially at cargo and ‘airside’ areas; insufficient cargo screening, especially for explosives; limited threat assessments; police agency rivalries, lack of coordination, and lack of information sharing (including between public and private sectors).

The clear message from the Wheeler Review was that the federal government needed to show greater leadership in coordinating airport security and setting standards for operatives, including private sector security. Post-Wheeler reforms have included the following: Australian Federal Police control on-site at major airports, fingerprinting and other biometric screening for airport staff, training upgrades, enhanced sharing of information between agencies, additional screening of passengers and baggage, increased airside perimeter patrols, wider CCTV coverage, improved technologies for detecting explosives, and the creation of investigation teams at major airports to focus on organised crime (Dodson & Wilkinson, 2005). In 2008, accusations surfaced that the full complement of airport police had not been reached and many of the security upgrades had only been partially implemented (O’Brien & Wilson, 2008). Similar
problems of inadequate checking of goods and vetting of staff at seaports has been identified (Prenzler, et al., 2010). Clearly, aviation security has been working in Australia in terms of the absence of adverse incidents (United States Department of State, 2012, p. 37). Nonetheless, this appears to be an area where utilisation and management of partnerships needs refinement in order to fulfil their potential and to guard against evolving threats (Prenzler, et al., 2010).

The Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project

The Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project was a high profile partnership aimed at stopping violence in the main nightclub precinct of the Gold Coast (Homel, et al., 1997). The impetus came from an escalating disorder problem that resulted in declines in local businesses and threatened the reputation of a major international tourist destination. The project began in 1993, and was managed by a Steering Committee, which included representatives from the local council; state health, police and liquor licensing agencies; tourism and business associations; and a university. Through a project officer, the committee managed a comprehensive diagnostic exercise which informed a complex set of interventions, many of which were focused around the concept of ‘responsible serving practices’, including encouraging patrons away from binge drinking through a focus on entertainment.

Poor security practices were recognised as a major part of the problem in Surfers Paradise; including a lack of coordination between police and security, and assaults by security officers. Venue managers and security firms agreed to substantially improved training for security staff, and the curriculum was later incorporated into the Queensland Security Providers Act 1993. Policing and security issues were primarily addressed through a ‘Security and Policing Task Group’. The main processes and outcomes of the group were described as follows (Homel, et al., 1997, pp. 52-53):

The Project Officer chaired meetings of the task group that helped to resolve the conflicts between police and security operatives. This resulted in agreement with a proposal put forward by local business people that the streets of Surfers Paradise be jointly patrolled by police and police-approved security firms... Protracted, and at times heated, meetings led to the adoption in September 1993 of full crowd control and security training for all bouncers. This was quickly followed by security management training for licensees and some police. The training, provided by a professional security organisation, included: ethics and good practice; management skills; staff recruitment; conflict resolution; venue security; civil and criminal law related to the operation of public venues; licensing law; the (proposed) Security Providers Bill; major incidents and emergencies; and incident reporting.

It was not possible to disentangle the various interventions and impacts associated with the project. Generally, however, the whole project was seen as successful. In summary, over two years, ‘verbal abuse declined by 82%; arguments by 68%; and physical assaults by 52%’ (Homel, et al., 1997, p. 36). It is unclear what happened on the ground in relation to the joint street patrols. Venue observations showed improvements in ID checks at entry points to nightclubs, more targeted patrols by security staff within nightclubs, and a better approach by security towards patrons. A
follow up evaluation showed that the project was not maintained at the initial standard, with subsequent increases in offences (Homel, et al., 1997).

**Centrelink’s Optical Surveillance Panel**

One clear cut example of the productive outsourcing of a traditional police functions is Centrelink’s covert surveillance program. This appears to have been particularly successful in detecting and stopping welfare fraud and supporting financial recoveries. The program was adopted as an ‘Enhanced Investigation Initiative’ by Centrelink in 1999 (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011, p. 97). Cases of suspected benefit fraud amenable to surveillance are outsourced to a panel of private investigation firms. In the first year of operation, 1,063 cases were finalised with 70% leading to $3.9 million in payments targeted for recovery. In 2008-09, 1,023 surveillance operations were completed; with 589 or 57.5% considered ‘actionable’, leading to annualised gross reductions in payments of $5.5 million and debt of $21.2 million. Total savings were estimated at $26.7 million or $26,126 per investigation. In 2010 Centrelink had 11 surveillance providers on its panel. Surveillance is conducted in accordance with the Privacy Commissioner’s *Covert Surveillance in Commonwealth Administration: Guidelines*, which include a requirement for qualified operatives.

