Private Security and Public Interest: 
Exploring Private Security Trends and Directions for Reform in the New Era of Plural Policing

Rick Sarre and Tim Prenzler

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The overall aim of this project (2007-2010), funded by the Australian Research Council (LP0669518) with additional funding and in-kind support from the Australian Security Industry Association Limited (ASIAL), was to provide the first ever comprehensive study of the legal and regulatory issues, together with policy implications, of the development and growth of the private security industry in Australia over the past three decades. We determined that the security industry is growing at a faster rate than both the increasing growth in police numbers and the Australian population, and available figures indicate the industry is now larger in numbers than conventional police personnel (indeed, perhaps twice the size). Indeed, citizens are far more likely to encounter security personnel (and their security devices) than police officers in their day to day activities. Citizen dependence upon private services for their safety is thus increasing.

Australian parliaments and police managers, too, are recognising the enormous potential benefits of private security and public-private partnerships. They understand, however, that these partnerships need to be underwritten by basic levels of prescribed competency and integrity. Surveys of security providers and industry associations show that the industry itself aspires to a more professional standing too.

The picture, however, is not entirely rosy. There have been, over the last decade especially, a number of scandals around private security officer conduct. Major adverse events that drew widespread media attention were the death of cricketer David Hookes following an altercation with a crowd controller, the shooting death of a robber by a security guard, the infiltration of nightclub security by organised crime figures trading in illicit drugs, widespread problems with serious assaults by crowd controllers, and misrepresentation in mobile patrol contracts by Australia’s (then) largest security firm which found itself in legal proceedings brought by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).

The research shows, nevertheless, that there is a high degree of regulation of the security industry throughout Australia, and that this regulatory legislation has evolved greatly over the past 15 years, and in some jurisdictions has embraced the key industry associations themselves. Notwithstanding this evolution, regulation of the industry continues to be inconsistent between jurisdictions and is, according to some, still open to exploitative activities and unscrupulous behaviours. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. In order for the public and police alike to maintain (or gain) confidence in the private security industry, the industry itself must redouble its efforts to present itself as groups of professionals consisting of highly trained and skilled personnel exercising high levels of integrity. The industry also clearly expects closer monitoring and better enforcement of regulations by the regulators.

We are pleased that the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has sought to install a model of national regulation that allows not only better management of those coming into the industry but also more flexibility for security personnel wishing to operate in more than one jurisdiction. Their foreshadowed changes are crucial to ensuring that there is confidence in the ability of security professionals to carry out their tasks.

This confidence should not only be in the eyes of the public, but by the police with whom security must interact. Our research task thus reviewed models of collaboration that best serve to enhance policing generally. It is indisputable that there has been an explosion of
private/public security partnerships in critical sites such as ports and airports, sports stadiums and courts. The issue of collaboration is strongly related to security industry training and entry standards. The public/private relationships that were observed and studied in this part of the research tell a story of cooperation for mutual benefit. The most successful private sector partnerships are found where that sector is filling a need that assists the public police to perform their roles. There are positive stories of good policing where models of cooperation have held firm. However, better documentation is required of crime reduction impacts and cost-benefit ratios in order to ensure accountability for public monies invested in these projects.

Moreover, as policing moves more and more into private hands, the traditional legal powers that apply to ‘policing’ are becoming outdated. The powers and immunities of private security personnel are often unclear and inconsistent, dependent upon fine distinctions, differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and differ markedly from those of the public police even though security personnel are often carrying out many of the same tasks in the same precincts. The rules regarding the protection of property and citizen’s arrest, for example, bear this out. The research project makes a number of suggestions designed to remedy this situation in order to give greater legal clarity to the policing landscape.

Police and security officers provide an essential service in protecting people from crime and violence. But provision of this service comes at a high cost, as evidenced in the stories that emerge from the occupational health and welfare data. There are great dangers associated with working in an industry which confronts violence on a regular basis. It is thus important that greater efforts are put into protecting the welfare of officers engaged in the tasks of crime prevention, order maintenance and law enforcement; as well as protecting the public from excessive force, over-zealous encounters and inappropriate protective strategies. We make some observations about what needs to be done, especially in relation to better training (for example, tactics that reduce body contact) and better applied research.

The trend to greater reliance on private security for protection from crime and violence in our society is strong and continuing. Our study, mirroring the groundbreaking United States’ Hallcrest Reports of the 1980s, was designed to make a significant contribution to the literature. We now have a better understanding of private security industry trends, laws, regulation, private-public partnerships, and occupational health and safety issues as a result of this study.

Rick Sarre and Tim Prenzler
Adelaide and Brisbane
April 2011
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A great deal of the primary work for this project was conducted by Ms Karen Earle (University of South Australia, School of Commerce) whose interviewing and writing and other project tasks were indispensable to the success of the project.

Our gratitude is also extended to Mr Bryan de Caires, the Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Security Industry Association Limited (ASIAL) along with the ASIAL Board. Established in 1969, ASIAL represents approximately 85% of the security sector in Australia. Their ARC Linkage partnership has been instrumental in the success of our endeavours.

Other assistance (comments, responses, data collection, writing) has been provided by Superintendent Wayne Ashley (Licensing Services Division – Vic), Ms Karen Avery (Licensing and Regulation Policy – NT), Mr Damian Azzapondi (Industry Licensing – Qld), Ms Sue Barker of Safe Work Australia; Mr Simon Beer (Legal, Enforcement and Policy – SA), Mr Dale Blackmore (University of SA); Mr Mark Bodycoat (former Commissioner of Consumer Affairs for South Australia), Dr Trevor Bradley (Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand), Mr Steven Clark (PhD student UniSA), Mr Graham Close (Licensing Operations – SA), Mr Rick Draper (Amtac Professional Services Pty Ltd), Mr Tony Edwards JP (Security Manager, Acer Arena), Ms Patricia Ferguson (Griffith University); Mr Graham Field (Adelaide Institute of TAFE), Professor Jenny Fleming (University of Tasmania), Detective Inspector Steve George (Licensing Enforcement Division – WA Police), Professor Martin Gill (Perpetuity Research & Consultancy International); Mr Robert Grimshaw (Griffith University); Mr Matthew Harper (Emergency Management, Blue Mountains City Council), Mr Peter Jones (Licensing and Regulation Policy – NT), Mr Matt Lady (UniSA), Ms Candice Lowden (Griffith University); Mr Tony Mangion (Business and Occupational Services – SA), Mr David Martin, Ms Kirsty Martin (Griffith University); Mr Bob Melling (Industry Licensing – Qld), Mr Anthony Minnaar (University of South Africa), Ms Belinda Phelan (University of SA); Dr Hank Prunckun (Australian Graduate School of Policing, Charles Sturt University), Dr Janet Ransley (Griffith University), Ms Jessica Ritchie (Amtac Professional Services Pty. Ltd), Mr Josh Ryehart (Business and Industry Licensing – ACT), Mr Charles Sedgwick (Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand), Mr Roger Sharp (Business and Industry Licensing – ACT), Mr Kerry Shepherd (Business Affairs Branch – Tas), Mr Cameron Smith (Security Industry Registry – NSW), Mr Barry Squire (Site Property Services, Department of Education, Training and Employment SA), Dr Alison Wakefield (formerly University of NSW, now Portsmouth University); Senior Constable Mark Weir (Licensing Enforcement Division – WA Police), Mr David Williams (Palgrave Macmillan, UK); Mr Keith Wilson (Executive Officer Protective Security, Defence Security Authority), Mr Ben Woods (Industry Licensing – Qld).

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1. CHAPTER ONE  DIMENSIONS What are the growth patterns and dimensions of security industries in Australia?

Introduction

This research component provided the framework for the research by determining the size of the phenomenon and its growth trends. Australia followed an international trend of substantial growth in security services in the last three decades of the 20th century. Nonetheless, the precise dimensions of this change are difficult to trace. This first component of the research project examines the development of the Australian security industry across a number of key indicators, such as personnel, business size and financial turnover. An historical picture has been developed of the relative size, growth and scope of the private (and related public) arms of law enforcement and crime prevention services. This allowed the researchers to build partnership and regulatory models based upon what the industry currently exhibits rather than what we think it should exhibit. This analysis includes sub-components of the security sector, such as manpower (guarding, cash-in-transit, crowd control), electronic security (alarms, CCTV, access control and physical/barrier security) and enquiry (investigators, debt collectors, process servers). The 2006 census provides the opportunity for an enlarged, up-to-date assessment of the size and components of the industry and long term trends, along with the collection of current and historical licensing data from regulatory agencies. These data set the foundation for the remaining studies.

People engaged in security functions outside the more traditional ‘public’ police are now increasingly involved in a vast array of ‘policing’ responsibilities on a daily basis. The most commonly identified roles include activities that may be best described as ‘order maintenance’ such as crowd control, property management, guarding and patrolling, the escorting of prisoners and court security. But private operatives are also active in crime prevention consulting, risk management and insurance assessment, weapons training, crime scene examination, surveillance activities (including CCTV monitoring), private investigations, assistance with forensic evidence-gathering, information technology advising, hi-tech systems development and communications support.

The 1990s saw a rapid expansion of these roles. Consequently, there were, across Australia, formal revisions of industry regulation that were followed by a period of legislative and industry stability. However, in 2003-5, a series of public scandals over security personnel conduct, along with deficient security standards in key areas, precipitated major reviews and modification of regulatory systems in a number of jurisdictions.

The demand for privately funded policing and security services grows daily. According to the IBIS World Industry Report 2007 (IBIS 2007) in 2005-06 the security services industry contributed an estimated $1,363 million to the Australian economy, which represented 0.15% of the national GDP. The demand in Australia comes from a range of industry types. For example, the manufacturing industry demands guards, patrols and alarm monitoring services at factories. Retail traders outsource security services at shopping centres, while the finance industry demands services to enable their banks and building societies to secure Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs). Hotels, accommodation providers, cafes and restaurants regularly
use crowd management security staff. Specialist cash handling services are utilised regularly at pubs and clubs that have installed gaming machines, and on tollways, where large amounts of cash are deposited daily. Property and business services require guards and patrols at major buildings and residential/apartment developments. The education services sectors (and others) use alarm monitoring extensively, and the health and community sectors largely outsource security services at major hospitals. Additionally, cultural and recreational services often require security staff and utilise video monitoring services of patrons (IBIS 2007). Future demand for security services is predicted to be in the area of CCTV and alarm surveillance together with an increased demand for ATM and other cash related services. These provide better security and at a lower cost than do guard and patrol services; resulting in the slowing down of demand for guard patrol services.

An additional comparative perspective on private security and public policing can be provided by the ‘Counting the Costs of Crime’ study by the Australian Institute of Criminology, the most recent of which was published in 2008 (Rollings 2008). Based on Productivity Commission data, the research concluded that the cost of conventional police services (focused on crime) for 2005-06, was approximately $4,480 million (adjusted for the non crime-related activities that police undertake). A similar analysis for the private security industry, using figures supplied by the Australian Security Industry Association Limited (ASIAL), concluded that an amount of $4,436 million is spent annually on private security activities, a roughly equal amount.

Up to 1998, research revealed that security industries were growing at a greater rate than the public police (Prenzler and Sarre, 1998) and that there was a growing trend toward oligopolies where 1% of the industry was made up of large firms which undertook 66% of the employment in the security. This trend has continued into the current decade. The trend towards a ‘hybrid’ model of public/private policing is thus now firmly entrenched. As Lucia Zedner has observed, the publicly employed officers of state police

may come to be seen as an historical blip in a more enduring schema of policing as an array of activities undertaken by multiple private and public agencies, and individual and communal endeavours. (Zedner 2006, 81)

Methodology

The statistical data for this research component have been gathered from two main sources. The first data sets are from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), and the others are from each jurisdiction’s regulatory agency. The ABS database is mainly census data, but there are some useful comparisons made with information provided through the Australian Business Register. The regulatory agencies data have been collected with the kind assistance of individual employees at the various agencies in each jurisdiction in Australia.

When analysing the census data it is worth keeping in mind that the figures used have a number of limitations. Firstly the census also only reports a person’s main occupation, and much security work appears to be a major secondary (or part-time) occupation for many people. In addition, those working in management within the security industry are most likely to record their occupation under the census ‘management’ categories rather than as a ‘security’-related category.
Further, there is an issue of consistency with security provider categories available in the different census collections. The occupational category ‘guards and security officers’ was introduced into Australian census reports only in 1986. However, the number of categories included as security providers has increased significantly since 1986 and moved beyond simply classifying security providers as ‘guards and security officers’. Therefore, while we can gain a picture of the increase in security providers more broadly, the individual occupation category changes are more difficult to analyse accurately. However, some consistent occupational categories in the census have applied for security occupations for the ten year period from 1996 to 2006.

Additionally, the census data do not differentiate between private security personnel and publicly funded security operatives (such as the Police Security Services Branch or PSSB in South Australia). Licence figures from regulatory agencies, therefore, provide researchers with an alternative perspective on personnel numbers. These regulatory data give a perspective on both individuals working in the industry as well as businesses in the industry.

Problems also arise, however, when relying solely on regulatory data. Different jurisdictions have different regulation needs and require licenses for different ‘security activities’. Some jurisdictions regulate a great number of these activities, including ‘in house’ security (such as South Australia), however, others require a limited number of these activities to be licensed (such as Northern Territory which is moving to regulate more latterly). This means that the number of licensed individuals may not capture the entire scope of those doing security related work. This may result in the official number of security personnel being reduced, as well as making comparison between jurisdictions less accurate. Conversely, an individual may hold more than one licence, effectively inflating the number of security personnel.

In addition, the models set up to regulate the jurisdictions vary. Some are regulated by the State police, others by an administrative government agency or, as is the case in New South Wales, a combination of the two. Also, over the past seven years or so, most jurisdictions have changed and updated the legislation which governs their security industry. A detailed study of the regulatory regimes throughout Australia is found in chapter two of this report.

The Australian Business Register (ABR) provides useful material, but it only collects data on those businesses which have an Australian Business Number (ABN). In order to qualify for an ABN a business must have an annual turnover of $50,000. This may exclude some security business from being included in these data. Additionally, the security data collected from the census and regulatory agencies includes (for the most part) locksmiths. The ABR (under the collection category ‘Security and Investigative Business’) does not include this occupation.

Notwithstanding the limitations of these data, with the use of the ABS census and business register data, complemented by regulatory agency data, we are able to gain a great deal of information about the private security industry throughout Australia, now and for the past ten years. We are also able to draw some useful comparisons with the policing industry over the same time.
Findings: Profile of the Industry

The security industry is growing at a faster rate than both the Australian population and police, and is now larger (in number) than conventional police forces. As indicated in Table 1-1 and Figure 1-1 (below) the security industry, in terms of numbers, grew approximately 41% in the ten years from 1996-2006 compared to 14% police numbers and 12% population.

Figure 1-1 below represents the growth in numbers of the two sectors between 1991 and 2006.

**Figure 1-1: Police Officers and Security providers, 1991 – 2006**

![Graph showing growth in numbers of police officers and security providers from 1991 to 2006](image)

*Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 1991-2006. These are combined security related functions for all census reports. Note that these have been modified and expanded over time. In 1991 “guards and security officers” was the only category in use.*

Table 1-1 below outlines the various categories within the security industry, and the number of security providers within each category, for each of the census years from 1996, 2001 and 2006 for total Australia. Also the percentage change from 1996 to 2006 is shown.
Table 1-1 Number of Security Providers by Category, 1996-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>% Change from 1996 to 2006</th>
<th>2006 % of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Investigator</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Advisor</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>+53</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locksmith</td>
<td>1,492</td>
<td>1,877</td>
<td>2,279</td>
<td>+53</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance Investigator</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>+4.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Collector</td>
<td>5,933</td>
<td>9,666</td>
<td>10,141</td>
<td>+71</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bailiff or Sheriff</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>+23</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Officer</td>
<td>27,439</td>
<td>33,884</td>
<td>5,424</td>
<td>-80.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured Car Escort</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>+815</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alarm, Security or Surveillance monitor</td>
<td>Category not used</td>
<td>Category not used</td>
<td>30,752</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowd Controller</td>
<td>Category not used</td>
<td>Category not used</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SECURITY</td>
<td>37,372</td>
<td>48,579</td>
<td>52,768</td>
<td>+41.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>39,225</td>
<td>41,426</td>
<td>44,898</td>
<td>+14.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>17,752,829</td>
<td>18,769,249</td>
<td>19,855,288</td>
<td>+11.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As noted above, the total of all security providers increased by 41% over this period, the number of police increased by 14%, while the population increased nearly 12%. Looking at this increase in more detail, of particular note is the 815% increase in armoured car escorts and the 71% increase in debt collectors. It is, however, difficult to compare the originally used category of ‘security provider’, as this category was split in the most recent census into the individual categories of ‘alarm, security or surveillance monitor’, ‘crowd controller’ as well as the category ‘security officer’. Even so, if we are to combine these categories for comparative purposes there a percentage increase of 34.

Additionally, in 2006, just over 58% of security providers were classified in the category ‘alarm, security or surveillance monitor’. This is in keeping with the predicted future demand for CCTV and alarm surveillance (IBIS 2007).

---

1 The category ‘security advisor’ became ‘security consultant’ in 2006 census.
2 The category ‘bailiff or sheriff’ became ‘court bailiff or sheriff’ in 2006 census.
3 If the category ‘security guard’ included the total of the new categories for 2006 the total ‘security officer’ would be 36,661.
4 If the category ‘security guard’ included the total of the new categories for 2006 the % change would be +34%.
5 New category introduced in 2006 census.
6 New category introduced in 2006 census.
Table 1-2 Comparison of Regulatory data and Census data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regulatory Data 2008</th>
<th>Census Data 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>7,210</td>
<td>3,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAS</td>
<td>1,568</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>25,030</td>
<td>12,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>2,605</td>
<td>1,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>17,983</td>
<td>9,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>36,654</td>
<td>18,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>20,306</td>
<td>5,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>112,773</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,742</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Australian Regulatory Agencies and Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006

Table 1-2 above shows the comparison of numbers of security providers between the data collected by the regulatory agencies and the data collected by the Census. These data illustrate that the census fails to capture a large proportion of the security industry.

Overall, we can see that not only is the private security industry increasing in numbers at a greater pace than police, but it is also growing steadily upwards as a rate per 100,000 population. Figure 1-2 and Table 1-3 (below) show the rate per 100,000 population for security and police for the years 1996, 2001 and 2006. While in 1996 the rate of police to population was greater than that of security providers, since then the rate of security providers to population has outstripped that of police.
Figure 1-2: Police and Security Providers: Rate per 100,000 population – Total Australia

![Bar chart showing police and security rates per 100,000 population from 1996 to 2006.](image)


Table 1-3 Australia – Rate per 100,000 population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Police per 100,000 population</th>
<th>Security per 100,000 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1-4 Total Australia – numbers and % change from 1996 to 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>% change (from 1996)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>39,225</td>
<td>41,426</td>
<td>44,898</td>
<td>+14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>37,372</td>
<td>48,579</td>
<td>52,768</td>
<td>+41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop.</td>
<td>17.7m</td>
<td>18.7m</td>
<td>19.8m</td>
<td>+11.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1-4, above, shows the numbers and percentage change from 1996 to 2006 for police, security and the total population of Australia. The data show that, from 1996 to 2006, whilst the population increased by 11.8% and police numbers increased by 14.5%, the security industry increased by just over 41%.

Table 1-5 Percentage change Australia over the two relevant periods

From 1996 – 2001: Total Australia
5.6% increase in police
30% increase in security
5.7% increase in population


From 2001 – 2006: Total Australia
8.4% increase in police
8.6% increase in security
5.7% increase in population
Table 1-5 provides a more detailed analysis of Table 1-4. It shows the breakdown of the percentage change between the two census periods. It can be seen that the largest increase in security occurred between 1996 and 2001.

Furthermore, in 1996, for Australia overall, there was a ratio of private security to police of 0.95:1. This increased to be 1.17 security providers for each police officer in 2001 and 1.18 for each police officer in 2006. Table 1-6 below shows the ratio of security providers for each jurisdiction and the ratio change between the census years.

### Table 1-6 Ratio of Security Providers: Police 1996, 2001 & 2006 Change in Security Provider Ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>1.20:1</td>
<td>1.54:1</td>
<td>0.34 ↑</td>
<td>1.45:1</td>
<td>0.09 ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>1.04:1</td>
<td>1.40:1</td>
<td>0.36 ↑</td>
<td>1.34:1</td>
<td>0.06 ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>0.78:1</td>
<td>0.98:1</td>
<td>0.20 ↑</td>
<td>1.04:1</td>
<td>0.06 ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>0.91:1</td>
<td>1.24:1</td>
<td>0.33 ↑</td>
<td>1.21:1</td>
<td>0.03 ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>0.76:1</td>
<td>0.90:1</td>
<td>0.14 ↑</td>
<td>0.98:1</td>
<td>0.08 ↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAS</td>
<td>0.73:1</td>
<td>0.81:1</td>
<td>0.08 ↑</td>
<td>0.85:1</td>
<td>0.04 ↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>1.08:1</td>
<td>1.04:1</td>
<td>0.04 ↓</td>
<td>1.08:1</td>
<td>0.04 ↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>0.74:1</td>
<td>0.71:1</td>
<td>0.03 ↓</td>
<td>0.72:1</td>
<td>0.01 ↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>0.95:1</td>
<td>1.17:1</td>
<td>0.22 ↑</td>
<td>1.18:1</td>
<td>0.01 ↑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (1996 - 2006)*

This report now takes a more microscopic analysis of the two industries by looking at the industries in each capital city and by comparing country and city data.
Table 1-7 Comparison of Capital Cities - Numbers and Ratio - 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>security:police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>12,316</td>
<td>6,865</td>
<td>1.79:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>9,986</td>
<td>6,560</td>
<td>1.52:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canberra</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>1.48:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>5,313</td>
<td>4,361</td>
<td>1.22:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perth</td>
<td>3,703</td>
<td>3,095</td>
<td>1.20:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>3,081</td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td>1.12:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darwin</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>1.06:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobart</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>0.87:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>36,647.00</td>
<td>25,402.00</td>
<td>1.44:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1-7 shows the number of police and security providers as reported in the 2006 Census. It also shows the ratio of security providers to police. Only Hobart has fewer than one security provider per police officer. Sydney has the largest ratio with nearly two security providers for every police officer. This is inconsistent with the overall state ratio. The Northern Territory has the lowest ratio of security providers per police officer and the Australian Capital Territory has the highest ratio. The numbers are presented pictorially in Figure 1-3 below.
The following data look at country towns throughout each jurisdiction. Table 1-8 outlines the number of security providers and police offices in large country towns and shows the ratio of security to police. A ‘large country town’ is defined as having 20,000 population or more at the 2006 census. The ACT is not included because it has no large country towns.

**Table 1-8 Comparison of Large Country Towns – Number and Ratio - 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>security</th>
<th>police</th>
<th>ratio security:police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>2,862</td>
<td>2,443</td>
<td>1.17:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>3,874</td>
<td>3,544</td>
<td>1.09:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>1,199</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>1.01:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>1.01:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>0.95:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Australia</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>0.95:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>0.65:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL AUSTRALIA</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>9,056</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,461</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.07:1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006)*

Interestingly, although Tasmania (overall) and Hobart (individually) both have a ratio of fewer than one security provider to each police, the large country towns in Tasmania have a...
ratio of security to police of almost one to one. Queensland has the greatest ratio with 1.17 security providers for every police officer in large country towns.

**Figure 1-4: Comparison of Large Country Towns – Number - 2006**

![Comparison of Large Country Towns – Number - 2006](image)

*Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006)*

Looking at the ratio of security to police in small country towns (towns with fewer than 20,000 population) Tasmania has the largest ratio of 0.79 security providers for every police officer. The ratio for each jurisdiction across the country is relatively consistent, with each jurisdiction having fewer than one security provider for each police officer.

**Table 1-9 Comparison of Small Country Towns – Number and Ratio - 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>ratio security:police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>0.79:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>2247</td>
<td>3258</td>
<td>0.69:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>1458</td>
<td>2143</td>
<td>0.68:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Australia</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>0.66:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>0.60:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>1424</td>
<td>2646</td>
<td>0.54:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>0.46:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.39:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL AUSTRALIA</strong></td>
<td><strong>7045</strong></td>
<td><strong>11026</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.64:1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006)*
Table 1-10 below compares the ratios of security to police for each jurisdiction for the total state, capital city and large and small country towns.

**Table 1-10 Ratio – State, Capital City, Large and Small Country Towns - Security:Police - 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total State</th>
<th>Capital City</th>
<th>Large Country Towns</th>
<th>Small Country Towns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>1.45:1</td>
<td>1.48:1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.39:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>1.34:1</td>
<td>1.79:1</td>
<td>1.09:1</td>
<td>0.69:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>1.21:1</td>
<td>1.52:1</td>
<td>1.01:1</td>
<td>0.54:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>1.08:1</td>
<td>1.22:1</td>
<td>1.17:1</td>
<td>0.68:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>1.04:1</td>
<td>1.20:1</td>
<td>0.95:1</td>
<td>0.66:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>0.98:1</td>
<td>1.12:1</td>
<td>0.95:1</td>
<td>0.60:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>0.85:1</td>
<td>0.87:1</td>
<td>1.01:1</td>
<td>0.79:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>0.72:1</td>
<td>1.06:1</td>
<td>0.65:1</td>
<td>0.46:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL AUSTRALIA** 1.18:1 1.44:1 1.07:1 0.64:1

*Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006)*

Not surprisingly, each jurisdiction has a higher ratio of security to police in their capital city than the state ratio, and with all the jurisdictions except Tasmania, this is where the largest ratio is. Tasmania has its highest ratio in large country towns. Tasmania is the only capital city to have more police than security providers.
It can be seen that the census figures (keeping in mind their limitations) for the total of Australia show that the private security industry has increased at a greater pace than that of the police, even when adjusted for the population increase.

The following analysis of licence data and the Australian Business Register data add some useful information to supplement the census data.

The most recent national analysis of core State and Territory licensing systems data found that, in 2003, there were 97,182 security licences issued in Australia (Prenzler 2005). Various adjustments down for individuals holding multiple licences and adjustments up for unlicensed operators or those operating under non-core legislation (such as process servers in some jurisdictions) suggest a very approximate figure of 100,000 plus persons directly involved in private security work. This indicates that there are at least twice as many individuals working in security than police. This current research confirms this.

Looking at the profile of the companies that make up the industry (the ABS Business Register) one finds that companies may be small, locally based, national or multi-national in scale. There are also many operators who practise alone, or in small businesses. Licensing data helps us here to glean a better picture of the security business landscape.

Table 1-11 Number of Security and Investigative Businesses by Business Size and Change for the Financial Year 2006-07

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>operating at beginning of financial year</th>
<th>Operating at end of financial year</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>non employing</td>
<td>employ 1-19</td>
<td>employ 20-199</td>
<td>employ 200+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1128</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>2454</td>
<td>2310</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1-12 captures the most recent snapshot of business operations nationally. At the beginning of the financial year 2006/07, there were 5,478 registered businesses in the security industry in Australia. This was made up of 2,454 (45%) businesses that did not employ staff other than the business owner, 2,310 (42%) businesses employing 1 to 19 staff, 663 (12%) businesses employing 20 to 199 staff and 51 (1%) businesses employing over 200 staff. By 30 June 2007 (a year later) the number of businesses within the industry in Australia had decreased by 10%. Given that the number of individuals working within the security industry is consistently increasing, this decrease in businesses is probably due to a number of

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7 This does not include locksmiths, who are included in census data and regulatory data.
8 To be included on the ABS Business Register, a business must have an Australian Business Number (ABN).
smaller businesses ceasing to trade and the number of larger businesses increasing (or remaining the same) with staff who may have moved from smaller to larger firms.

Contrast this with business operating in 2003/04, where there were 5,685 at the beginning of the financial year, made up of 66% non-employing, 24% employing 1-19 staff, 9% employing 20-199 staff and 1% employing over 200 staff. At the end of this financial year there were 5,415 businesses, a decrease of 51%. These data are outlined below.

**Table 1-12 Number of Security and Investigative Businesses by Business Size and Change for the Financial Year 2003/04**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main State</th>
<th>Operating at start of financial year</th>
<th>Operating at end of financial year</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Percentage change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-employing</td>
<td>1-19</td>
<td>20-199</td>
<td>200+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>3741</td>
<td>1392</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Australian Bureau of Statistics (2004)*

The market segments using these services are estimated to be made up of 90% businesses and 10% households. Households basically require services in the areas of alarm installation, alarm monitoring, casual guarding, and night and holiday patrols (IBIS 2007). If locksmiths were to be included in this data one could safely assume that the use by householders would be slightly larger.

Small to medium sized companies and government departments regularly use private patrols, alarm monitoring and static guards. The larger corporate sector engages private personnel as reception managers, monitors of CCTV, and as access controllers. They invariably use the services of security consultants to advise on appropriate alarm systems, environmental crime prevention design and physical barriers, as well as aspects of risk management and fraud prevention generally (IBIS 2007).

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9 This does not include locksmiths, which is included in census data and regulatory data.
Profile of Security Personnel

The 2006 census data shown above indicate that there were 52,768 security providers who indicated that a security function was their main occupation (compared with 44,898 police). Of these, 76% of security providers were male and 24% female, a 3:1 ratio. The gender ratio for police is virtually identical.

Figure 1-5 below shows the number of employees in each age group for both occupations, for the year 2006. These data show that 2% of security providers are aged below 20 or over 65 years of age; 60% are aged between 20 and 44 years; and 36% are aged between 45 and 64 years. The age of police is more is more concentrated in the 30 to 39 year age range with 44% in that range; 28% are aged 40 to 49 years; 19% below 30 years and 10% above 50 years.

Figure 1-6 Security Industry and Police by Age Group: 2006 Census – Total Australia


Figure 1-7 below shows the number of police and security providers in each age range in 1996, 10 years prior to the previous data.
Figure 1-7 Security Industry and Police by Age Group: 1996 Census – Total Australia

Over the period 1996-2006, the weighted average age of security providers increased from age 38 years to 40 years and for police the weighted average age increased from age 35 years to 38 years.

The data below from the 2006 census show the percentage of security providers and police earnings at each income level for full time and part time employment respectively. The data show that 93% of police are employed full time and 7% are employed part time: 74% of security providers were employed full time and 26% were employed part time. However, these data for security providers are somewhat problematic. The census data only asks for ‘main occupation’. Anecdotal evidence shows that many working in the security industry do so as a second job, hence would not be shown in the census data.

The prominence of part-time, and also casual, work was explored by a special Australian Bureau of Statistics survey of the industry in 1998/9 (ABS 2001-2006) which found that 47% of persons were employed casually, 37% permanent full-time and 14% permanent part-time. This highlights the difficulty if one were to rely solely upon census data in the employment status category.

From 1996 to 2006, security staff employed full time increased from 72% to 75%, a 3% increase. By contrast, police employed full time increased from 87% to 93%, a 6% increase. Over the same period, security staff employed part time decreased from 28% to 26%, a 2% decrease. Police employed part time decreased from 13% to 7%, a 6% decrease.

Table 1-13 Income by Full Time Employment – 2006 Total Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>TOTAL SECURITY FULL TIME</th>
<th>% of total security employed full time</th>
<th>TOTAL POLICE FULL TIME</th>
<th>% of total police employed full time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1-$149</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150-$249</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$250-$399</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$400-$599</td>
<td>5,568</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$600-$799</td>
<td>11,474</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>1,727</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$800-$999</td>
<td>9,820</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>4,783</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000-$1,299</td>
<td>5,137</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12,944</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,300-$1,599</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11,583</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,600-$1,999</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3,395</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,000 or more</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative income</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil income</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated - Not applicable</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36,465</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>36,787</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 1-8 Police and Security Percentage Income Range - Full Time: Total Australia 2006

These data show that, in 2006, the most common category of police employed full time (35%) earned between $1,000 and $1,299 per week, whereas the most common category of security employed full time (31%) only earned $600 to $799 per week.

The data below show the comparative figures for part time employment in the industries.

**Table 1-14 Income by Part Time Employment – 2006 Total Australia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL SECURITY PART TIME</th>
<th>% of total security employed part time</th>
<th>TOTAL POLICE PART TIME</th>
<th>% of total police employed part time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1-$149</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150-$249</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$250-$399</td>
<td>2,976</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$400-$599</td>
<td>3,885</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$600-$799</td>
<td>1,993</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$800-$999</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000-$1,299</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,300-$1,599</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,600-$1,999</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,000 or more</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative income</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil income</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated - Not applicable</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,696</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,971</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When it comes to part time earnings, security providers generally earn a lower income than police. It is difficult to make exact comparisons of respective earning capacity due to the limitations of census data, but it is a safe assumption that private security employees earn less, even when accounting for their part time status.

Table 1-15 below shows the education level for security and police from the 2006 census.

Table 1-15 Total Australia – Education Level 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>SECURITY %</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>POLICE %</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate Degree</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grad Dip &amp; Grad Cert</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,491</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor Degree</td>
<td>3,425</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6,969</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Diploma &amp; Diploma</td>
<td>3,665</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14,371</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate III &amp; IV</td>
<td>10,585</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5,306</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 12</td>
<td>12,830</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9,241</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 11</td>
<td>4,325</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate II</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 10 or below</td>
<td>11,084</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No educational attainment</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable - Inadequately described</td>
<td>4,869</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,63</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>44,899</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These data are shown pictorially below.
Figure 1-10 Total Australia - Education Level - Percentage: 2006

The 2006 census data show that 31% of security are educated below year 12 level; 44% are educated to year 12 or certificate 3 or 4 level; and only 16% are educated above Certificate 4 level\(^{10}\). Compare this to police: 52% of police are educated above Certificate 4 level\(^{11}\); 33% of are educated to year 12 or Certificate 3 and 4 level; and only 10% of police are educated below year 12\(^{12}\).

\(^{10}\) Including Diploma, Advanced Diploma, Bachelor and post graduate level; 9% classified as not applicable or inadequately reported.

\(^{11}\) Including Diploma, Advanced Diploma, Bachelor and post graduate level.

\(^{12}\) 5% classified as not applicable or inadequately reported.
Table 1-16 below shows the data for the census year 2001.

Table 1-16 Total Australia – Education Level 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Total Security</th>
<th>% Security</th>
<th>Total Police</th>
<th>% Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate Degree Level</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate Level</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,214</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor Degree Level</td>
<td>2,133</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,908</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level Certificate Level</td>
<td>2,539</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7,538</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate Level</td>
<td>11,456</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7,711</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated/Inadequately Described</td>
<td>4,487</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,460</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Qualifications, Qualification out of scope, person under 15</td>
<td>27,543</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17,189</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48,661</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>41,385</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is difficult to compare these 2001 data with those of 2006 as the education categories changed from one census to the next however, we can see that a rough comparison would suggest that in 2001, 11% of security providers and 35% of police were educated above year 12 level (Diploma and above). 24% of security and 19% of police were educated below year 12 (Certificate level). However there is a large amount of unspecified data in this table.

These data show that, overall, security providers are less likely to have completed higher formal education than police and they are more likely to be employed part time. The age of security providers spans a much greater range than does the age of police, from 20 years to 65 years, whereas the age of police is clustered between 25 and 49 years.
Figure 1-11 shows the distribution of gender between security providers and police in 2006. Of the 52,768 security providers recorded for 2006, 76% were male and 24% female. The gender difference for police was virtually identical at 77 per cent males and 23 per cent females.

The following summarises the changes in the security industry in Australia over the ten years from 1996 to 2006, as captured by the census data.

- 37,372 increase to 52,768 in number of security providers
- 39,225 increase to 44,898 in number of police
- 41% increase in security
- 14.5% increase in police
- 12% increase in population
- 3% increase in security employed full time
- 2% decrease in security employed part time
- 6% increase in police employed full time
- 6% decrease in police employed part time
- weighted average age of security decreased from age 40 years to 38 years
- weighted average age of police decreased from 38 years to 35 years

• Not only is the security industry increasing in number at a greater pace than police, but it is also increasing as a rate per 100,000 population.
• Regulatory data suggests that there are more than twice as many persons employed in the security industry than in the public police.
• Security providers are more likely, than police, to be employed part time, earn less, and have obtained lower education levels.

Discussion

There are some important limitations to this study (as described in the method section) and differences in the datasets. However, a number of useful findings were made. There would appear to be at least twice as many licensed private security providers as police. Security personnel have also been increasing in numbers at a rate above that of police and the population, although with some slowing in growth from the turn of the century. The available data also confirm some commonly held views about differences between police and security personnel: security providers are less likely to have completed higher education than police, they earn lower salaries and they are more likely to be employed part-time. The age of security providers also spans a wider range than police.

The main factor behind the growth in private security appears to be market demand, partly in response to steep rises in crime – from the 1970s to the 1980s – and continuing high levels of crime, but also because of a shift in consciousness away from reliance on police to a mentality of 'self-protection' (Sarre and Prenzler 2009). The move to a ‘user-pays’ approach to security, away from police providing rapid home and commercial security cannot be overstated either. Growing affluence and attendant changes in lifestyle has resulted in the move to a user-pays economy and increasingly the devolution of many traditional policing roles to the private security. Added to this technical innovation has delivered a vast new array of security options. Other contributing factors include increased security requirements in insurance policies, growth in legal responsibilities on property owners for the safety of visitors and staff, improvements in security technology (in the quality of CCTV images for example) and the lower prices, and the spread of knowledge about successful situational and environmental design approaches to crime prevention.