As part of an evaluation of the program (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011), Centrelink reported the surveillance contract costs at $1,003,998 for 2009/10. ‘Total annualised savings’ were estimated at $28,007,961. These figures suggested a net return of approximately $27.0 million, or $27.89 saved for every dollar spent, not including administration and debt recovery. However, actual recoveries were not reported, only ‘debt raised’, which was listed at $22.8 million. In relation to the benefits of outsourcing, Centrelink reported that an in-house unit would not be cost-effective. The irregular nature and location of operations meant that surveillance was more effectively contracted out to specialist firms with availability in targeted locations.

**Strike Force Piccadilly 1 & 2: New South Wales Police**

Strike Force Piccadilly 1 and Strike Force Piccadilly 2 are two particularly outstanding examples of successful public-private crime prevention partnerships in Australia. Strike Force Piccadilly 1 was established in 2005 by the New South Wales Police to counter a large upsurge in ATM ram raids in Sydney. A Problem Oriented Policing (POP) approach was adopted in partnership with key private sector stakeholders, including security managers from the Australian Bankers’ Association, the Shopping Centre Council of Australia, cash-in-transit firms, and the ATM Industry Association. Close consultation and intelligence sharing led to two main areas of intervention: enhanced capability in police rapid response with a 1800 hotline to alarm monitoring companies; and the application of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) methods, including relocation of ATMs and the installation of specialist bollards and anti-ramming devices.

An evaluation (Prenzler, 2009a) found that the initial increase in ram raids was halted, and the number was reduced from 69, in the 12 months before the nine month
intervention implementation period, to 19 in the final 12 months of the post-intervention period. This represented a 72% reduction in incidents. For the same periods, successful raids (where cash was obtained) were reduced from 30 down to one – representing a 97% reduction. Although, Strike Force Piccadilly was a ‘natural experiment’, developed in a crisis without a control group, there was no evidence of displacement to related crimes such as armed robbery, commercial burglary and motor vehicle theft. A follow up evaluation found the reductions in ram raids were sustained over a further two years of data (Prenzler, 2011). Raids were reduced by 94% (from the pre-intervention period) to four in the third year in the post-intervention period. Successful raids were reduced by 100% to zero in the second post-intervention year, and by 96.6% to one in the third year.

The follow-up evaluation of Strike Force Piccadilly also identified a switch in offender tactics to explosive gas attacks, which involve pumping accelerant gases into an ATM and then setting the gases alight, resulting in an explosion intended to provide access to the cash canister. The attacks peaked from 2008 to 2009, including 19 attacks in November 2008. Strike Force Piccadilly 2 was then successful in halting this new crime threat. The strategies adopted by Piccadilly 1 were maintained, including participant meetings, along with the introduction of gas detection devices by ATM operators and the rapid enlargement of police personnel. The detection equipment normally triggered (1) a back-to-base alarm that alerted police on the priority response system, (2) an audible alarm and release of smoke designed to act as deterrents, and (3) the release of a gas that mixed with the explosive gas making it inoperable. Strike Force staff were increased from six to 50 during the peak of operations, including detectives, intelligence analysts and forensic specialists.

The evaluation of Strike Force Piccadilly 2 covered 14 months of data. It showed a 91% reduction in all gas attacks from 54 in the first 12 months to five in the final 12 months. For the same periods, successful attacks were reduced by 100% from 22 to zero. (There were also some minor instances of ATM attacks by burglaries and with cutting equipment). Again, there was no evidence of displacement to related crimes, which were stable or showed modest declines. The effect of security strategies prominent in Strike Force Piccadilly 1 appeared less important than police investigations and the incapacitation of a small group of specialist offenders, but these investigations were facilitated by CCTV footage from ATM operators and assistance from partners in the preservation of crime scenes that provided forensic data.

The National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council

Another highly successful Australian partnership against crime is the National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council, begun in 1991. The Council has been described as ‘arguably Australia’s most enduring and successful business and government partnership in crime prevention’ (Australian Crime Prevention Council, 2012, p. 1). The Council was an initiative of the federal and state governments and the insurance industry, and its membership includes police, and motoring and transport bodies. Its mission is to ‘facilitate the implementation of a diverse range of infrastructure and social responses to reduce the level of motor vehicle theft’ (2012, p. 1). Social measures include public education campaigns and an acclaimed ‘U-turn program’ focused on diverting young offenders into employment. Infrastructure measures have
been complex, including improved tracking of vehicles and parts. A ‘Secure by Design’ initiative has also been a feature, including a strong focus on immobiliser technology.