The private contract security sector is characterised by considerable diversity, with a large number of small businesses and small number of very large businesses. The industry itself appears to be fairly stable, with the larger sector characterised by foreign ownership. The IBISWorld (2007) report describes a number of industry-specific trends that are likely to continue:
• significant continuing growth in electronic alarm and CCTV surveillance and monitoring, as these are often seen to be more cost-effective than manned patrol and guarding services
• reduced growth in demand for personnel in patrol and guarding
• increasing demand for cash-in-transit security, driven in part by the proliferation of automatic teller machines
• continuation of low entry barriers to business, but with increasing government intervention likely to make security a medium-level industry for regulation
• increasing foreign ownership of Australian security businesses.

Despite the general decline in crime in Australia, the crime rate (and fear of crime) remains relatively high by comparison with the rest of the developed world, and some areas (such as fraud) are growing in magnitude (Rollings 2008). Notwithstanding the alleged omnipresence of security, research indicates that only around 45 percent of Australian households have
basic security measures in place, suggesting considerable scope for a greater contribution from the industry to domestic crime prevention (ABS 1999; 2005). It is clear from international research that premises with security have significantly lower rates of criminal victimisation than those without and that growth in security is one of the most important influences on falling crime rates (van Dijk 2008: 129). At the same time, there is a widening gap worldwide between victimisation of the rich and poor relative to their ability to afford security (van Dijk 2008: 134).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has highlighted the evolving nature of security services in Australia, including growth rates exceeding those of the population and police, as well as some basic differences between security personnel and police in education, employment status and pay. It has linked the empirical data to current industry business trends that point to significant growth in electronic surveillance, monitoring and cash-in-transit services for the foreseeable future. Overall, Figures on the size and growth of the security industry show that Australians, across all jurisdictions, are becoming increasingly reliant, if not dependent, on private security services. Consequently, the developments in industry regulation represent important advances in protecting the public from malpractice. That issue is dealt with in the next chapter.
2. CHAPTER TWO  REGULATION: What are the current and preferred models of private security regulation?

This chapter of the report describes the current regulatory systems in place for security personnel in Australia, and explores preferred models of regulation for the industry.

For this study, the authors looked at the diversity of regulation of the private security industry throughout Australia. They drew comparisons between the various approaches of the different jurisdictions. Discussion focused on the areas such as the approach to regulation, the legislation, the varying classes of licences (the activities which are regulated), the training required by the legislation and facilitated by the industry, and protocols for compliance, penalties and probity issues.

Each State and Territory in Australia has a licensing system for security providers that resulted from a major shift, mainly in the 1990s, from partial and minimalist forms of occupational registration to full licence requirements. The new system was based on compulsory pre-entry training and a set of disqualifying criminal offences. The main focus of the initial wave of change in the early 1990s was on private contract security companies and staff. The general direction of the new licensing systems received widespread support from industry members (Prenzler and Hayes 1999; Prenzler and Sarre 1999).

Notwithstanding these new regulatory systems there have been reoccurring instances of malpractice in the industry. This would indicate that the current regulatory regimes need further review and reform. The limited evidence of effectiveness – regarding licence application rejections for example – show that potentially inappropriate persons are being excluded from working in security. But it remains a patchwork of standards and terminology across the eight jurisdictions. In addition, while New South Wales (NSW), South Australia (SA) and Western Australia (WA) eventually developed comprehensive, or near-comprehensive, licensing, other jurisdictions left out key areas of security work, such as in-house guarding, station monitoring and locksmiths. Concerns persist about pre-entry training standards which are highly variable and limited to one week on average in most jurisdictions. There is also little evidence of proactive auditing of conduct once licences are issued. Initial concerns about the extent to which criminal history checks are properly ‘national’ have been largely met, through all jurisdictions adopting the ‘daily checks’ requirements under the harmonisation program outlined by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in July 2008 (discussed below).

Methodology

Throughout 2007 and 2008 the research team conducted interviews with senior personnel from each jurisdiction’s regulatory agency. The process started with a round of 22 initial interview questions, followed by a further interview approximately six to eight months later which enabled the team to ask a further five questions, which had evolved along the process, and to confirm the accuracy of our interpretation of the responses to the initial questions.

In addition to this, in February 2010 a survey of security personnel was conducted via the Australian Security Industry Association Limited (ASIAL) website. An email was sent to ASIAL members encouraging them to complete the survey. This survey probed into individuals’ opinions of the regulatory system, and related matters, in the individuals’ jurisdictions.
Findings

One of the predominant observations that our study found is that every jurisdiction has a slightly different legislative approach to govern the regulation of their security industry. Of the eight jurisdictions within Australia, five regulate purely through an administrative government department, one (Victoria) regulates entirely through the police department and two (NSW and WA) have an approach that utilises unsworn police staff operating as a licensing bureau within the police department.

This section of the report draws a picture of the regulatory frameworks currently operating and asks the following questions:

- To what extent should the various activities carried out under the umbrella of ‘security work’ be regulated?
- How should training of the industry be carried out and regulated?
- What is the preferred model of regulation?
- Is there one model that would be appropriate for every jurisdiction to follow to provide complete uniformity of regulation throughout Australia, or does the industry require different models for the different jurisdictions?
- Is it appropriate to have a uniform approach to all aspects of regulating the industry, or are the only some aspects (such as training) that can practically be uniform throughout Australia.
- Should a system of transferability of licences between jurisdictions be developed to assist mobility of the industry and with greater scrutiny?

In July 2008 the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) embarked on a process of seeking a nationally consistent approach to licensing manpower (guarding) (COAG; 02/07/2008). The following licensable activities have been included in this quest:

- General guarding;
- Crowd or venue controlling;
- Guarding with a dog;
- Guarding with a firearm;
- Monitoring centre operations;
- Body guarding; and
- Training.

Throughout this report the different policy areas on which COAG has agreed to seek consistent regulation are discussed. The three overarching areas which COAG is addressing in those aforementioned licensing activities include:

- Probity of the industry generally
- Competency and skills, and
- Mobility.

More specifically, the issues being addressed cover:

1. Mandatory exclusion categories for applicants (and without regard for spent convictions) for 10 years after a conviction and five years where guilt but no conviction recorded.
2. Minimum identification and probity checks (including a 100 point check) and fingerprinting.
3. Restrictions to licence based upon “close associates”.
4. Using criminal intelligence that does not have to be disclosed.
5. National criminal history checks and daily local criminal checks.
6. Eligibility restrictions where a person has been absent from Australia for 12 months and cannot satisfy probity during that absence.
7. Pre-licensing foundation knowledge and probationary licensing for six months.
8. Improvement in the quality and consistency of materials for students.
9. Improvement in the quality and consistency of Registered Training Organisations.
10. Mutual recognition arrangements to improve mobility of licensed operators.

According to the COAG timetable, each jurisdiction was required to have a report to COAG by July 2009, with the policies in place by January 2010 (COAG; 02/07/2008). This timetable has fallen behind schedule but a great deal of the work has been done by the jurisdictions on an ad hoc basis. Anecdotal evidence suggests that by the date of this report (April 2011) WA and NSW are totally compliant.

Our research, however, looks not only at the COAG policy options but also asks the following policy questions that require further examination:

1. What is the best range of licences?
2. Can we draft enforceable Codes of Conduct and what will they look like? Who will do them?
3. To what extent should there be proactive compliance monitoring? Psychological testing for crowd controllers? Random drug and alcohol testing?
4. Should there be compulsory refresher training for renewal of licences?
5. Will these policies apply to the electronics sector as well?

The following is a summary of the findings from this research and discussion on the COAG project.

**Legislation**

The following Table 2-1 outlines the various pieces of legislation governing the licensing of private security in each jurisdiction.
Table 2-1 Relevant legislation for private security regulation in each jurisdiction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ACT          | Security Industry Act 2003 (ACT)  
               Security Industry Regulations 2003 |
| NSW          | Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW)  
               Commercial Agents & Private Inquiry Agents Act 2004 (NSW)  
               Security Industry Regulation 2007 |
| NT           | Private Security Act 1995 (NT)  
               together with the Criminal Code 1994 (NT)  
               Private Security Act Regulations 1995 |
| Qld          | Security Providers Act 1993 (Qld)  
               Security Providers (Crowd Controller Code of Practice) Regulation 2008  
               Security Providers (Security Firm Code of Practice) Regulation 2008  
               Security Providers (Security Officer Licensed Premises Code of Practice)  
               Regulation 2008  
               Security Providers Regulation 2008 |
| SA           | Security and Investigation Agents Act 1995 (SA)  
               Security and Investigation Agents Regulations 1996 |
| Tas          | Security and Investigations Agents Act 2002 (Tas)  
| Vic          | Private Security Act 2004 (Vic)  
               Private Security Regulation 2005 |
| WA           | Security and Related Activities (Control) Act 1996 (WA)  
               together with the Security and Related Activities (Control) Amendment Act  
               2007 (WA)  
               Security and Related Activities (Control) Regulations 1997 (WA) |

**New South Wales** has not made changes to their Act since 2005. Changes to their regulations, however, occurred in 2007. Since 2006, three jurisdictions, **Western Australia**, **Victoria** and **Tasmania**, have undergone major reviews. **South Australia**, the ACT and the **Northern Territory** have all carried out changes in areas such as the introduction of regulation of crowd controllers, introduction of drug testing, introduction of a system of infringement notices, and (specifically in SA) tighter regulation of crowd controllers giving the Office of the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner (OLGC) authority to undertake random drug tests and to regulate compliance with liquor and gambling laws generally. There are proposed reforms for **South Australia** as well, focusing on the transition to nationally consistent categories of security agents in the guarding sector. The reforms are also designed to strengthen probity requirements by including additional mandatory disqualifying offences, and bringing in licensing for security industry trainers, as well as requiring trainers to meet the same probity requirements as licensed security agents.

The ACT has implemented changes in 2011 for a new suite of subclasses. Security employees working at licensed premises must hold a Responsible Service of Alcohol certificate from 1 December 2011.

Most notable of the jurisdictions which have conducted major reviews of their legislation since 2006 is **Western Australia**. This jurisdiction has completely revamped their legislation and related regulations. This makes the Western Australian industry, arguably, the most tightly regulated security industry currently in Australia.

After a review of their legislation in 2007, **Queensland** introduced new penalties for unlicensed operators, and increased probity including a new ‘point’ system requiring 100 points of identification. In 2008, Queensland introduced a whole suite of new licence categories.
The death of cricket identity David Hookes at the hands of a crowd controller in January 2004 in Melbourne (Sarre and Prenzler 2009, 127-128) highlighted the need for tighter security transparency and accountability in Victoria. Consequently, the Victorian Act is currently under review by a private consultancy agency.

THE LICENSING AUTHORITIES

Australia hosts a number of different security licensing regimes. Currently five jurisdictions regulate their security industry through a non-police government agency. These agencies are situated in either a Department of Justice or a Consumer Affairs type department. One jurisdiction (Victoria) regulates through a licensing division located wholly within its police service, whereas New South Wales and Western Australia operate a model that is within the police jurisdiction but is operated entirely by unsworn staff. The New South Wales agency was once reliant upon information being provided by the key industry association, ASIAL, but that relationship is no longer in play (as explained below).

Table 2-2 Type of regulatory authority for each jurisdiction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Regulator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>Government agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>Police with internal administrative agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>Government agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>Government agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>Government agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>Government agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>Police with internal administrative agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Which is the preferred model?

Representatives of each jurisdiction were asked what they thought of their model of regulation, and if they believed it worked well or could or should be done differently. With the qualified exception of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), each jurisdictional representative believed their model was the preferred method of regulation of the security industry in their jurisdiction.

The Australian Capital Territory representative believed that the NSW model was an excellent model. However, their view on its applicability for the ACT was qualified by saying that it depends on the focus of the purpose of security. If it is a ‘side extension’ of police, then it should be regulated by the police. If it is ‘stand-alone’ then it should be regulated by a separate government agency. This choice should be determined by the level of compliance that is needed. If the need for compliance enforcement is high, then it should be regulated by police; where the requirement is low, then an agency approach will be adequate. In the ACT, the regulatory agency does minimal compliance work. This is because compliance enforcement is not seen as a major issue in the ACT. In NSW, on the other hand, there is a greater need for compliance enforcement so the police are better placed to be the regulators.

The New South Wales representative believed that their model (having non-sworn officers to do the administrative work and sworn officers to do the compliance and enforcement work) is
the best approach. This model is more cost effective, too, than a model where all the duties are carried out by sworn officers. Moreover, having the administrative and enforcement processes run from the same department ensures good communication between the two.

It should be noted that in December 2009 the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in its Report on Corruption in the Provision and Certification of Security Industry Training (Operation Columba) suggested that, without effective enforcement of reforms to the security industry, the intended effect of these reforms had been negated. An independent review of the NSW Police Force’s regulation of the security industry was undertaken by the management accounting firm Deloitte between February and April 2010. Deloitte prepared an independent analysis of the capacity of the Security Industry Registry (SIR) to carry out the functions currently allocated to it. They recommended abandoning the co-regulatory model (which had involved an association with ASIAL) in favour of the SIR assuming the role of principal regulatory body, and reporting to the Commissioner of Police via the State Crime Command. The SIR was then renamed the Security Licensing and Enforcement Directorate (SLED). As a result of the reforms promulgated on 15 July 2010, the SLED now has a role in identifying and investigating non-compliance with the Security Industry Act 1997, both proactively and in response to complaints from industry. The Government has amended the Security Industry Regulation 2007 to specify new licence fees and to remove the requirement for Master licensees to be members of industry associations.

The Victorian representative argued that it is more appropriate to have security regulated by police because of the potential use of firearms by security officers. If a firearms regulatory agency is to be involved, then that agency is VicPol and hence the regulatory question has been answered. However, the number of security officers who are licensed to carry firearms makes up only a small section of the security industry. Furthermore, in every jurisdiction the police licence and monitor the use of firearms and there is no suggestion in those jurisdictions that a two-agency approach is unworkable.

Further arguments put forward in support of the police model of regulation are that police are trained in compliance and enforcement skills more than civilian regulators. On the other hand, civilian regulators argued that this is a training issue and that they are able to specialise in these skills specific to security (and other occupational compliance where they regulate more than one occupation).

The Tasmanian representative strongly supported their current model. Tasmania regulates through an agency model but with strong police liaison and involvement. The administrative agency looks after the day to day affairs, but TasPol interview every new applicant for a licence. This is the only jurisdiction where this occurs and probably results in a high level of ‘character’ testing. TasPol are freed up to do this by not having to do the administration, nor the compliance checks.

The Northern Territory agency regulator argued that there is less corruption if the industry is regulated outside of police; however they went on to emphasise that a good working relationship with police is needed. Their jurisdiction operates under a Memorandum of Understanding to allow police ‘read only’ access to all data bases in relation to security regulation and compliance. It was stated by the regulator that it would be unlikely that the industry would notice a difference if police were to take over the regulation of the industry in this jurisdiction.
The South Australian representatives commented that they believe that the decision-making is more impartial if regulated by an agency, and working closely with SAPOL. There does not have to be any formal police involvement other than close communication.

Queensland regulates through a government department model and its representatives give a number of reasons that justify their approach being the most appropriate for that State. They cite particularly the focus on a ‘consumer protection’ ethos and the ability of the one department to regulate a number of different occupations. They point out that most of the regulatory agencies which oversee security also regulate other areas such as consumer affairs, business registration, trade licences, liquor licences etc. The requirements of CCTV to be installed where there is pub or club liquor licensing involved mean that there is usually an overlap with security functions. This means that administrative regulation processes can be streamlined and cross matched where more than one licence is required by the same business or individual. It was also argued that their agency regulation model is cheaper to the State than a police regulated model.

Western Australia has now introduced an approach where, like NSW, unsworn police staff do the licensing duties and sworn officers do the investigations and the compliance. Indeed, *the Security and Related Activities (Control) Act 1996 (WA)* stipulates that the licensing officer must be an unsworn staff member. At the present time, with the new amendments in place from June 2009, unsworn officers (referred to as ‘Compliance Officers’) have special powers to do compliance only, thus freeing up police officers to carry out investigations into any alleged criminal conduct of licensed persons.

The WA representative commented that this model is the most appropriate for that State because regulation requires semi authority, and so becomes the core business of police. It means that staff are better equipped with powers and processes that are less bureaucratic. Having unsworn staff working closely with sworn officers is cost effective and means that those with the required powers have been trained accordingly and are thus readily available.

**CLASSES OF LICENCES and MUTUAL RECOGNITION**

All jurisdictions differentiate between a firm’s licence and an individual licence. That is, to operate a business in the security industry in Australia, the firm itself must have a ‘firm’s licence’, and then each individual within that firm (who works in security or who undertakes related activities) must be individually licensed for each security activity he/she undertakes.

There are significant discrepancies between jurisdictions about what licences are available and which activities are regulated. The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) does not address either of these issues in their recently released national consistency policy. However, the COAG review does address the issue of mobility by requiring that

“…The MCPEM-P (Ministerial Council for Policing and Emergency Management – Police), in consultation with the SIRF (Security Industry Regulators Forum) implement full and effective mutual recognition arrangements for the industry, consistent with the approach developed by the COAG Skills Recognition Steering Committee, to improve mobility of security personnel and business across jurisdictions” (COAG; 02/07/2008).