The Council’s purported success, including its ability to sustain partnerships, has been attributed in part to its rigorous evaluation program, including a three year cycle of independent evaluations (Australian Crime Prevention Council, 2012). The Council was established two years before the increase in motor vehicle thefts peaked in Australia. Incidents of motor vehicle thefts reported to police decreased by 85,158 – or 61% – from the peak of 139,894 in 2001 to 54,736 in 2010 (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012, p. 4). The most recent evaluation of the Council’s work covered the five year period 2005/06 to 2010/11, which involved a reduction in thefts of approximately 22%. The evaluation sought to separate the Council’s influence from other possible influences on motor vehicle theft rates. The result of this complex analysis was that, over the five years, ‘24 per cent of the total reduction in short term theft ... was attributed to the NMVTRC’, and ‘80 per cent of the trend changes in profit motivated theft were attributable to the work of the NMVTRC’ (Australian Crime Prevention Council, 2012, p. 3). Furthermore, in financial terms,

Under the assumptions used, the total estimated benefits of the NMVTRC’s contribution to vehicle theft reduction over the five year period was $444 million compared to costs borne by all parties of $243 million; delivering a net value of $201 million to the Australian community (Australian Crime Prevention Council, 2012, p. 4).
Section 4

The Way Forward: Finding Synergies in Public Policing and Private Security

This final section of the report reviews the evidence presented above concerning the pros and cons of various forms of privatised policing, and then presents a set of guidelines for governments to more fully engage with private security in order to improve guardianship and maximise the crime prevention potential of both sectors.

Assessment of the Evidence

‘Synergy’ has been defined as ‘Benefits resulting from combining two different groups, people, objects or processes’ (en.wiktionary.org/wiki/synergy). The term is also often used to describe a combined effect which is greater than the separate effect of each element. However, synergy is also ‘frequently dismissed as business jargon’ (en.wiktionary.org/wiki/synergy). The evidence canvassed in this report suggests strongly that police and government can work successfully with private security in a way that goes well beyond mere corporate jargon in producing real synergies in crime reduction. In the long run, that means fewer burglaries, fewer thefts, fewer robberies and assaults, less threatening and intimidating behaviour; possibly even less drug use and fewer sexual assaults and homicides. It also should mean much greater feelings of safety and freedom as people go about their work and leisure not fearful of crime and disorder.

Sections 1 to 3 of this report examined a variety of sources of evidence about the separate and combined contributions of police and private security to reduce crime. The best interpretation of the downward trend in crime rates globally is that private security has made a major contribution. Improved police practices have also been shown to reduce crime; but more in relation to specific crimes and, then, often with major contributions from private security. There are a variety of case studies, from Australia and internationally, of successful public-private partnerships. These often involve the following key groups: (1) police, (2) a government department or sector other than police, e.g., local government, (3) a business association, and (4) private security.

Partnerships can be simple arrangements. For example, a partnership can involve police or another government agency contracting in a private sector firm with a view to the public provision of a cheaper and/or specialist service. Partnerships can also be more complex and wide ranging. Recently, in the UK, with a focus on advancing crime reduction and contributing to reduced public sector expenditures, some police forces have adopted the term ‘Business partnering’. A definition adopted by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary is as follows:

**Business partnering** goes beyond traditional outsourcing; it draws on the skills, expertise, technology, and innovation of the private sector to support end-to-end transformation of service delivery within the organisation and to improve services to the public (HMIC, 2012a, p. 60).
Partnering in that sense can include advice from security experts, adoption of security technology, and projects of the type outlined in sections 2 and 3 of this report. Terms like ‘business partnering’, ‘partnership policing’ and ‘public-private crime prevention partnerships’ also help avoid the stigma at times associated with the terms ‘privatisation’ and ‘outsourcing’.

‘Privatisation’ and ‘outsourcing’ are often read as implying a reduction or replacement of existing government services, including reductions in public ownership of basic infrastructure and reductions in government employment conditions and job security. In fact, the history of ‘privatisation’ in policing shows that these do not necessarily go together (Chaiken & Chaiken, 1987). A growing market for policing-type services can grow alongside growing or stable police numbers. In addition, outsourcing by governments can create services that did not exist before, including services that provide a mix of private and public provision, or services that are extended through private provision. Examples include open space CCTV systems, stadium security, and covert surveillance of suspects.