The implementation of mutual recognition, however, has been piecemeal. Discussion of the rather *ad hoc* compliance with COAG’s admonition follows the presentation of licence categories in Table 2-3.
Table 2-3 Licence Categories for each Australian jurisdiction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master licence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee licences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1A - Patrol, guard, watch or protect property (including cash in transit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B – Act as a bodyguard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1C – Act as a crowd controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2A – Act as a security consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B – Sells security equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2C – carry out surveys and inspection of security equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D – Give advice about security equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2E – Install, maintain, monitor, repair or service security equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*New sub categories, to be introduced on 14 June 2011:*

| 1D - Guard with a dog                                     |
| 1E – Monitoring Centre Operator                           |
| 1FC – Guard with firearm for cash in transit              |
| 1FP – Guard with firearm to protect property              |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trainer licence</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEW SOUTH WALES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodyguard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowd controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard dog handler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring Centre Operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss Prevention Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Seller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locksmith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier Equipment Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Equipment Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Master Licence for corporation, government agency, and individual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORTHERN TERRITORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowd Controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Firms Licence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUEENSLAND</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crowd Controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodyguard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Transit Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed security officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring security officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dog patrol security officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security equipment installer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Investigator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Firm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOUTH AUSTRALIA**

| Security agent - security guard work |
| Security agent - security systems work |
| Security agent - crowd control work |
| Security agent - canine handling |
| Security agent - security guard work limited to control room operations |
| Security agent - security systems work limited to providing sales and advice only |
| Security guard restricted to watching, guarding or protecting property |
| Security agent restricted to guard work as an employee |
| Security agent restricted to security systems as an employee |
| Security agent restricted to crowd control as an employee |
| Security agent restricted to canine handling as an employee |
| Security agent - security guard limited to control room operations as an employee |
| Security agent restricted to security systems work limited to providing sales and advice only as an employee |
| Security agent restricted to watching, guarding or protecting property as an employee |
| Security agent restricted to guard work as an employee under supervision |
| Security agent restricted to security systems as an employee under supervision |
| Security agent restricted to crowd control as an employee under supervision |
| Security agent restricted to canine handling as an employee under supervision |
| Security agent restricted to security systems work limited to providing sales and advice only as an employee under supervision |

**TASMANIA**

**AGENT LICENCE**

- Crowd Control - Agent
- Security General Guarding - Agent
- Security Guarding with Dog - Agent
- Security Guarding with Firearm - Agent
- Monitoring Room Operator - Agent
- Body Guard - Agent
- Commercial - Agent
- Inquiry – Agent
- Trainer licence (to be introduced in 2011)

**EMPLOYEE LICENCE**

- Crowd Control
- Security General Guarding
- Security Guarding with Dog
- Security Guarding with Firearm
- Monitoring Room Operator
- Body Guard
- Commercial Sub-Agent

Further information

The Government of New South Wales, in the wake of an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) Report on Corruption in the Provision of Security Industry Training, announced in 2010 that it will abandon the co-regulatory approach in favour of the Security Industry Registry (SIR) assuming the role of principal regulatory body. The SIR will be renamed the Security Licensing & Enforcement Directorate (SLED) and will become part of the NSW Police Force’s State Crime Command. The security industry will fund the SLED to perform its new regulatory functions. Master licensees will no longer be required to be members of an Approved Security Industry Association – this requirement will come into effect once the legislative changes have been passed by Parliament.

From 24 February 2011, all security firms operating in Queensland are required, as a condition of their licence, to be a member of an approved security industry association. Approved security industry associations will take on a key role of improving the integrity of the security industry. (ASIAL gained approval as an approved security industry association in the same month.) Existing security firms are required to become a member of an approved association within 60 days of the new requirements commencing, 26 April 2011. Security firms who do not have an active membership with an approved association by that date will be at risk of having their licence cancelled.13

In South Australia Attorney-General John Rau announced (early 2011) the tightening of licensing and regulation of the security industry. The proposed changes reflect the SA Government’s support of COAG to adopt a more nationally-consistent approach to the regulation of the private security sector including agreed minimum standards relating fingerprinting, police probity checks, eligibility criteria and the licensing of trainers. Among the proposed changes in 2011 include the requirement for security industry trainers to hold a licence, and training providers to gain the approval of the Commissioner for Consumer Affairs before they can provide any training. Individual trainers and directors of Registered Training Organisations that deliver security guard training will need to undergo fingerprinting and police checks, to ensure they meet the same stringent probity requirements as those required of licensed security agents.

Victoria has a ‘lower’ class of regulation called ‘registration’. The types of activities which only require registration include electronic sector installers and alarm monitors.

Tasmania allows businesses that are not in the security business (and hence do not hold a firms licence), to employ individual security providers directly (so long as they are appropriately licensed).

The Northern Territory moved quickly in relation to the availability of mutual recognition with their licences. If a security officer has a valid licence in another jurisdiction, they can work in the NT. The eligibility and training of that person is only reviewed upon renewal of that licence in NT. However, the mutual recognition licence will only be valid in NT once the person has undergone a fingerprint check in NT.

The Australian Capital Territory specifies that all firm licensees must be a member of a security industry association. There is no requirement for them to be a resident of the ACT to obtain an ACT security licence; a person living in NSW, for example, is eligible to apply for an ACT licence. If someone has a NSW licence they can get an ACT licence by mutual recognition. However, the application process including mutual recognition takes longer than the process to get a NSW licence alone.

PROBITY CHECKS

COAG has called upon each jurisdiction to report on its requirements concerning the standards for identification and probity checks for security industry licences including criminal history checks, fingerprinting and ‘close associate’ checks.

Criminal history checks

Criminal history checks is one policy area that COAG is addressing in their attempt to gain a nationally consistent approach to security licensing. This would require all jurisdictions to have consistent mandatory exclusion categories, with exclusion enforced for ten years for a conviction and five years where guilt found but no conviction recorded. The exclusion categories are for the following offences:

i. offence involving assault or violence against the person,
ii. offence involving dishonesty or theft,
iii. firearms or weapons offence,
iv. offence of robbery,
v. offence in relation to a prohibited drug or plant,
vi. offence in relation to a restricted pharmaceutical substance,
vii. offence against Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code as set out in the Schedule to the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 or a terrorist offence against the law of any State or Territory or overseas jurisdictions (COAG; 02/07/2008).

Currently, all jurisdictions carry out mandatory criminal history checks. Applicants must present as a ‘fit and proper person’. Queensland extends this check to include New Zealand. Refusal of a licence is usually based upon a person being guilty of a ‘prescribed offence’. Being ‘guilty’ includes a finding of guilt but where no conviction has been recorded. Prescribed offences include convictions within the last ten years for offences broadly including firearms offences, drug offences (which involve a term of imprisonment), violent offences such as assault (where imprisonment was imposed), murder, kidnapping, sexual offences, fraud offences (involving imprisonment). More recently these offences include offences related to riot and terrorism. New South Wales mirrors these provisions and also includes offences relating to reckless conduct causing death at a workplace.

The meaning of ‘fit and proper’ varies between jurisdictions. For instance, in the Australian Capital Territory, a person cannot be refused a security licence on the basis of not being ‘fit and proper’ unless they have a criminal conviction. Other jurisdictions have a broader application, for example, where there is police intelligence that indicates that the applicant is not ‘fit and proper’. In South Australia and New South Wales the Commissioner does not have to inform applicants why they were deemed not to be ‘fit and proper’.

Under the COAG plan, the non-disclosure of reasons for the denial of a licence will become consistent nationally, although any such decision will be subject to administrative review processes (COAG; 02/07/2008).

Applicants who have a known ‘close association’ with unsavoury characters can be deemed not a ‘fit and proper’ person to hold a security licence in all jurisdictions (see ‘close associates’ below).

In Tasmania if a person presents with ‘matters of concern’ they will be asked to provide a character reference in support of their application. In the Australian Capital Territory, on application, and each year upon renewal, the applicant must provide an Australian Federal Police (AFP) clearance certificate (which they have followed up themselves). In South Australia, the criminal history check also includes a detailed look at matters that had come to police attention but that were ‘not proceeded with’ and anything on the police record of ‘relevance’. A licence can be refused in South Australia if it is not ‘in the public interest’.

A consistent approach across Australia would eliminate the ability for someone to be deemed unfit for security work in one jurisdiction, but able to gain a licence in another. This policy, however, does not seem to address the inconsistent way licences are refused under the ‘fit and proper’ person policy, where each jurisdiction has a different approach to determining who is ‘fit and proper’.

For greater consistency and security, jurisdictional criminal history checks must include national criminal history checks on every licence applicant at the time of the application and then daily local criminal history checks for the licence’s duration. This should include measures to enable jurisdictions to act promptly to suspend or revoke a licence if daily criminal history checks reveal an adverse event.
Fingerprint checks

The requirement for fingerprinting or other checks is inconsistent across Australia. **South Australia** introduced mandatory fingerprint checks in 2005. Neither **Queensland** nor the **Australian Capital Territory** currently fingerprint applicants, although Queensland plans to introduce a mandatory requirement from 1 August 2011.\(^\text{14}\)

**Tasmania** does not yet collect fingerprints *on a regular basis* for ‘cost reasons’ but anecdotal evidence is that that is soon to change. However, TasPol will fingerprint upon request if there is doubt as to an applicant’s identity. **Western Australia** now has in place a full hand (palm print and finger print) requirement along with photographing. **New South Wales** does fingerprinting and also photographs all new applicants. Indeed, all new applicants across Australia now require photographic IDs to be on file.

Under the COAG policy, jurisdictions will be required to have in place the use of a 100 point identity check and mandatory fingerprinting prior to the issue of a licence.

Close associate checks

All jurisdictions check ‘close associates’ as part of their determination of ‘fit and proper’ persons. However, the definition of a ‘close associate’ varies between jurisdictions. Once again, this is an area where COAG is attempting to find consistent ground.

Jurisdictions have been requested by COAG to enforce eligibility restrictions sufficient to refuse or revoke a licence application based on the probity persons having a financial interest in or exercising a significant influence over the management or operation of the security business.

**TESTING FOR PROHIBITED DRUGS / ALCOHOL**

Only two jurisdictions, **South Australia** and **Western Australia**, currently have provision for drug and alcohol testing. However, these provisions are only for crowd controllers. In **South Australia**, SAPOL has authority to carry out random or targeted tests on crowd controllers while they are working, and controllers are required to provide a sample of urine or blood, if requested. When a positive test is found, a sample is sent to a forensic lab for confirmation. The crowd controller has an opportunity to explain, and then it is up to the Commissioner of the Office of Consumer and Business Affairs (SA) to exercise his/her discretion to continue or to cancel the licence. This is not necessarily a life ban, and the crowd controller can reapply in a ‘reasonable’ time. In order to prepare a story published in *The Advertiser* in January 2011, journalists had obtained, under FOI, documents related to drug testing from the Office of Business and Consumer Affairs (OCBA) which regulates the industry. Of the 432 security guards tested in 2009, 49 had drugs in their system (11.3%). If applied across the industry in SA, as many as 900 would have used illegal drugs at some time.\(^\text{15}\)

In **Western Australia**, all licensed crowd controllers, along with all security officers with firearm or baton endorsements, must provide a sample of blood or urine for testing if required. However, WA does not test for alcohol; only for prohibited drugs. The testing can be carried out at any time on the licensed person. A drug test notice is issued for the person to attend a set time and place. The drug testing is then carried out by an ‘approved sample collector’ (a police officer who has been trained as a phlebotomist and who is approved by the Commissioner of Health).


\(^\text{15}\) “‘Clean up’ fails to halt security guard drug use”, by Miles Kemp, 24/1/11 page 4.
Western Australia has also introduced a presumptive drug test kit which indicates within three minutes if drugs are present in one’s urine. If there is a drug present, the sample is decanted into two drug test kits; one is kept by the licensed person as a control sample (they can have it analysed at their own cost if they disagree with the result of the other sample) and the other sample is analysed by the Government chemical laboratory.

With the exception of the Northern Territory (where there is currently a proposal before parliament to introduce random drug testing to be carried out by police), no other jurisdiction undertakes testing for drugs or alcohol, nor plans to. All of these other jurisdictions rely on the ‘fitness for work’ policy or OH&S requirements to control drugs and alcohol in areas under their purview.

**TRAINING**

Following direction from COAG, all jurisdictions now operate under a series of agreed Minimum Standards. The training package CPP07 – Property Services is the key. This training package is an integrated set of nationally endorsed competency standards, assessment guidelines and Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF) qualifications, specific to the security industry. Qualifications within this training package range from Certificate I to Certificate IV, then go on to Diploma, Advanced Diploma, Vocational Graduate Certificate and Vocational Graduate Certificate. All jurisdictions require that initial training be completed to a minimum of Certificate II level. However, NSW, in addition, requires Certificate I for pre-licensing approval for new applicants.

Security licensing and regulatory authorities across Australia actively participated in the development of the CPP07 Property Services training package with a view to aligning security units and qualifications as part of the move towards a national licensing system for security. Commonwealth, state and territory governments want to develop uniform national standards for the private security industry in order to:

- raise the minimum quality standards of the industry relating to:
  - skills and training
  - trustworthiness and reliability of security personnel
- extend security capacity particularly to cope with surges in demand for special events by:
  - reducing barriers to interstate trade and increasing mobility of security personnel between jurisdictions
  - increasing economies of scale and scope for nationally focused companies to help them build capacity.

This will require:

- improving and standardising probity checks and exclusion criteria,
- standardising secure classifications, licences and registration procedures across jurisdictions to enhance measures of equivalence to encourage mutual recognition across jurisdiction,
- standardising and improving skills and training and aligning these to security, and
Since workers within the security industry are employed across a range of service types, the training package is made up of a number of different units of competency. The base Australian Qualifications Framework qualifications are:

- Certificate II in Security Operations
- Certificate II in Technical Security
- Certificate III in Technical Security
- Certificate III in Investigative Services
- Certificate IV in Security and Risk Management
- Diploma of Security and Risk Management.

Additionally, the security sector skill sets are provided in CPP07 for:

- Perform Retail Security Operations
- Perform Cash-in-Transit Operations
- Perform Monitoring Centre Operations
- Conduct Investigations
- Use Firearms and Defensive Tactics
- Coordinate Control Room Operations
- Manage Dogs for Security Functions
- Conduct Factual Investigation
- Conduct Surveillance
- Provide Biometrics Consulting and Advice
- Coordinate Investigative Activities

The ‘Security Operations’ stream is the base for the individual security guarding type worker (for example general guarding or crowd control) and the ‘Technical Security’ stream is for those working with the technology involved in security work (for example, installing security cameras and systems). Once the general core subjects are completed, the security worker then specialises in the specific area. Those jurisdictions which require the firm to be trained (i.e. those running the business) complete the Security and Risk Management stream.

The level of competency required for Certificate II, for example, requires that the individual has the following competencies or learning outcomes to be able to:

- “demonstrate understanding of a broad knowledge base incorporating theoretical concepts, with substantial depth in some areas,
- analyse and plan approaches to technical problems or management requirements,
- transfer and apply theoretical concepts and/or technical or creative skills to a range of situations,
- evaluate information, using it to forecast for planning or research purposes,
- take responsibility for won outputs in relation to broad quantity and quality parameters, and
- take some responsibility for the achievement of group outcomes.” (Construction and Property Services Industry Skills Council, 2008)

By way of example, in order to become suitably qualified as a crowd controller the worker must obtain Certificate II in Security Operations which consists of seven core units, which are:
Communicate effectively in the security industry
Maintain workplace safety
Work effectively in the security industry
Work as part of a team
Provide security services to customers
Provide first aid
Respond to security risk situation

Then they must complete four electives, which generally are:

- Control access to and exit from premises
- Monitor and control individual and crowd behaviour
- Screen baggage and people
- Protect self and others using basic defensive techniques

If the worker is specialising in general guarding they would need to complete the same seven core units and complete the following electives:

- Protect persons
- Control access to and exit from premises
- Patrol premises
- Protect self and others using basic defensive techniques

COAG has included an examination of the training requirements across Australia in its drive for consistency. The focus of the COAG criteria is on improving standards rather than changing the content of the training; in particular the quality and consistency of training materials and quality of Registered Training Organisations (RTOs).

The competency and skills which all jurisdictions are now required by COAG to agree upon include: a pre-licensing course for new applicants covering critical foundation knowledge for employment in the security industry prior to a licence being issued; and a provisional, probational or conditional licence for a duration of not less than six months prior to the full licence being issued.

The question then arises: if it is the applicant and employer who are responsible for training, who will bear the increased costs (justified by higher qualified individuals) of the provision of security services? One of the great advantages for outsourcing of police roles is its low cost. If the training regime becomes too onerous, a private security service may price itself out of the market.

**MUTUAL RECOGNITION 2 recent cases**

*Kabir and the Commissioner of Police for NSW [2010] AATA 853*

*Dib and the Commissioner of Police for NSW [2010] AATA 852*

In these two cases (heard by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT)), the NSW Security Licensing and Enforcement Directorate (SLED) argued that the applicants were not eligible to apply under the provisions of Section 19 of the *Mutual Recognition Act 1992* (Cth) because each had had a previous NSW licence that had been revoked as a result of ‘disciplinary action’. In both cases, the individuals' revocations occurred because they had failed to comply with the requirement to complete a required training upgrade. The AAT affirmed the Commissioner's decision, ruling that a revocation on these grounds *does* constitute ‘disciplinary action’. This means that applicants who have their licences revoked
for not providing upgraded training certificates, and who then obtain an interstate licence (in the case of Mr Kabir, the Northern Territory; in the case of Mr Dib, Queensland) are not eligible for a licence in NSW under mutual recognition principles. The ruling means that each time a person reapply for a NSW licence he or she must still hold a current equivalent interstate licence. If the interstate licence has expired, he or she will need to meet NSW licensing requirements (including completing training and assessment with a SLED approved Registered Training Organisation).

PROVISION AND RESTRICTIONS FOR CONTRACTING OUT
The Northern Territory is the only jurisdiction which does not have provisions for contracting out. South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia all have a requirement, but it is only that the subcontractor must have the appropriate licence. In New South Wales, a firm can only subcontract to another firm holding the same licence, but they do not have to inform the client or get client approval. Queensland has partial provision and, as for NSW, no client approval is required. Subcontracting in that State can only be done to firms with the appropriate licence. In addition, a register must be kept of all subcontracting out.

RERAINT AND ARREST PROVISIONS
The general provision in Australia is that those working in security-related industries do not have any specific powers of restraint and arrest. However, there are exceptions in each jurisdiction where such powers are granted in specific legislation. For example, in the Northern Territory, the security guards working in the Casino have power to hold people in an ‘approved place’ under the Gaming Control Act 1993 (NT).

Section 28:
Detention of suspected person in casino
(1) Notwithstanding any other law of the Territory, where:
(a) the person for the time being in charge of a casino;
(b) an employee authorised by the Licensee to act in pursuance of this section; or
(c) a gaming inspector,
suspects on reasonable grounds that a person in a casino is contravening or attempting to contravene this or any other Act, the person in charge, the employee or inspector may detain the suspected person in an approved place in the casino until the arrival at the place of a member of the Police Force.

Victoria also has specific provisions for arrest and detention powers regarding transport security for its transport systems. In relation to these matters, and other ad hoc legislation, Chapter 4 on Legal Powers will expand the discussion.

COMPLAINTS, INFRINGEMENTS AND PENALTIES
Security personnel who breach the relevant jurisdiction’s security legislation or regulations are subject to penalties. These penalties range from fines to suspensions or revocation of licence, which requires a re-application for a licence after a certain period and by virtue of the respective Act/Regulation. In addition, security personnel may have their licence suspended or revoked for breaches of the criminal law generally. In the ‘agency’ style of regulation, where licensing legislation is breached, personnel are investigated and adjudicated by staff of the licensing authority (with appeal provisions to a court). On the other hand, where the criminal law is allegedly breached, the investigation and adjudication is carried out by police
(with appeal to the courts). Each outcome would be notified to the licensing authority. In Victoria, where police do the regulation of licences, police investigate all alleged breaches with either the licensing section of the police involved (for regulation breaches), or with the courts adjudicating.

All jurisdictions have provision to suspend or revoke a licence under the ‘fit and proper person’ provisions, where a criminal offence been committed or there is a breach of licensing regulations (such as failing to wear security identification badge or being intoxicated whilst on duty). In addition, all jurisdictions have offences which result in mandatory suspension or revocation in line with offences that will restrict initial approval of an application (and in line with the COAG provisions). Generally speaking, once charges have been laid, the licensing authority can exercise mandatory suspension or revocation of licence even while charges are pending. Once guilt has been found (with or without conviction) there is the option to continue the suspension or revocation, as the person’s continuing in the industry may not be in the public interest.

Investigation and enforcement zeal varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The enforcement branches in New South Wales, Western Australia and Victoria carry out regular and specific inspections of licensed security personnel. But the ACT does not have dedicated security inspectors and only discovers infringements when an inspector for the other business fields discovers them as part of those inspections. For example, liquor licensing inspectors may discover infringements by the security staff at the same time.

**LEGISLATION RELATING TO THE USE OF FIREARMS**

Every jurisdiction throughout Australia follows the National Firearms Agreement 1996 and each jurisdiction has specific firearms legislation for the control and use of firearms. Furthermore, in all jurisdictions, security personnel must have an approved and genuine reason to carry a handgun.

In the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria, all firearm licensing and registration is carried out solely by the police. That is, the individual must obtain a firearms licence (as anyone who wishes to use a firearm in that jurisdiction would) and then that licence is endorsed on the relevant security licence. In these situations, it is the responsibility of the security firm to issue and secure the firearms. In Victoria there is a move to require the firm to have a special firearms licence, but this plan is in its infancy.

**New South Wales** has stringent provisions for permits for ammunition, calibre issue and return of firearms. There are also considerable restrictions on storage and transportation of firearms, as well as annual training and accreditation. A separate firearms registry is kept.

**Queensland** requires endorsement for cash in transit security guards. Weapons licensing requires that there be an endorsement if one wishes to obtain an occupational weapons equipment licence. Static guards can no longer carry firearms.

**Western Australia** requires an endorsement for security personnel wishing to carry firearms for cash in transit. For other armed guarding, a permit must be sought for the specific event.

**FIREARMS CARRIAGE, THEIR INSPECTION AND COMPLIANCE MONITORING**

In all jurisdictions inspection and compliance in relation to firearms is carried out by the police. The jurisdictional representative in the Australian Capital Territory noted, however,
that inspections are not carried out specifically in relation to security but only general firearms inspections and compliance as for any firearms owner. Random inspections are conducted in Western Australia. No other jurisdiction has random inspections.

To what extent are private guards routinely armed in Australia? Guards protecting cash delivery trucks or replenishing ATM machines are usually equipped with handguns. In his report for the AIC Rees (1984: 57) reported that 27 per cent of the 289 PSC employees who returned the author's questionnaire said they carried a gun or other weapon while on duty. There are no survey data that have attempted to cross-match firearms licences with the occupation of those who hold a licence. In the absence of any hard data we are left with guesswork. The percentage figure is a difficult one unless we have confidence that the classifications of security tasks are being universally adopted, which is not the case. In other words, the figures have cash in transit guards at around 1% of security industry employees, but that is only because we incorporate debt collectors and locksmiths and surveillance camera monitors in the definition. It may be the case that the Rees figure is based upon a much narrower definition of PSC. Prenzler (2005a) had the range as between 10-30% for 2003-4.

According to security association sources, approximately 4 -5% of security officers/guards possess a licence to carry a firearm, most of which are used in Cash In Transit operations.

A survey of the industry in Europe reveals that the proportion of security personnel that is authorised to be armed is about 40 per cent in Bulgaria, just under 25 per cent in Slovenia, Spain and Turkey, and below 10 per cent in Croatia, Germany and Sweden (CoESS 2008, Small Arms Survey 2011, Florquin 2011). A number of countries actually prohibit security personnel from using firearms at all, including the Bahamas, Denmark, Japan, Kenya, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway and the UK. A survey of the industry across 34 European states reveals that the vast majority of security personnel are only allowed to use handguns and not long-arms (CoESS 2008, da Silva 2010).

USE OF DOGS

Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia all have a specific licence class for security with the use of a dog. In the Northern Territory, under new legislation (currently under review) an applicant will need to have a licence endorsed to use a dog, but currently there are no provisions for licensing security with a dog. Queensland now requires that a guard licence must be endorsed to use a dog as ‘patrol property’. In order to be trained in the use of dogs, the guard must, as one of his/her electives, complete a unit of competency which includes managing of dogs or handling of dogs for security patrol. In WA, police carryout regular and specific inspections in this area. This will be increased when the dedicated ‘compliance officers’ commence.

LIQUOR LICENSING PROVISIONS

Throughout Australia, special provisions for security have been put in place for pubs and clubs with a liquor licence. Research has shown that this area of security work is considered to be potentially volatile (Williams, 2001). As such, those supervising the security of these premises require specialist training in order to addresses the unique challenges of the late night pub or club scene. Security personnel who work in pubs and clubs are usually classified as ‘crowd controllers’ to differentiate their work from that of the typical static ‘security guard’.
Crowd control generates a great deal of public scrutiny. As a consequence, a number of jurisdictions require specific skills and reporting procedures for crowd controllers, compared to those of other security officers. However, this is not uniform. Notwithstanding the high public concern, and the inconsistent regulation requirements throughout Australia, COAG has chosen not to address this area specifically.

Nevertheless, the following provisions are in place throughout the various jurisdictions.

- In the **Australian Capital Territory**, **Western Australia** and **New South Wales** a publican must have a master security licence or subcontract to a firm that does. From 1 December 2011 in the **ACT** a security employee working in a licensed premises must hold a Responsible Service of Alcohol (RSA) certificate.
- In the **Northern Territory**, a publican must keep a register of who is working on security each night, and include their allocated number. Both ‘crowd controllers’ and ‘security guards’ are licensed to work in licensed premises in the NT.
- In **Queensland** there is a provision under the **Liquor Act 1992** that owners or managers of premises must keep a ratio of crowd controllers to crowd (1:100) and a crowd controller register must be kept for additional information, for example, injuries.
- In **South Australia** crowd controllers in licensed premises must be registered with the Office of the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner (in addition to their crowd controller licence requirements) and must be trained in RSA. If the crowd controller is not RSA trained, he/she is not able to use force against a patron; the Responsible Person must carry out the use of force. They must also keep a register of patrons against whom force was used to refuse entry to or remove from the licensed premises. In addition, procedural requirements for removal of a person from a licensed premises (or refusal of entry) are set out under Schedule 1A of the **Liquor Licensing (General) Regulations 1997**.
- In **Western Australia** there is a requirement that crowd controllers must keep an incident register where a crowd controller physically restrains a person or removes a person for behavioural reasons or refuses a person entry.
- The licensing and training of crowd controllers is currently under review in **Tasmania**. There is a loophole in Tasmania, in so far as a liquor licensee needs no security training. Hence a pub owner who does his/her own ‘crowd controlling’ needs no licence and hence has no training. However, in the Wrest Point Casino, all security staff need a security licence plus the casino needs the liquor licence under separate legislation.
- **Victorian** crowd controllers must also be trained in RSA.

**A BLACK MARKET?**

The Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (LMHU) in Victoria launched its **Safeguard** initiative in 2010. The campaign aims to assist clients in finding quality contractors, and to eliminate rogue contractors. The Safeguard report draws on research conducted by the LHMMU Security Union in surveying tenants, clients and their employers. Their survey involved 223 Victorian security officers and 194 respondents working in office buildings and other properties requiring contract security in Melbourne. The report’s findings included:

- Significant growth in the industry has led to a flood of rogue contractors into the market, setting off a price war.
Many contractors are failing to properly train their officers, while high turnover due to low pay and insecure jobs also undermines standards.

80.4% of tenants, clients and their employees surveyed agreed that security officers in their buildings perform a vital role.

85.3% would be concerned about cut-price contractors being used in their building.

Other than that report, no jurisdictional representative, in interviews with the research team, seemed worried about the existence of a black market in the security industry. The only jurisdiction to make a specific comment was WA, which stated that one area of concern may be that electricians may be installing alarms without a security alarm installer licence. However, the general consensus is that when unlicensed operators stray into the industry, the regulated operators quickly squeeze out those not licensed.

There is a ‘grey area’ of people working casually as security guards at parties and private functions for no fee or reward. This is not generally an issue unless, or until, something goes wrong.

Any other issue relating to the black market is mainly to do with the activities on the ‘periphery’ of the industry, such as unlicensed people working in the security hardware area, mainly due to ignorance of the need for a licence.

MEASURES OF COMPLIANCE AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

The most common measure of compliance and performance of the regulatory agencies is the requirement upon licensees to provide a report of the agency in the departmental Annual Report. This provides a limited avenue for public agency scrutiny. The areas mainly reported on are mostly to do with the number of licences issued, licences suspended and timeframes for processes.

The ACT has limited measures of compliance through targets concerning the number of inspections carried out. The Commissioner reports to the minister and the department is subject to audit. NSW and WA do not have any compliance measures at present but are currently developing performance indicators each with officers dedicated for this job.

SURVEY OF THE INDUSTRY

During February 2010, a survey of security personnel was conducted via the Australian Security Industry Association Limited (ASIAL) website. The questionnaire sought the views of the owners of security firms and security managers about a preferred system for regulating the industry in their main jurisdiction of operation. The survey was divided into three parts. Part A asked demographic questions, Part B asked opinions on security industry regulation, and Part C asked for free text comments.

Preliminary summary results are presented below. More detailed cross-tabulations will be presented in the final report to the Australian Research Council and interpolated into the material presented above.

PART A: DEMOGRAPHICS OF RESPONDENTS

The survey attracted 170 respondents. The following figures show the distribution of total respondents by; jurisdiction, job category, the respondent’s position in their company and the number of employees in each respondent’s company. Figure 2-1 looks at respondents by jurisdiction.
The largest number (73) and percentage of respondents came from NSW with the least respondents from NT (n=2). Differences in population should be taken into account when analysing these figures, as well as the number of security business in each jurisdiction.

Figure 2-2 summarises the distribution of job categories the respondents represent. ‘Unarmed guards’ was the job category chosen by most respondents. This is also representative of the national spread of security operators according to the 2006 census data.

Figure 2-3 shows that the largest response rate (n=123) was from those who are the ‘owner and manager’ of their business.
The majority of respondents are involved in a company with 1-19 employees. This is shown in Figure 2-4. Overall, respondents to this survey are most likely to live in NSW, work mainly with ‘unarmed guards’, and be the owner and manager in a business which employees 1-19 employees.

**PART B: OPINIONS ON SECURITY INDUSTRY REGULATION AND TRAINING**

The next of the survey asked respondents about their opinions on the security regulation in their jurisdiction and training. We have divided it here into a number of sections.

**Section 1: This section asked a series of questions about the effectiveness of the current regulatory structure operating in Australia.**

Figure 2-5 shows responses to the question “how effective do you believe that the current regulatory system is in your jurisdiction in ensuring practical competencies for individuals entering the industry?”
Figure 2-5 Effectiveness in competencies

Figure 2-5 shows responses to the question “how effective do you believe that the current regulatory system is in your jurisdiction in supporting ethical conduct in the industry?”

Figure 2-6 Effectiveness ethical conduct

Figure 2-6 shows responses to the question “how effective do you believe that the current regulatory system is in your jurisdiction in supporting ethical conduct in the industry?”
Figure 2-7 shows responses to the question “how effective do you believe that the current regulatory system is in your jurisdiction in removing disreputable operators from the industry?”

**Figure 2-7 Effectiveness removing disreputable operators**

![Removing Disreputable Operators from the Industry](image)

Figure 2-8 show responses to the question “how effective do you believe that the current regulatory system is in your jurisdiction in removing criminal elements from the industry?”

**Figure 2-8 Effectiveness remove criminal elements**

![Removing Criminal Elements from the Industry](image)
Figure 2-9 shows responses to the question “how effective do you believe that the current regulatory system is in your jurisdiction in raising the level of professionalism in the industry?”

**Figure 2-9 Effectiveness raise professionalism**

![Bar chart showing responses to the question about the effectiveness of the regulatory system in raising professionalism.](image)

Figure 2-10 shows responses to the question “how effective do you believe that the current regulatory system is in your jurisdiction in raising the level of professionalism in the industry?”

**Figure 2-10 Effectiveness safe practices**

![Bar chart showing responses to the question about the effectiveness of the regulatory system in promoting safe work practices and minimizing injuries.](image)
Figure 2-11 show responses to the question “how effective do you believe that the current regulatory system is in your jurisdiction in reducing the incidence of assaults by security personnel?”

**Figure 2-11 Effectiveness reduce assaults**

Reducing the Incidence of Assaults by Security Personnel

![Bar chart showing responses to effectiveness in reducing assaults.]

Figure 2-12 shows responses to the question “how effective do you believe that the current regulatory system is in your jurisdiction in reducing injuries to security personnel?”

**Figure 2-12 Effectiveness reduce injuries**

Reducing Injuries to Security Personnel

![Bar chart showing responses to effectiveness in reducing injuries.]

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Figure 2-13 shows responses to the question “how effective do you believe that the current regulatory system is in your jurisdiction in making security personnel more effective in protecting the community security personnel?”

Figure 2-13 Effectiveness protect community

Section 2. The next series of questions sought responses from respondents regarding appropriate training.

Figure 2-14 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of unarmed guards?”

Figure 2-14 Appropriate training unarmed
Figure 2-15 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of armed guards?”

**Figure 2-15 Appropriate training armed**

[Bar chart showing appropriateness of pre-licence training for armed guards]

Figure 2-16 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of cash in transit guards?”

**Figure 2-16 Appropriate training cash in transit**

[Bar chart showing appropriateness of pre-licence training for cash in transit guards]
Figure 2-17 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of crowd controllers?”

**Figure 2-17 Appropriate training crowd control**

![Graph showing the appropriateness of pre-licence training for crowd controllers.]

Figure 2-18 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of consultants?”

**Figure 2-18 Appropriate training consultants**

![Graph showing the appropriateness of pre-licence training for consultants.]

Figure 2-19 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of investigators?”

**Figure 2-19 Appropriate training investigators**

![Appropriateness of Pre-licence Training for Investigators](image)

Figure 2-20 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of bodyguards?”
Figure 2-20 Appropriate training bodyguards

Figure 2-21 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of trainers?”

Figure 2-21 Appropriate training trainers

Figure 2-22 show responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of locksmiths and installers of physical security?”

Figure 2-22 Appropriate training locksmiths
Figure 2-23 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of dog handlers?”

**Figure 2-23 Appropriate training dog handlers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appropriateness of Pre-licence Training for Dog Handlers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yes  No  Don’t know

Figure 2-24 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of loss prevention officers?”

**Figure 2-24 Appropriate training loss prevention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appropriateness of Pre-licence Training for Loss Prevention Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yes  No  Don’t know
Figure 2-25 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of electronic security installers?”

**Figure 2-25 Appropriate training electronic**

![Bar chart showing appropriateness of pre-licence training for electronic security installers.]

Figure 2-26 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of security salespersons?”

**Figure 2-26 Appropriate training sales**

![Bar chart showing appropriateness of pre-licence training for security salespersons.]

Figure 2-27 shows responses to the question “In your view, do you think that mandated pre-licence training under current legislation is appropriate to the work of in-house security providers?”

**Figure 2-27 Appropriate training in house**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appropriateness of Pre-licence Training for In-house Security Providers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 3. The next series of questions was designed to elicit comments and views regarding the quality and content of training courses.

Figure 2-28 shows responses to the question “Do compulsory pre-licence training courses teach adequate communication skills?”

**Figure 2-28 Training and communication skills**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-licence Training and Adequate Communication Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2-29 shows responses to the question “Do compulsory pre-licence training courses teach adequate conflict resolution skills?”

**Figure 2-29 Training and conflict resolution**

Pre-licence Training and Adequate Conflict Resolution Skills

- Yes
- No
- Don’t know

Figure 2-30 shows responses to the question “Do compulsory pre-licence training courses teach adequate physical restraint skills?”

**Figure 2-30 Training and physical restraint**

Pre-licence Training and Adequate Physical Restraint Skills

- Yes
- No
- Don’t know

Figure 2-31 shows responses to the question “Do compulsory pre-licence training courses teach adequate self-defence skills?”

**Figure 2-31 Training and self-defence skills**

Pre-licence Training and Adequate Self-Defence Skills

- Yes
- No
- Don’t know
Figure 2-32 shows responses to the question “Do compulsory pre-licence training courses teach adequate knowledge of law?”

**Figure 2-32 Training and knowledge of law**

![Graph showing responses to the question about adequate knowledge of law.](image)

Figure 2-33 shows responses to the question “Do compulsory pre-licence training courses teach adequate basic security procedures?”

**Figure 2-33 Training and security procedures**

![Graph showing responses to the question about adequate basic security procedures.](image)
Figure 2-34 shows responses to the question “Do compulsory pre-licence training courses teach adequate occupational health and safety principles?”

**Figure 2-34 Training and OH&S**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-35 shows responses to the question “Is firearms training adequate for security personnel under firearms legislation?”

**Figure 2-35 Training and firearms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-36 shows responses to the question “Are new national training competencies appropriate?”

**Figure 2-36 New national training competencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2-37 shows responses to the question “Have training standards in the industry improved over the last five years?”

**Figure 2-37 Training improvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have Training Standards in the Industry</th>
<th>Improved over the Last Five Years?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-38 shows responses to the question “Should there be mandated training in security management?”

**Figure 2-38 Mandated training**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should there be Mandated Training in Security Management?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 4. The next series of questions was designed to see what respondents thought of industry input into legislative requirements.

Figure 2-39 shows responses to the question “Was the current legislation developed with sufficient consultation with the security industry?”

**Figure 2-39 Legislation and consultation**

![Graph showing responses to the question “Was the current legislation developed with sufficient consultation with the security industry?”](image)

Figure 2-40 shows responses to the question “Is there sufficient scope for input from the industry into the administration of security industry legislation?”

**Figure 2-40 Legislation and input**

![Graph showing responses to the question “Is there sufficient scope for input from the industry into the administration of security industry legislation?”](image)
Figure 2-41 shows responses to the question “Is there adequate communication between the regulator and licence holders?”

**Figure 2-41 Regulatory communication**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-42 shows responses to the question “Is the current regulatory body the appropriate body to regulate the industry?”