From that perspective, the facilitation of private security, including through public-private cooperative arrangements, can potentially significantly enhance government obligations to protect citizens. This is particularly the case in times of economic contraction, when governments seek to balance budgets and restore confidence while also meeting basic human needs in areas such as security. But it also applies outside economic downturns – given that it is now acknowledged that public police services can never provide adequate protection because of the breadth and complexity of opportunities for crime. Private security can augment, rather than displace or replace, public policing (Chaiken & Chaiken, 1987). At the same time, when governments decide they must cut police budgets, then private security is one way to fill a temporary or longer-turn gap – provided certain public interest criteria are addressed and accountability requirements are satisfied.

Forms of partnership or outsourced policing are not, however, unproblematic. Expensive and elaborate partnerships have at times failed to show a crime reduction effect. In other cases, the precise factors affecting reductions in crime are difficult to identify. It is also often the case that financial cost-benefit data are entirely missing from evaluations. There are also various risks, especially to civil liberties, through, for example, intrusive surveillance or harassment and excessive force by security officers. Nonetheless, critiques of public-private crime prevention partnerships in Australia and elsewhere have not involved calls for their disestablishment, but rather for improvements in management. Recommendations include better coordination of partners; improved screening and supervision of staff; and better evaluation protocols to more accurately identify the impacts on crime and fear of crime, and areas that require modifications. Many of the limitations of partnerships can be related to deficiencies in implementation, including inadequate consultation with stakeholders and the selection of inappropriate or underdeveloped interventions. Examples include the failure to site CCTV cameras in sufficient concentration in crime hot spots, and inadequate monitoring and response capability.

Many of the problems of project implementation have been related to the need for a much stronger security management culture in both the private and public sectors.
(Button & George, 2006; Wheeler, 2005). However, security management appears to be an underdeveloped science in Australia’s education system. One recent survey of policing and security courses in Australian universities and colleges of Technical And Further Education (TAFE) found that police studies dominated, with very few opportunities for advanced studies in security management (Prenzler, Martin & Sarre, 2010). Greater knowledge of standard procedures in security and risk management would most likely contribute to better practice, including more mutual respect between project partners and the creation of a common language of ‘protection’ (Swanton, 1993).

The case studies examined in this report demonstrate many of the potential benefits and pitfalls of public-private partnerships. Some quite dramatic reductions in crimes were reported and these were at least in part attributable to the sharing of resources, knowledge, skills and information across a range of public and private sector participants. Previous analyses of case studies have identified the following key ingredients as important for successful partnerships (Prenzler & Sarre, 2012, p. 163):

- a common interest in reducing a specific crime or crime set,
- effective leadership, with personnel with authority from each partner organisation driving participation,
- mutual respect,
- information sharing based on high levels of trust in confidentiality,
- formal means of consultation and communication; such as committees, forums and e-mail networks,
- willingness to experiment and consider all ideas,
- formal contractual relationships are not always essential,
- additional legal powers are not always necessary on the security side,
- data-rich projects appear more likely to generate effective interventions and demonstrate success.

The evidence gathered in this report showed that private security can make a major contribution to crime prevention, and to criminal justice, through quite diverse activities. A standard set of private security services has evolved that is now commonly associated with government clients (and government corporations). These include:

- guarding premises, and entry-exit control,
- traffic control at road works,
- installation and monitoring of security devices,
- monitoring of alarms and surveillance cameras,
- patrol and rapid response,
- crowd control and patron protection,
- close personal protection of VIPs,
- transport of cash and valuables,
- prisoner transport,
- court security,
- prison management,
- detention centre management,
- locations of persons and delivery of summonses,
• technical advice, and
• risk assessment and security management advice.
There is undoubtedly enormous scope to enlarge the uptake of these services. There is also a set of less commonly considered services that should be considered – some of which have been canvassed in the case studies in this report. They can operate with various levels of police involvement and back up. They include:

• supply and monitoring of personal duress alarms (e.g., for persons holding violence protection orders),
• investigation of missing persons cases,
• locating wanted persons,
• covert surveillance,
• background checks on employment applicants,
• selected criminal investigations, including fraud and organised property theft,
• independent crime assessments audits,
• penetration testing of security systems,
• bailiff duties in evictions and repossessions that normally involve police,
• wheel clamping and removing illegally parked vehicles,
• operating speed detection equipment,
• conducting random breath tests,
• conducting vehicle checks at police dragnets,
• street patrols in high crime zones (with delegated authority to serve on-the-spot fines for nuisance offences, engage in dispute resolution, and call police for more serious offences),
• operating drug sniffer dogs at concerts, nightclub precincts and high schools, and
• operating offender electronic monitoring programs.