**Figure 2-42 Regulatory body appropriateness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2-43 shows responses to the question “Is compliance with current legislation effectively monitored?”

**Figure 2-43 Monitoring compliance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>40%</th>
<th>60%</th>
<th>80%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-44 shows responses to the question “Are there very few unlicensed security personnel working in the industry where licences are required?”

**Figure 2-44 Unlicensed operator perceptions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0%</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>30%</th>
<th>40%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-45 shows responses to the question “Are criminal history checks updated frequently enough?”

**Figure 2-45 Criminal history checks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0%</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>30%</th>
<th>40%</th>
<th>50%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2-46 shows responses to the question “Do the very large majority of security companies comply with award payments and legislated employment conditions?”

**Figure 2-46 Compliance with awards**

![Compliance with awards chart]

Figure 2-47 shows responses to the question “Is there a problem in tendering with competitors undercutting through cash-in-hand payments to operatives?”

**Figure 2-47 Extent cash in hand**

![Extent cash in hand chart]
**PART C: FREE TEXT COMMENTS ON THE REGULATORY SYSTEM**

For the purpose of this report these free text comments have been coded into similar responses. Figure 2-48 asks about positives and Figure 2-49 about negatives.

**Figure 2-48 What are the best aspects of the current regulatory system?**

What are the best aspects of the current regulatory system?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensing</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security checks</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More professional industry</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourage bad operators</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2-49 Are there any deficiencies in the regulatory system?**

Are there any deficiencies in the regulatory system? If so, please specify.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should be national approach</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some not paying award rates</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlicenced/ inadequately trained operators</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of compliance/ enforcement by regulator</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too much training required</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probationary system</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police involvement inappropriate/ untimely</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2-50 What areas of training, if any, need improvement?

What areas of training, if any, need improvement?

- Dog handling
- Crowd control
- Firearms
- Security systems
- Provisional licensing SNAFU
- Monitor training providers for quality
- On the job training
- Self defence / physical restraint
- Management training
- All areas
- English language skills / literacy / numeracy
- Legal
- Security procedures
- Communication
- Conflict resolution
- Fire safety
- Monitoring and call centre / customer service
- None / n.a.
- Don’t know
- Other
Figure 2-51 Loopholes in the current legislation

Please describe any loopholes that you are aware of in the current legislation.

- Provisional licences / border hopping / mutual recognition
- Sub-contracting arrangements / cash payments
- Sub-contracting arrangements / cash payments
- Shortcuts in training
- Poorly trained / qualified staff
- Poor enforcement
- Inadequate security / background checks
- Poor documentation / management
- Poor literacy / numeracy / English language skills
- First aid requirements
- Those not subject to licensing (e.g. locksmiths)
- None / n.a.
- Don't know

Figure 2-52 Areas that are not covered by regulation

Are there any areas of security work which are not covered by industry regulation that should be?

- Electrical contractors / engineers
- Locksmiths
- Specialised work - e.g. airports etc.
- Gates & fencing
- Retail security / loss detection
- Consultants
- IT security
- In house staff
- Managers & supervisors
- RSA marshalls
- Screening / searching people - regulations needed
- None / n.a.
- Don't know
- Other
Figure 2-53 Which agency should administer the current legislation?

If you don’t think that the current regulatory body should administer the current legislation, which agency should and why?

![Pie chart showing percentages for different agencies]

- Current body / SIR / Dept of Fair trading: 40%
- Should be a national body: 24%
- Police: 11%
- Not Police: 6%
- AG's / Justice: 13%
- Consumer Affairs: 7%
- Industry people: 7%
- None / n.a.: 4%
- Don’t know: 4%
- Other: 9%

Figure 2-54 Appropriate penalties?

Are the penalties for breaches of the current legislation appropriate? If not, what should they be?

![Pie chart showing percentages for different views on penalties]

- Yes: 51%
- No: 33%
- Don’t know: 10%
- Not enforced: 10%
- Not harsh enough: 18%
- n.a.: 10%
- Other: 5%
Summary of survey findings

The above four sections have looked at the opinions of participants in the security industry on the effectiveness of the current regulatory structures in Australia, on the adequacy or otherwise of training for specific security work, the quality and content of that training, and the appropriateness of industry input into current legislative requirements.

Most responses regarding the effectiveness of the current regulatory structures indicated respondents’ views that they were ‘moderately effective’. However, a majority of respondents thought that their current regulatory authority’s ability to remove disreputable operators from the industry is ‘highly ineffective’ (59%). Moreover, 38% of respondents thought that their regulator’s ability to support ethical conduct was ‘highly ineffective’; although that same percentage (38%) thought that it was ‘moderately effective’.

Regarding the adequacy of training for specific security work, respondents were generally satisfied with the appropriateness of the pre-licence training. The only exception was for security salespersons, where 38% of respondents thought the pre-licence training was not appropriate.

When looking at the quality of pre-licence training, respondents’ thoughts were mixed. Generally speaking, respondents were of the view that the training quality was adequate in the areas of knowledge of law, basic security procedures and occupational health and safety principles. But training was not adequate in the areas of communication skills, conflict resolution skills, physical restraint skills and self-defence skills.

55% of respondents thought that training in firearms was adequate under the existing jurisdiction-based firearms legislation.

A majority of respondents thought that industry standards had improved over the last five years.
The final section, too, showed a very mixed bag of responses. When it comes to industry input into legislative requirements of the industry, a majority of respondents felt there was insufficient consultation with industry when developing legislation, insufficient input into the administration of industry legislation, and poor communication between regulator and licence holder.

Moreover, there is insufficient monitoring of compliance with legislation; infrequent criminal history checks updating, and a scepticism that large companies comply strictly with award payment requirements. In addition, 62% of respondents thought that there is a problem with industry undercutting through ‘cash in hand’ payments.

44% of respondents agreed that their current regulation body is the most appropriate one to regulate the industry.

The free text questions elicited general views that can be summarised thus: the best aspect of the current regulatory regimes is the licensing system, while the biggest deficiency is the lack of enforcement. Indeed, the most notable legislative loopholes are its allowance for poor training and ineffective enforcement. While penalties are appropriate, the compliance mechanisms are simply not adequate to deal with those who stray.

**Conclusion**

The industry is continually under great public scrutiny. High profile cases and adverse events such as the death of David Hookes at the hands of a Melbourne crowd controller, the Sydney Armed Robbery Shooting, the theft of firearms from security firms in NSW, and the infiltration of criminal motorcycle gangs into Adelaide nightclub security have made headlines (Prenzler and Sarre; 2008; Sarre and Prenzler 2009, 126 ff, 230 ff).

The research shows that there is a high degree of regulation of the security industry throughout Australia, and that this regulatory legislation has evolved greatly over the past 15 years. Notwithstanding this, regulation of the industry as it currently stands is inconsistent between jurisdictions and, in some aspects, still open to exploitative activities and unscrupulous characters and behaviours. In order for the public to maintain (or gain) confidence in the private security industry, the industry itself must present as professionals consisting of skilled personnel with high integrity, who have been well trained and who are well regulated.

In March 2007 the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) conducted a strategic intelligence assessment of the private security industry. The Commission found instances of criminal infiltration in the industry but it also found that the vast majority of security providers did act appropriately. However, as with all industry sectors (particularly those with a large number of relatively low paid employees), there is a relatively small ‘rogue’ element. From 2009, the ACC has been conducting a special intelligence operation into the industry which aims to build an accurate picture of the organised criminal threat (ACC 2009).

Fortunately, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) is attempting to address these issues with its push for greater probity, more consistent regulatory activities and heightened skills training. It is attempting to increase mobility within the industry, too, through its support for mutual recognition.

We applaud all attempts towards a uniform approach to regulation notwithstanding the diverse differences found in the eight jurisdictions. It would be appropriate for all jurisdictions to regulate the same security activities to the same level, and agreeing on the minimum required skill level and training for each activity.
3. CHAPTER THREE  PARTNERSHIPS: What are the current relationships between public and private policing and what are the preferred partnerships that should be developed?

Introduction

This research component studied the nexus between public and private policing – for instance, the perception of an emerging ‘dual’ justice system – through a series of case studies designed to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of current models (around existing protocols) of cooperation.

In the last four decades especially, the policing and security roles undertaken by the private sector have expanded significantly. Private sector personnel are no longer simply watchmen engaged in crime prevention. They are now involved in a vast array of policing responsibilities on a daily basis, adding to, taking from, and complementing the tasks undertaken by public police. These roles include not only surveillance, investigation, crowd control, prison escorts, court security, guarding and patrolling, but also proactive crime prevention, risk management and assessment, weapons training, crime scene examination, assistance with forensic evidence-gathering, information technology advice, hi-tech systems development and communications support. There are very few tasks undertaken by police that cannot be assumed by the private sector.

Cooperation history

Historically, police had a patronising, if not suspicious and antagonistic, attitude towards their private counterparts. However, calls for greater routine cooperation between public and private policing in Australia have increased in recent years. These calls have come largely from senior police, following approaches from industry figures seeking strategic alliances. Former Australian Federal Police (AFP) Commissioner Peter McAulay, in a paper to the 1994 Police Commissioners’ conference, argued that the mutual exclusivity of private and public security needed to come to an end. Since both services have common goals, he said, a formal relationship was needed (McAulay 1994, 2). Mark Golsby and Bob O’Brien, in a report commissioned in 1996 to explore the possibilities for mutual benefit, concluded similarly:

[There has been] a concern by some police that their role and functions were being eroded by the growth of private security. However, this view has matured over a period of time and police are now recognising that there are opportunities for the police and private security industry to work together. (Golsby and O’Brien 1996, 15)

Most of the early impetus for this growing confidence in private operators came from the local government sector and private corporations. In addition, some police policy-makers saw the benefits to the public sector of ‘cross-fertilisation.’ This occurs when their private counterparts are required, in contractual agreements, to measure performance, deliver client service, engage in management planning, and seek outcome-based targets. These requirements are then passed back to police, asking “can you measure your performance in the same way?” Peter Matthews expressed similar optimism in 1989:

[Privatisation] may encourage a re-evaluation of the operation of specific practices as well as inviting a critical re-examination of the relationship between the various agencies involved. This, in turn, could encourage new alignments and generate new practices that may possibly overcome the inertia that has characterized the criminal
justice system for so long (Matthews 1989, 21).

More recently, the post-September 11 counter-terrorism agenda has given considerable impetus to public-private security arrangements.

Table 3-1 sets out the opposing historical principles, roles, authority and status often ascribed to the two sectors. Two key features are the differences between obligations of egalitarian public service, and obligations exclusively to the client. In other words, police retain a core responsibility to the public, whereas private security personnel are free to focus on primary prevention of crime.

Table 3-1 Competing principles of public policing and private security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>taxpayer-funded</td>
<td>profit-driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public interest</td>
<td>client interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equal service</td>
<td>selective service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heavily regulated</td>
<td>less regulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>centralised, bureaucratic</td>
<td>fragmented, diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focused on law enforcement</td>
<td>focused on crime/loss prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>offender-oriented</td>
<td>protection-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reactive</td>
<td>proactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public space</td>
<td>private space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>specific powers</td>
<td>citizen powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intensive training</td>
<td>limited training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limited discretion</td>
<td>wide discretion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the 1990s, private security personnel had begun to assume some of the more traditional police functions such as street patrolling, transport of prisoners and public transport safety. Residential communities and their local councils began to employ security firms to patrol their respective shopping precincts and residential neighbourhoods. The stage was set for formal cooperative models to be developed.

The following case studies have been developed by a mixture of discussions with key players and by direct observation.

Methodology

A ‘snowball’ method utilising key informants was used to assist with the compilation of the case studies. These case studies were intended to demonstrate positive police-security cooperation. Initial key informants were identified from delegates at the annual Australian Security Industry Association (ASIAL) conferences and South Australian Police (SAPOL) and Victoria Police (VicPOL) contacts. From these informants, other case studies were identified and studied. As each case study was identified, documentary and other information was gathered through the researchers witnessing the partnerships in progress (as in the sporting events) or through interviews with key personnel in the partnerships. The findings were then analysed from the perspective of public interest criteria of crime.
reduction, and in terms of specific obstacles to, and facilitators of, successful co-operation.

THE CASE STUDIES

Greater reliance on policing partnerships with private security has led to major event organisers and other retail and business interests seeking out both sectors to meet their security needs. The desire of organisers has been to use their resources to prevent violence and crime before it occurs, to tackle violence and crime when it occurs, to make injuries less likely and to make events and business precincts more financially successful because more people will want to attend them and frequent them.

Eleven case studies follow:

1. 2000 Sydney Olympics, New South Wales
2. Adelaide Oval cricket, South Australia
3. MCG Australian Football League, Victoria
4. Project Griffin, Victoria and South Australia
5. Strike Force Piccadilly, New South Wales
6. Market City, New South Wales
7. Qantas Security, New South Wales
8. Eyes on the Street, Western Australia
9. Centrelink, Australian Capital Territory and nationwide
10. Court Security, nationwide
11. Ipswich Safe City Program, Queensland

CASE STUDY ONE

THE 2000 SYDNEY OLYMPICS

The coordination between public and private (and volunteer) security services for the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games was the subject of much acclaim. A secure environment was provided at all Olympic venues, and at 600 non-competition sites not only in Sydney but around Australia. In addition to police officers and volunteers, over 4,000 security officers worked a combined total of 27,000 shifts over the two-week period. $100 million was budgeted for security costs, which included communications equipment, dogs and handlers, rapid deployment squads and the erection and patrolling of perimeter fencing. The NSW Police Service established, and then coordinated, the Olympic Security Command Centre. This operational centre managed police officers, private security agents and over 5,000 rural fire service and State Emergency Service (SES) volunteers who were also involved in security-type functions.

Private security personnel, with appropriate security licences, but without specialised training, were given specific powers that derived from the legislation creating the particular Olympic authority itself. The Security Industry (Olympic and Paralympic Games) Act 1999 (NSW) allowed security personnel to act in accordance with the wide powers vested in them by the Australian Olympic Committee. The legislation expired on 1 December 2000.
Other legislation remains in force, however. For example, the *Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority Act 1998* (NSW) created the Foreshore Authority which was only partially linked to the Olympics and continues to this day. The Foreshore Authority can appoint licensed security officers to be ‘rangers’ (section 32) and can empower them to exercise certain powers, including removal of unwanted persons from the Sydney Harbour Foreshore, search and seizure powers and ‘move on’ powers. Each of these powers is found in Part 4 of the *Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority Regulation 2006* (NSW). The important thing to note here is that rangers are not public servants, but operatives who have an appropriate licence, and who are contracted to the Authority to carry out their roles, subject to their undertaking further training.

**CASE STUDY TWO**

**THE ADELAIDE OVAL CRICKET TEST**

On 29 November 2008 researchers attended the Adelaide Oval security coordination box for two hours to watch the interaction between South Australia Police (SAPOL) and Weslo, the largest security firm in South Australia, during a test between New Zealand and Australia. SAPOL and Weslo have developed a strong working relationship around sports stadiums.

Weslo staff at the ground were principally doing perimeter security and bag checking. There were forty SAPOL officers at the ground also. The SAPOL numbers are inclusive of operational and support members on duty at the ground (that is, including those who worked in the police office and police command centre on each day). The figures also include the plain clothes ‘spotters’ who stand in the crowd and direct (by microphone) police to the trouble makers ahead of any apprehension by SAPOL officers.

The ratio of public police to private security, (approximately 1:2.3) was maintained throughout the test as follows:

- **Day 1** 40 SAPOL to 95 Weslo;
- **Day 2** 40:93;
- **Day 3** 40:92;
- **Day 4** 22:72

The cricket test did not go into a 5th day.

In the Adelaide Oval precinct, then, Weslo staff more than doubled police, but police took the lead role in despatching officers to deal with unruly patrons. Not one Weslo staffer was seen to actually confront and touch anyone. While there were some 20 arrests, all were effected by SAPOL. Two SAPOL officers were in charge of the control room and the discussions with the two Weslo staff who were also present were more to do with seeking information about exits and gate control than anything else. The power was almost always with SAPOL.

What was interesting was the information flowed not so much from public to private (or vice versa) but from the electronic data source of SAPOL files into which each apprehended person’s name was fed. Weslo had no access to this database.

Within seconds, the control room was able to get a full description of all previous convictions of that individual, not only those convictions that related to crowd control or unruly behaviour.
Details of the arrest (or escort from the grounds) were fed into the computer such that if that person were detained subsequently, the police would be in a position to arrest them for failing to comply with a police order.

The following photographs illustrate the control room atmosphere.

![Photo 3-1 View of Adelaide Oval from the western stand control room](image1)

![Photo 3-2 Weslo security position](image2)
Photo 3-3 Control room operations

Photo 3-4 Police surveillance control room
CASE STUDY THREE

THE MCG and AFL FOOTBALL

On 3 July 2009, researchers attended the MCG for the afternoon and evening to watch the interaction between VicPol (Victoria Police) and MSS Security during an Australian Football League (AFL) game between two Melbourne-based teams, Essendon and Collingwood. The security cooperation is derived through a partnership arrangement with the Melbourne Cricket Club (MCC), MSS and VicPol.

MCC employed security guards operate when there is no event at the MCG but the ground is open Monday to Friday. The MCC now has fourteen full time ‘asset protection’ personnel. MSS is employed to supply guards for events, and police from VicPol are employed on a voluntary basis, above normal duties to work at events.

Researchers were well accommodated and advised by Andy Frances: Manager – Security and Venue Support (MCC), Superintendent Trevor Parks: Major Events and Emergency Management (VicPol), Trevor Dohnt, MCC General Manager: Event Operations, and Peter Wearne: General Manager: Facilities (MCC).

Numbers of security officers (public and private) vary by event. Certain combinations of AFL teams attract more potential trouble than others. The night of the game saw 125 MSS staff and around 20 VicPol officers, a ratio of around 1 VicPol officer for every six MSS personnel.

The MCG venue organisers have available to them specific security-related legislation passed in 2009 which came into operation on 1 July 2009.

Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic)

Section 102. Event organiser to manage event venues and event areas during operational arrangements period

(1) Nothing in this section derogates from any rights subsisting in, or any remedy available to, any venue manager or manager of an event area under any other law or any contract or agreement between the venue manager or manager of an event area and the event organiser of an event to which this Part applies.

(2) An event organiser of an event to which this Part applies is responsible for, and has all powers necessary to control access to, an event venue or an event area by participants, officials, volunteers, spectators and other persons during an operational arrangements period for that event.

The different demographics between cricket, football and soccer crowds mean that different security arrangements are required for each sporting event. Some of the major occasions which require the highest security include the AFL grand final and the first day of the Boxing Day cricket test match. Determining the ratio of security to police for any event is established by the ‘risk level matrix’. The number of police needed for most events is declining, as risks at most events are becoming less, especially with bag searches.