Guidelines for Advancing Synergies in Public and Private Policing and Security

Research on cooperative crime prevention projects, and the factors affecting success, has led to the development of various guidelines for planners and practitioners (e.g., CoESS, 2010; Crawford, et al., 2005; Marks, Meyer & Linssen, 2005; Mazerolle & Prenzler, 2004; National Institute of Justice 2005; Prenzler, 2009a). Consistent application can be useful to ensure that the mistakes of the past are avoided, that interventions match the target crime problem and setting, that outcomes are optimised, and that public accountability requirements are met. A number of other best practice principles have been developed around regulation of the security industry, with a view to maximising public confidence in the sector, creating a level playing field for competing security firms, and enhancing the industry’s contribution to general crime prevention (Button, 2012; Prenzler & Sarre, 2008). The following 14 points summarise these principles. These points involve both direct relationships, such as partnerships and contracts, and indirect relationships, through facilitating standards and professionalism on both sides. Some of the recommendations are already in place in various forms in different jurisdictions, but the points serve as a checklist for a comprehensive approach to effective ‘business partnering’.

1. Establish a system to evaluate and recognise organisations and residences that have in place security systems/services commensurate with their ongoing risk profile.
For example, where a business installs and maintains a back-to-base monitored alarm system and locking devices (doors/windows), there should be the opportunity to receive a reduced insurance premium.

2. Establish systems to support crime prevention partnerships

Effective partnerships against crime – involving private security, business and resident groups, government and other groups – can be facilitated by the following four main actions.

2.1. Governments should establish in-house crime prevention units, staffed with qualified persons, responsible for a variety of prevention-related tasks. A key task should be scoping partnerships, with a focus on hot spots for crime – such as entertainment precincts – and vulnerable groups – such as the elderly or public housing recipients. The process should include collecting crime data across time and space, and consulting with stakeholder groups.

2.2. The next step in initiating a partnership is to establish a coordinating committee and engage a project officer. Coordinating committees should, as far as practicable, involve representatives from all key stakeholder groups. (The representative should have decision-making power in their respective institutions or groups.)

2.3. Coordinating committees should have an option of applying for start up funds. Subsidising the installation of security hardware is likely to be a key means of facilitating participation and the uptake of project interventions.

2.4. Accountability requirements should include rigorous evaluation standards.

3. Provide crime prevention advice services

Government departments, including police, should provide free security advice, including on-site inspections, to low income or vulnerable groups or persons in high crime locations. The service can include subsidised private sector consulting, provision of a list of private security providers willing to provide quotations, as well as options for subsidised security installations.

4. Build in policy consideration of outsourcing and business partnering options

Governments should adopt policies that include consideration of private options in crime prevention and criminal justice programs. Policy reviews and strategic planning should therefore always include a business case that involves a private security option. This should include obtaining expressions of interest and quotations for services. One model question is: Can this policing task be carried out effectively and safely by less expensive private security? Another question would be: Can a private provider supply a superior service at a justifiable price?

5. Develop demonstration projects and showcase best practice
Governments should commit to demonstration projects by selecting specific crime problems amenable to partnership interventions. These projects should be properly funded and supported, with rigorous evaluations. The outcomes and ‘lessons learnt’ should be promoted through government networks to encourage forms of replication. This will help build an evidence base that is jurisdictionally specific and relevant to local conditions.

6. Mandate security consultation in project development

Governments should require that all planning and approval processes include security risk assessments and specification of anti-crime measures. This should include building design and the design of larger developments – such as housing and industrial estates, housing complexes, shopping centres, transport hubs and open space public venues.

7. Share crime data

Police can facilitate private sector crime prevention by improving access to crime data, especially data on the physical location of different types of crimes. These kinds of data can assist security managers develop interventions that match the risk levels for their facilities. This can also help save on unnecessary security investments.

8. Share criminal intelligence

On a selective basis, police (and other crime fighting agencies) can provide selected criminal intelligence to security providers; especially in relation to repeat and serious offenders, and wanted persons. Security officers can therefore assist in identifying these offenders and calling police. This can serve a safety function as well. Much of this should be done at a local level; for example, between police stations and nearby shopping centre security staff.