We attended the security briefing late afternoon, although it did not appear that all of the MSS staff could hear (or were interested). At this briefing the security personnel were given the areas they were designated to work, and some of the potential risks where highlighted e.g. lost children, responding to the consumption of ‘smuggled in’ alcohol and drunken and obnoxious behaviour.
In the stadium, MSS staff outnumbered police but the police took the lead role in despatching officers to deal with unruly patrons. Security are the first responders (in charge of breaches of conditions of entry such as being in possession of contraband) while police are responsible for breaches of the criminal law. Police can apply on the spot penalty notices and 24 hour banning notices, and take photos of offenders. Police are specifically directed to back up the decisions made by security personnel. In fact, VicPol management encourage security personnel to report any police officer who does not support the security personnel.

At the end of the night, all of the stakeholders gathered for a de-briefing. Apart from a couple of evictions and some patrons caught with contraband, it was a relatively event free night.

The advantages of outsourcing the security to MSS is primarily the cost. Police will cost approximately $60 per hour per officer, whereas private security will be less than half of that amount, although this advantage may be under threat as more training is undertaken and consequently more pay is being requested.

The need for police presence is clear when patrons break the criminal law, and it was commented upon by MCG staff that the visual deterrent of the police uniform also aids in the control of the crowd.

The following photographs are taken at the briefing for MSS security personnel and in the control room.

Photo 3-5 MSS briefing MCG
Photo 3-6 MCG surveillance room looking over the crowd of 80,000

Photo 3-7 MCG surveillance room looking over the playing surface at half time
Photo 3-8 Personnel in the MCG surveillance room watching the crowd disperse
CASE STUDY FOUR

PROJECT GRIFFIN

Project Griffin is a program that involves the use of private security by the London Metropolitan police. The name is taken from the fictitious creature of eagle and lion creature that is the symbol of the City of London. Project Griffin was developed by the City of London Police in 2004. The idea of the project was to have, at the ready, a significant number of private security officers, specifically ‘Griffin-trained’, available to help police if there was a major incident, such as a terrorist attack. These officers remain employed principally in other ‘security’ occupations, usually as security managers of selected Central Business District (CBD) buildings. According to anecdotal reports, there could be up to 4,000 security officers working privately in the London CBD on any given day.

Privately-based security personnel are, therefore, ‘on call’ for emergency responses. Their managers regularly exchange information during scheduled telephone hook ups. The powers of these officers (and they are very limited powers indeed) only come into play when a terrorism incident occurs and they are called up for ‘critical incident management’ duty, principally to man police cordons and control access to areas affected by terrorist acts.

A variety of Project Griffin was launched by Victoria Police (VicPol) in 2005 and operates, in a limited fashion, around the Melbourne CBD under the auspices of VicPol’s Counter-terrorism Coordination Unit which was also set up in 2005.

In a similar move in 2008, SAPOL initiated a Project Griffin Steering Committee (made up of SAPOL representatives and a selection of private security managers) to progress the implementation of the initiative in the Adelaide metropolitan area. The Steering Committee has (to December 2010) identified 31 major security providers and 51 managers, for training. Its aims include establishing networks, target hardening, sharing intelligence and maximizing strategic alliances. It links back into the Police Security Liaison Forum (PSLF) which comprises representatives of the private security industries and SAPOL, and the communication is with Crime Stoppers.

The plan for SA is to have two stages: Stage 1 is awareness training for security managers and personnel who express an interest in being part of this project. Stage 2 is information sharing; conference calls and/or automated messaging systems via a secure website to deliver general crime and public order information. Currently SAPOL are developing a training package to deliver to deliver counter-terrorism, crime and community safety awareness training for private security. There will also be a media strategy, and a corporate sponsorship drive.

The difference between SAPOL and VicPol is that the former includes regional areas and anti-crime activities, not just anti-terrorism.

Other than these variations on a Griffin theme, there are no Griffin-style programs currently running in Australia.
CASE STUDY FIVE

STRIKE FORCE PICCADILLY

Strike Force Piccadilly was a New South Wales Police initiative designed to address an upsurge in ram raids targeting automatic teller machines (ATMs) in the greater Sydney area between 2005 and 2008. The project won a 2009 Australian Crime and Violence Prevention Award from the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department. An evaluation (Prenzler, 2009) found that the project was highly successful. The initial increase in ATM ram raids (both attempted and successful) was halted, and the number was reduced from 69 in the 12 months before the intervention to 19 in the final 12 months of the post-intervention period. This represented a 72% reduction in incidents (see figure 1). For the same periods, successful raids (where cash was obtained) were reduced from 30 down to two – representing a 93% reduction.

Figure 3-1 All ATM Ram Raids, Successful and Unsuccessful, August 2005 to April 2008

The research also found that the reduction in ram raids was attributable to interventions developed in a consultation process with industry stakeholders, including the Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA), the Shopping Centre Council of Australia, cash-in-transit firms, and the ATM Industry Association (ATMIA). The consultation and development process began with a large forum and was followed by smaller meetings. It was discovered that all stakeholders were engaged in different prevention efforts. The consultation process allowed for a coordinated approach and led to the implementation of six main strategies:

1. The introduction of a police 1800 hotline. Alarm monitoring companies would only use the system when two or more alarms in a multiple alarm system would indicate a very high probability of a ram raid in progress. Police made the calls a priority (subject to
triage) and despatched patrol cars with sirens and lights. In most cases this closed the offenders’ window of opportunity.

2. Companies were engaged in development and installation of cut-resistant and ramming-resistant bollards; internal bollards around machines; and other technologies for securing ATMs, such as brackets and base plates.

3. Companies relocated machines to areas inaccessible to vehicles wherever possible.

4. NSW Police developed and disseminated a risk assessment and reduction tool, which included information on many of the measures at 2 and 3 above.

5. The police also made available Crime Prevention Officers to carry out risk assessments and make recommendations for security upgrades.

6. Regular intelligence reports were circulated with detailed data on factors associated with successful and unsuccessful raids.

Strike Force Piccadilly demonstrated the potential significant crime prevention benefits of public-private partnerships, especially when they are well-organised and include research and information sharing.

CASE STUDY SIX

MARKET CITY SHOPPING PRECINCT

The Market City shopping precinct is situated in the heart of Sydney above a busy open ‘paddy’s market’, and offers shoppers factory outlet shopping, restaurants, cinemas and a tavern. Late in October 2007, the City Central Crime Prevention Bureau of the NSW Police found that this shopping complex (hereinafter the ‘Centre’) was experiencing 20 to 30 thefts a week; far more than other recognised local ‘hot spots’.

Having observed the Centre security in action Senior Constable Jacob Reeves (from the Crime Prevention Bureau) noticed that the security officers were not particularly proactive in dealing with potential security issues. They were not observant of potential opportunities for theft and they did not employ a crime prevention approach to their job. He noticed that the security officers only responded once a theft had taken place.

As a result of this, the New South Wales police approached Reliance Security (the private company responsible for security in the Centre) with the idea to work more smartly together to combat the high level of theft.

The partnership is based on the use of ‘banning orders’, the sharing of intelligence and the notion of security moving away from simply ‘security’ to risk management.

Banning orders are enforceable under NSW legislation and the banning database ensures that the orders can be enforced. Additionally, the length of these banning orders can be adjusted to match the level of unacceptable behaviour. By working together to issue, monitor and enforce banning orders, police and security have worked together to keep those patrons who display antisocial behaviour and undesirable people out of the Centre before further crimes are committed.

Furthermore, the sharing of intelligence has ensured that when security officers gather information about suspicious activities this information is passed on to the police. This information could be in the form of video images, photos, eye witness information and other physical evidence which may be collected by security officers. Once the information is
passed on, police act on the information. A high level of reliability ensures that security officers know their work is being valued.

One unique aspect of this partnership seems to be that the security management are flexible in allowing the police to advise on workable aspects of the security specifically for this Centre. Police say that they have “100 percent interest and 100 percent co-operation” between the two groups of professionals.

This partnership has worked well for both police and the Centre security because with security officers becoming more proactive in risk management the level of theft and antisocial behaviour has decreased making the shopping Centre a safer environment, attracting more patrons. Police do not have the resources to meet the level of surveillance required to create this environment on their own, so the proactive approach by security in this partnership is saving police time and money.

CASE STUDY SEVEN

QANTAS

In 2005 the Australian Government announced a major review of Australian airport security. The resulting ‘Wheeler’ report identified a number of problematic aspects in airport security. Specifically, the report highlighted issues in seventeen areas; in information sharing among agencies; the lack of threat assessments regarding threats from terrorism; the lack of assessments regarding threats of criminality; the flow of such information to relevant parties; the airport classification system; a series of problems in airport policing; weak and disorientated airport security committees; inadequate regulation; weaknesses in the Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC) scheme; the inadequate use of CCTV; insufficient regulations in the private security industry; the lack of monitoring of employee access to secure areas; inconsistent cargo screening; minimal regional airport security; minimal observation emerging technologies in security; and crisis management. The report additionally provided detailed recommendations for each issue, with the major changes requiring an overhaul of the airport policing system; the frequency and means by which intelligence and information was to be shared among relevant agencies; the licensing and background checking of contracted security employees, and a change in the emergency response arrangements.

As a result of the recommendations coming out of the Wheeler review, Qantas, the Australian-based airline, brought a unified policing model to airports and determined that it was important to have a partnership with the AFP. Today Qantas is the largest consumer of manpower in aviation in the world. Qantas employs its own security and the security organisation is a company in its own right. They employ 30 staff and subcontract through three providers with an annual budget of A$100 million globally.

A partnership arrangement with Australian Federal Police (AFP) was developed five years ago but there was no formal agreement with police. However, as a result of the aforementioned review Qantas and the AFP now operate under a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

The MoU sets out the cooperative responsibilities of each party, for instance, if there is a

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17 Interview with Steve Jackson; Head of Security; Qantas Security; Risk & Assurance; Qantas Airways Limited, 15 February 2010.
threat in an airport and an evacuation is required, security will deal with the evacuation while police deal with the threat. The structure of the partnership, its meetings, plans, governance and duration are carefully mapped out. There is a six monthly business activity review and a six monthly performance review of security by police.

Although the MoU is not legally binding it creates an environment of cooperation. Police have a tendency to harbour some prejudice, particularly when it comes to operationally sensitivity, however the MoU operates as ‘commercial in confidence’ and thus has created trust between the two parties. In short both got something each wants which broke down each protecting their own patch. The comment was made that this particular arrangement is effective, in part, because the background of manager is with the AFP.

In addition, it is possible for security to have ‘special member’ status for a specific incident e.g. Corby investigation into the cannabis carriage. The power is then revoked after the incident. The AFP can also swear in a security officer as a ‘special member’ then subject them to the secrecy provisions of the Official Secrets Act. The ‘special member’ status gives the security officer unique powers to investigate. This arrangement enables police and security to work closely together to deal with highly sensitive intelligence.

Finally, it was stated that the community like to see the presence of the uniform and understand police are expensive and not needed for all the security so the high presence of security officers aids in the feeling of safety.

CASE STUDY EIGHT

‘EYES ON THE STREET’ PROGRAM

Eyes on the Street is a crime prevention initiative involving working partnerships between the Western Australia Police, local government and businesses; including the security industry, in WA. The aim of the program is to involve businesses and their employees in gathering information and reporting to police. The theory behind the endeavour is that by increasing the level of police intelligence through business involvement is to reduce crime.

Industry partners are trained in recording and reporting persons or suspicious events. When an event takes place, the partner submits a report to the Eyes on the Street team who then follow up the report. Following this, regular feedback is provided to the partners. This regular feedback ensures that business partners are kept motivated to continue to report incidents.

The advantage of having security personnel involved in this program is that, due to the nature of their job, they require less training than the other business partners. Additionally, security personnel are more likely to recognise a relevant incident, provide more detailed and useful information in their reports and be more willing to report in the first place (Crime Research Centre 2008, 5). Furthermore, security personnel, generally speaking, already have a good relationship with police and understand the practice of reporting incidents. With the Eyes on the Street program, security personnel have the option of either reporting to police or to the program.

Along with the reporting of incidents, the program aims to reduce crime by the high visibility of the Eyes on the Street logo displayed on vehicles and in shop windows. Additionally, the advertising and marking campaign used to raise community awareness tends to lead to an increased feeling of safety. Offenders, too, by virtue of the high visibility of the program, are more likely to be aware of it, and thus are alerted to the likelihood of their being detected.
In 2008, the program boasted the involvement of over 100 agencies, with over 4,000 employees and over 500 vehicles branded with the Eyes on the Street logo. Over 4,500 pieces of information were received by police throughout 2008. In the previous 18 months, over 200 arrests were effected as a direct result of Eyes on the Street intelligence.\(^{18}\)

The Eyes on the Street program is regarded a successful program in so far as it involved strong community / police cooperation, although there was no objective evidence of a crime reduction effect (Crime Research Centre 2008). The program has recently been replicated in Canberra, where it began on 1 April, 2010. The program there utilises the resources of the organisation Crime Stoppers to increase the number of reports sent to Crime Stoppers and to process and disseminate the information received. On completion of a three month trial, a review will be conducted to assess the viability of an on-going program.

The Australian Capital Territory’s Crime Prevention Business Liaison Officers have conducted Eyes on the Street training sessions, with industry participants including ACTION Buses, Canberra City Rangers, the ACT Chamber of Commerce and the retail industry.

**CASE STUDY NINE**

**CENTRELINK’S OUTSOURCED SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM**

Covert or ‘optical’ surveillance was adopted as an ‘Enhanced Investigation Initiative’ by Centrelink in 1999. Cases of suspected benefit fraud amenable to this type of examination are outsourced to a panel of private investigation firms across Australia. In the first year of operation, 1,063 cases were finalised with 70% leading to $3,999,000 in payments targeted for recovery (Prenzler & King, 2002). In 2008-09, 1,023 surveillance operations were completed; with 589 or 57.5 percent considered ‘actionable’, leading to annualised gross reductions in payments of $5.5m and debt of $21.2m. Total savings were estimated at $26.7m or $26,126 per investigation, with an ‘effectiveness indicator’ rating of 72.5 percent (Prenzler, 2011).

Centrelink reported to the researchers that an ‘effective’ investigation ‘is one that incurs a reduction and/or a debt. Review effectiveness indicator percentage is the percentage of effective reviews divided by the number of completed investigations and is a financial year to date figure.’ In 2010 Centrelink had 11 contracted surveillance providers on its panel. Cases are allocated for fixed amounts of surveillance. Complex cases can lead to extended surveillance periods. Surveillance is conducted in accordance with the Privacy Commissioner’s *Covert Surveillance in Commonwealth Administration: Guidelines*.

Centrelink was also asked to provide a breakdown of all costs in the surveillance program, including contract, administration and recovery costs. Only the contract costs were reported: ‘the optical surveillance contracted costs for 2009/10 were $1,003,998’. ‘Total annualised savings’ were estimated at $28,007,961 (19 January 2011). These figures suggest a net return of $27,003,963, or $27.89 saved for every dollar spent, not including administration and debt recovery. However, it must be kept in mind that actual recoveries were not reported, only ‘debt raised’, which was listed at $22,831,803.

\(^{18}\) Government of Western Australia; Office of Crime Prevention
CASE STUDY TEN

COURT SECURITY

In the last twenty years, courts administrators around Australia and New Zealand have become increasingly aware of the importance of security. Today, in and around Australia and New Zealand courts, security systems and other security tools such as duress alarms, CCTV monitoring, hand held scanners and metal detectors are now commonplace. Courts administrators have taken extraordinary steps to ensure that those entering their courts pass through a secure point of entry. To do this effectively, they have engaged the assistance of design experts (see Figure 3-2).

Figure 3-2 Segregation and flow in Court Precincts

![Segregation and flow in Court Precincts](image)

These developments in security awareness, risk assessment and preparedness have arisen in response to the perception that there has been an increase in dangerous incidents in courtrooms and their environs (Sarre and Prenzler, 2011). For example, it was stated by the New South Wales (NSW) Attorney-General in October 2009 that there are, on average, 300 ‘security incidents’ monthly in NSW courts (Attorney-General, 2009). While that statement does not include a definition of ‘incident’, it is, nonetheless, a significant figure.

There is a significant role played in some jurisdictions by the private sector in providing prisoner transport services, too. Prisoner transport contracts are, by and large, between the security company and the legal entity representing correctional services and with police. They are not contracts with court services (Boswell, 2003).

Public/private partnerships in Australia and New Zealand: evidence from jurisdictions

Below are set out the arrangements currently in place in Australian and New Zealand courts for a ‘pluralised’ approach to security and prisoner transport.
In 2000, the Western Australian Ministry of Justice (now Department of Justice) was the first government department in Australia to introduce, by a ‘license’ system, the contracting ‘in’ of court security services and custodial services, prisoner transport and police ‘lock-up’ management, with police and private providers sharing jurisdiction in these areas (Harding, 2000). This was done pursuant to the power vested in the Ministry by the Court Security and Custodial Services Act 1999 (Western Australia).

South Australia was the first Australian jurisdiction to introduce legislation relating to the security of courts. This was done via the Law Courts (Maintenance of Order) Act 1928 (SA). This Act was replaced in 2000 by amendments to the Sheriff’s Act 1978 (SA). Indeed, South Australian court administrators embraced the private option in relation to prisoner transport four years earlier than their Western Australian counterparts, in December 1996.

In Victoria the Court Security Act 1980 (Vic) established a scheme of ‘authorized officers’ for their court security. These include police officers or people appointed as authorized officers by the chief executive officer of a court. The Act also allows for security services to be contracted out. The Victorian Supreme Court, County Court and Magistrates Courts have all embraced the private sector, with contracts in existence with G4S, Independent Security Services (ISS), Wilsons, Liberty Group and Chubb.

In the Australian Capital Territory, the private firm Metropolitan Security Services (MSS) provides court security for both Supreme Court and Magistrates Courts.

By virtue of the powers found in the Northern Territory’s Court Security Act 1998 (NT), the courts have contracted ‘in’ a range of private providers. In the Supreme Court, MSS is used for prisoner transport, ISS is used for access and premises security, while Protective Security Officers (PSOs) are used for in-court security. The Northern Territory has also conferred all powers on police officers by making them (like all Sheriff’s officers) ‘security officers’ under the Act (section 5(1)).

In New South Wales, private security providers have been completely scorned by the state’s courts administrators. They are not used at all (unless the courts are managed by the Commonwealth, such as the Family Court or Federal Court.) Anecdotal evidence is that the courts administrators believe that the status quo does not need to be disturbed in the absence of a crisis.