9. Update legal powers and protections

Security industry regulatory agencies should review the legal powers and protections granted to private security providers to ensure licensed operators have sufficient authority to work effectively in preventing crime and participating in partnerships and outsourced arrangements. Legislators should consider the possible need, in some circumstances, for private security providers to access government databases, apply for warrants, issue on-the-spot fines for nuisance offences, or engage in other interventions beyond the normal powers of citizens or the agents of property holders. Law reform in this area will need to include a clear set of partial immunities from prosecution for security providers acting in good faith in their work.

10. Establish national security protocols

Consideration should be given to developing national security protocols for a range of security related activities to ensure that the solution provided is appropriate for the risk faced.
For example, conflict over alarm responses can be addressed through standardised national protocols covering alarm monitoring and responses. The emerging model internationally requires monitoring firms to verify activations. This can be done by an on-site visual inspection or remotely through CCTV. Beyond that, there may be a case, depending on circumstances, for police to charge a fee for call outs. In Australia, nationally consistent standards would facilitate improved compliance.

Another example would be the development of a national protocol for the design, implementation and maintenance of CCTV systems, which could include a Codes of Practice. As a sector of the security industry that is experiencing rapid technological development and growth, the development of industry guidelines would help to maximise the effectiveness of CCTV systems and raise community confidence. This would also assist police in reducing and solving crime.

11. Provide professional development in crime prevention and security

Police and other relevant government departments should train their officers in the principles of situational crime prevention and problem oriented policing, and the strategic role of private and public security managers in effective crime prevention. Public-private crime prevention partnerships should be promoted through pre-service and in-service training courses.

Federal and state governments also need to support the expansion of courses in security management and crime prevention in colleges and universities, with regular reviews of curricula to ensure relevance.

12. Optimise security industry regulation nationally

Security regulation needs to be based on practical assessments of minimum entry standards for security operatives, security managers and the owners of security firms. There needs to be a simple, uniform and consistent national approach to licensing that is effectively enforced.

Sample requirements for integrity include excluding serving police officers from the industry, and requiring clear differentiation of police and security officer uniforms.

Regulation is best administered by a specialist business licensing division of government, rather than police. Police are specialists in crime control, and they should also be working with the industry. Regulation and cooperation entail a conflict of interest.

Regulators need to be pro-active in conducting inspections and monitoring the conduct of security providers, as well as independently investigating and adjudicating complaints. Impact data need to be collected to assess the effects of regulatory strategies on the conduct and competency of security providers.

Regulators also need to monitor compliance costs to ensure that the industry is not burdened with unjustifiable costs that reduce its capacity to satisfy demand. For example, the industry uses a large number of part-time operatives. Licence fees and
training costs need to be set at levels that allow an adequate supply of personnel; including through part-time and casual engagements, and on Friday and Saturday nights and at special events.

Regulation can include co-regulation options where, for example, firms are given discounts in licence fees for membership of approved professional industry associations. The associations should then audit members and deal with agreed categories of complaints, and engage in professional development activities.

Industry regulatory agencies should also include advisory boards with representatives from police, security associations and security employee unions.

13. Establish police-security consultative committees

Police departments should operate high-level committees that meet regularly to discuss policy level issues. These committees should include industry association representatives. Additionally, police local area committees, that include representation from reputable security firms, should address local crime issues and operational issues. Industry representatives can be rotated to ensure fairness. The focus here should be on solving crime problems and finding synergies at the local level.

14. Ensure greater transparency and rigour in contracting arrangements.

Where any work is contracted to security firms (whether government or corporate), procurement managers must ensure that quality is given an adequate weighting alongside cost and ensuring that the security providers meets all of their statutory obligations. Contract conditions need to reflect the requirements of the service provided, including consideration of the legal powers / responsibilities required of security providers and/or the technical expertise needed to fulfil the contract. It should also be a requirement that full disclosure be provided by all security providers (whether consultants, systems integrators or subcontractors) regarding relationships with any providers involved with the contract.

**Conclusion**

This report has shown that private security plays an increasingly important role in preventing criminal victimisation. There is a growing recognition of the many public benefits entailed in the expansion of the sector, including through public-private crime prevention partnerships and outsourcing of selected policing and security tasks. What is also clear is that there is considerable scope for governments to make much more of the skills and expertise of private security in extending public guardianship and preventing crime, as well as contributing to criminal investigations and criminal justice. While police and other government bodies now frequently express support for public-private cooperation against crime, the benefits need to be optimised through a more developed approach. The 14 points outlined above are will assist governments to systematically engage with the private sector to advance successful crime prevention and law enforcement programs.
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Washington, DC.


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Opinions expressed in this report are those of the author.