All court security in Queensland is undertaken by government employed Protective Security Officers (PSOs) empowered under the State Buildings Protective Security Act 1983 (Qld). The role of PSOs in the broad spectrum of policing in Australia, not just in Queensland but in other States and in the Australian federal jurisdiction, is a significant phenomenon (Sarre, 2010). Queensland also grants police officers the majority of the powers of a court security officer (section 25).

The Admission to Courts Act 1916 (Tasmania) was designed to limit the common law principle of open courts by allowing admission to be regulated in the interests of public order, safety, public morals and decency. The Act allows for the appointment of authorized officers and allows regulations to be made in relation to admission to courts, conduct and control of people in a court and other matters relating to public order or safety. In Tasmania’s Supreme Court, security is undertaken by government employed officers, although in the Magistrates Courts, private providers have now been contracted ‘in’.

The security of Federal courts is guided by the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth). In all Federal Courts in Australia (the High Court, Family Court, Federal Court, Federal Magistrates Court) security is now managed by Wilson Security, a
The New Zealand Court Security Act 1999 (NZ) allows the chief executive to employ or contract for court security officers, and that has been happening for many years. There is a provision in the Act granting police officers, too, all the powers and duties given to court security officers (section 34). The potential for demarcation disputes between police officers and court security officers has been averted by the law-makers making it clear that court security officers are not to exercise powers against a person when a police officer is dealing with that person unless the police officers requests assistance (section 29). In New Zealand prisoner transport contracts usually include in-court management.

In Table 3-2, one can see each of the relevant public/private partnerships (if applicable).

### Table 3-2 Court Security Services Matrix Public and Private

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Courts/Contacts</th>
<th>Private Security? Y/N</th>
<th>Provider</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Commonwealth Courts</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Wilson Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Supreme Court and Magistrates Court</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Metropolitan Security Services (MSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>All courts</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Sheriff’s Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>MSS (custodial); Independent Security Services (ISS) (access, premises, etc.); PSOs used for in-court security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>Magistrates Court</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Sheriff’s Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>All courts</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Government Protective Security Officers (PSOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>Supreme Court and District Court</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Sheriff’s Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Magistrates Court</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>G4S used for transportation &amp; court security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Magistrates Courts</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Dyson Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>ISS; Wilson Security; Chubb; G4S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>County Court</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>G4S + Liberty Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Magistrates Court</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>G4S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>All courts</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>G4S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>All courts</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Court Security Officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, in the last few decades there has been a heightened awareness of the risks in and around court buildings, and security has been stepped up accordingly. The risks are not only to litigants and court staff in terms of injuries and death, but also to the taxpayer in terms of potential legal liabilities for damages in the event that a foreseeable injury occurs because of lax security. In order to manage these risks within budgets that can be accommodated, courts management and prisoner transport services have been turning to the private sector. Generally speaking, the ‘report card’ presents a positive picture:

CASE STUDY ELEVEN

IPSWICH SAFE CITY PROGRAM

The Ipswich (Queensland) Safe City Program was established in 1994 in response to an upsurge in alcohol-related crime and disorder, mainly in the city centre (City of Ipswich 2010). The program is centred on a CCTV system managed 24-7 by a contracted security firm. The monitoring facility is linked by radio to security officers and police on the beat – as well as connecting with other security firms, the police operations centre and other services. By 2010 the program had a network of 181 cameras extending beyond the city centre to neighbouring suburbs and potential hotspots for crime such as bikeways and bus stops. The program invests heavily in the latest technology with pan, tilt and zoom camera functions, high picture definition and full digital recording and archiving. Live feeds can be transmitted to the main police radio room. The program includes a CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) advisory service for businesses. Apart from law enforcement interventions, the program also provides welfare referrals, including for young people, drug affected persons and missing persons.

The Ipswich Safe City Program is ‘widely recognised as one of the best private/police partnership anywhere in Australia’ (ASIAL, 2010). It has also been described as ‘the benchmark for a fully integrated crime prevention program that is not solely reliant on cameras and utilises a co-ordinated approach of all agencies’ (City of Ipswich 2010). It receives numerous visits from interested parties across Australia and overseas. Over the years a number of dramatic claims have been made for the benefits of the program, including directly leading to ‘5,475 arrests from 1994 to 2008’ (Ipswich News, 2009). A 2010 magazine article reported that Safe City had ‘reduced crime by 78% over the last 15 years, and in some cases ... by 90%’ (cited in Cowan 2010 p 23). Despite such claims, there are no formal evaluations on the public record. Inquiries by the chapter authors to the Queensland Police Service also revealed there are no historic, nor contemporary, crime data available for the areas covered by the cameras. Figure 1 shows recorded crimes against property and the person from 1990-91 in the police district of Ipswich – an area that goes well beyond the inner city. The data clearly show that there is no correlation between the roll out of the camera program in 1994 and offences at this level. A closer examination was made of specific relevant offences – such as good order offences, assault, theft, burglary, property damage and motor vehicle theft – again with no evidence of a positive effect from the camera program over the long-term. More detailed data are available from 2001 for the smaller police division of Ipswich, which more closely approximates the city centre where the majority of cameras are located. These data also show no appreciable benefits from the Safe City Program. The rates of reported property and violent crimes are well above those for Queensland and neighbouring police divisions.
Conclusion

The public/private relationships that have been observed and studied in this part of our research tell a story of cooperation for mutual benefit. Certainly the success rate depends upon the nature of the task to be performed. The most successful private sector partnerships are found where that sector is filling a need that assists the public police to perform their role as peace keepers.

As is often the case, there is some caution to be exercised. While police have a democratic duty to provide protection and law enforcement universally, or at least on the basis of the greatest need, private security personnel focus on supplying risk protection based on financial incentive. It is possible that even with high levels of cooperation in the sports arena market, public/private cooperative services may be overlaid by their commercial and potentially partial focus. Those concerns should remain at the forefront of any further studies of such cooperative models. There is also an obligation on these partnership projects to demonstrate more effectively crime minimisation effects and value for taxpayers’ money.

That said, the public/private relationships that have been observed tell a story of cooperation for mutual benefit. Around Australia, the private sector has shown itself capable of filling a need that assists the public police to perform their role. There is little doubt that there are positive stories of diversified public private partnerships. They are set to continue into the future. Not only is it possible to use public/private police cooperation to deliver safe and comfortable environments but, arguably, such cooperation is now imperative.
4. **CHAPTER FOUR  LEGAL POWERS:** *What are the legal powers and responsibilities of private personnel and how should those powers be better ordered and legislated?*

The purpose of this research component was to examine the legal powers, protections and immunities of private security providers in the light of possible inadequacies or ambiguities in the law. This research builds on the groundwork completed in 2005 using current case law, a survey of security providers, and other sources such as parliamentary debates and law reform reports, to suggest ways in which deficiencies in the law (state, territory and federal) should be addressed and improved.

The law of private security is not easy to discover, and much of the law that applies in this area is never tested in the courts (for example, an assault claim that is settled quietly with a confidential financial settlement). To find the law, we often have to look at circumstances and disciplines unrelated to private policing. The law of private security emanates from a range of sources usually unrelated to security personnel, and, in many instances, the principles of law often touted as being applicable to private forms of policing have not been tried in that legal setting. There are many aspects of the law relating to protection of property, reasonable force and surveillance devices which are unsatisfactory and confusing for security providers. This research will identify the unsatisfactory aspects of common law and legislation with a view to making recommendations for reform policy and a national research agenda.

Allied to this issue is the question of whether or not licence holders should be given any powers above those of citizens or agents of property owners. At present, security licences, in most cases, do not grant additional powers. A case might be made, for example, for private investigators to access confidential information for legitimate purposes and under strict conditions. However, one condition of special powers for licence holders might be that they also are given public interest responsibilities. The case for special powers for licence holders who are specifically trained will be explored.

**What legal powers exist?**

It is remarkable that the body of knowledge on the powers and impact of private security, although steadily evolving, remains relatively small by comparison with the academic literature on public police officers. There is very little literature that specifically critiques the issue of the legal powers that transnational private security providers may wield.

Given the rapid expansion of the presence of private personnel in policing activities, one might assume that careful attention would have been paid to the legal framework within which these cooperative activities take place. Sadly, this has not been the case.

The consequence of this neglect is that the legal authority, rights and powers of private security providers is determined more by a piecemeal array of legal privileges and assumptions than by clear law. True, there has been legislation passed in all Australian jurisdictions concerning the registration, licensing, identification and training of private legal personnel, especially in the past decade. However, the main aim of this legislation is to regulate those who operate within the industry, and to check those who wish to enter it against certain criteria and minimum training standards. The legislation does not deal with powers per se. There is very little in Australian legislation, and even less in the common law, that permits security guards, even licensed guards, to wield specific powers. Indeed, in two jurisdictions this fact is specifically mentioned in security licensing legislation. Section 8 of the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW) says that the holder of any licence can carry out the
functions authorised by the licence but that ‘[a] licence does not confer on the licensee any function apart from a function authorised by the licence.’ The South Australian Security and Investigation Agents Act 1995 s 15(1) goes a little further, stating that ‘[a] licence does not confer on an agent power or authority to act in contravention of, or in disregard of, law or rights or privileges arising under or protected by law.’ Section 15(2) then repeats the NSW legislative proscription upon those who would try to bluff the public, namely that ‘[a] licensed agent must not hold himself or herself out as having a power or authority by virtue of the licence that is not in fact conferred by the licence.’

The lack of legislation is confusing for security personnel and the public alike. Indeed, British academic Mark Button cites evidence that some security personnel (as many as 10 per cent in the United Kingdom) even believe that they possess the same powers as police officers (Button 2007). Nowhere do specific ‘policing’ laws directly and consistently focus on the way that private security personnel are empowered to act or to be given immunity from civil suit or criminal charges. Moreover, there are few legal decisions and precedents emerging from the courts. Hence it is difficult for anyone to find a satisfactory body of law on the subject.

In contrast, public police have coercive and intrusive powers. But there are distinct differences between the powers of public and private officers and agents. For example, public police are given statutory immunity from civil suit in circumstances where their beliefs and acts are ‘reasonable.’ Private personnel are afforded no such luxury. Indeed, private security remain vulnerable and constantly run the risk of being sued in the torts of assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of mental distress, defamation, nuisance and trespass to land and to the person. This is not to say that police do not run these risks, but because they have immunities in place, the police are far less likely to find themselves on the losing end of a civil suit brought by an aggrieved person.

Moreover, public police may act to prevent the commission of an offence before it actually happens (acting upon a suspicion). This concession is not granted to private security personnel (or anyone else for that matter). Public police powers, duties, rights, responsibilities and immunities have been so often debated in the courts that there is now a large and continually expanding body of law on these issues. The same cannot be said for private security law.

**Legal authority**

The legal powers, rights and immunities of private security personnel are obscurely and confusingly located across a range of fields: the criminal law; the law of property; the law of contract (both in terms of contracts of employment, and the contracts that apply to paying customers whenever they enter a private sports or entertainment venue); and employment law. The consequence of this is that there are many bits and pieces of common law, general law and legislation that come together to form what could loosely be referred to as ‘the law of private security.’

Starting from first principles, and speaking generally, unless there is specific legislation that empowers specialised staff to undertake certain tasks for some particular event, such as the Olympic Games, the law confers no powers upon security personnel beyond the powers given to the ordinary citizen. That having been said, the powers of the private citizen are considerable. The law of property, for example, grants to the owner of private property the power to require visitors to leave the premises (using reasonable force if necessary), or to subject visitors to stipulations (such as a search) prescribed and advertised by the property
owner. Similar powers exist for employers over employees. Each of these powers can be delegated to agents (private security) who are entitled to wear uniforms, and even to carry a firearm if they have the correct training and licence.

Two areas of law are of particular interest to security personnel. Firstly the use of force in defence of property is important, as personnel are often called upon to defend their clients’ property, and secondly the power of citizen’s arrest, for in the eyes of the law, security personnel are ‘citizens.’ Each of these is reviewed here in turn.

The use of force in defence of property

In most States and Territories, the common law power of property owners to defend their property from uninvited trespassers and not face criminal prosecution has been reinforced by statute. The protection is provided by the defence of self-defence. Self-defence is generally available to persons who use force to prevent an assault on them, or their imprisonment or the imprisonment of another, to protect property from unlawful taking, damage or interference, or to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises or to remove a person committing a criminal trespass (Sarre and Prenzler, 2009, Chapter 4).

In South Australia, an amendment to the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) became law in December 1991, adding, to the common law test of ‘reasonable’ force, a subjective component in determining the availability of a defence to a criminal charge. Prior to this, an accused, in order to establish a defence, was required to cast doubt over the prosecution case that he or she had used more force than was reasonably proportionate in the circumstances to defend his or her life or property. Now the law has widened this to a substantially subjective test: did the accused have reason to believe that his or her life or property was in danger when acting in a defensive manner? If so, she or he will be able to establish a defence.

15A—Defence of property etc

(1) It is a defence to a charge of an offence if—

(a) the defendant genuinely believed the conduct to which the charge relates to be necessary and reasonable—

(i) to protect property from unlawful appropriation, destruction, damage or interference; or

(ii) to prevent criminal trespass to land or premises, or to remove from land or premises a person who is committing a criminal trespass; or

(iii) to make or assist in the lawful arrest of an offender or alleged offender or a person who is unlawfully at large; and

(b) if the conduct resulted in death—the defendant did not intend to cause death nor did the defendant act recklessly realising that the conduct could result in death; and

(c) the conduct was, in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed them to be, reasonably proportionate to the threat that the defendant genuinely believed to exist ...

[emphasis added]

If the accused can satisfy a judge or jury of his or her genuine belief, then he or she will not be found guilty of any assault or battery that may have occurred during that defence of person or property.
Section 15C gives greater latitude to homeowners to defend their property by saying that the 'reasonable proportionality' test does not apply to homeowners who are defending themselves 'innocently' against a home invasion.

In the Queensland Criminal Code (1899) there is a roughly equivalent section (277(1)), but it persists with a more objective test. Note that, unlike the South Australian law, it extends the right to an agent (for example, a security guard) of the property owner or occupier:

> It is lawful for a person who is in peaceable possession of any land, structure, vessel, or place, or who is entitled to the control or management of any land, structure, vessel, or place, and for any person lawfully assisting him or her or acting by his or her authority, to use such force as is reasonably necessary in order to prevent any person from wrongfully entering upon such land, structure, vessel, or place, or in order to remove therefrom a person who wrongfully remains therein, provided that he or she does not do grievous bodily harm to such person. [emphasis added]

This legislative power also extends to those who are trying to prevent someone from thieving. This is found in section 274:

> It is lawful for any person who is in peaceable possession of any moveable property, and for any person lawfully assisting him or her or acting by his or her authority, to use such force as is reasonably necessary in order to resist the taking of such property by a trespasser, or in order to retake it from a trespasser, provided that the person does not do grievous bodily harm to the trespasser. [emphasis added]

There is a similar provision in Western Australia, both as to objectivity and extension to agents, under the Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA). Section 254(1) of this Act allows a property owner a fair degree of latitude in determining what amounts to reasonable force:

> 254 (1) For the purposes of this section … the term ‘place’ means any land, building, structure, tent, or conveyance, or a part of any land, building, structure, tent, or conveyance.

> (2) It is lawful for a person (‘the occupant’) who is in peaceable possession of any place, or who is entitled to the control or management of any place, to use such force as is reasonably necessary

> (a) to prevent a person from wrongfully entering the place;

> (b) to remove a person who wrongfully remains on or in the place; or

> (c) to remove a person behaving in a disorderly manner on or in the place;

> provided that the force used is not intended, and is not such as is likely, to cause death or grievous bodily harm to the person.

> (3) The authorisation conferred by subsection (2), as limited by the proviso to that subsection, extends to a person acting by the occupant’s authority except that if that person’s duties as an employee consist of or include any of the matters referred to in subsection (2) (a), (b) or (c) that person is not authorised to use force that is intended, or is likely, to cause bodily harm. [emphasis added]

The effect of section 254(3) is to differentiate the powers of landowners (who can use force up to grievous bodily harm) from those of their agents (who must not have intended any bodily harm).
The New South Wales parliament, too, has legislated concerning the defence of one’s property. Section 418 of the Crimes Act 1900 states:

1. A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person carries out the conduct constituting the offence in self-defence.

2. A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if the person believes the conduct is necessary:
   
   a. to defend himself or herself or another person, or
   
   b. to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the liberty of another person, or
   
   c. to protect property from unlawful taking, destruction, damage or interference, or
   
   d. to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises or to remove a person committing any such criminal trespass,

   and the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives them.

By virtue of section 419, the prosecution has the onus of proving, beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-defence. Significantly, self-defence is not available in New South Wales if the death of the attacker has resulted (section 420) but it may reduce murder to manslaughter (section 421).

In Victoria, we find some variations on these themes. Section 462A of the Crimes Act 1958 allows any person the right to use force ‘not disproportionate to the objective as he believes on reasonable grounds to be necessary to prevent the commission, continuance or completion of an indictable offence or to effect or assist in effecting the lawful arrest of a person committing or suspected of committing any offence’. This assumes, of course, that people understand the distinction between indictable and non-indictable offences – a distinction that is not always clear even to criminal lawyers.

In the Australian Capital Territory, there is no provision in the Crimes Act 1900 for a defence of ‘defence of property.’

Under the Northern Territory Criminal Code, section 27, force in self-defence, defence of property and arrest ‘is justified provided it is not unnecessary force and it is not intended and is not such as is likely to cause death or grievous harm.’ Such force can be used in a number of circumstances, including:

27(k) in the case of a person who is entitled by law to the possession of moveable property, or a person acting by his authority, and who attempts to take possession of it from a person who neither claims right to it nor acts by the authority of a person who claims right to it and the person in possession resists him, to obtain possession of the property, provided he does not intentionally do him bodily harm.

Thus it is clear that, at both common law and in the Code jurisdictions, legitimate force can be used to protect one’s own property, and in self-defence, and, indeed, in effecting a lawful citizen’s arrest (discussed below). But the provisions are widely diverse and inconsistent between jurisdictions. One can safely say, however, that excessive force is, as a rule, penalised by the criminal law unless there are exceptional reasons for its deployment. What is ‘excessive’ and ‘exceptional’ depends upon the facts of each case.
The power of citizen’s arrest

Police officers can detain any person upon suspicion of that person committing an offence by virtue of specific legislation or the common law. If their suspicion turns out later to be incorrect, they are generally immune from civil suit. In addition, all police officers have the right to arrest any person without a warrant on suspicion that an offence is about to be committed. By virtue of their discretionary powers, police officers, generally speaking, are permitted a general defence of reasonable suspicion or honest exercise of power.

Private citizens (including security officers acting on instructions from their principals, and civilian police auxiliaries), on the other hand, have no power to detain or arrest any persons without their consent unless they are given authority to do so either by some specific legislative power or in circumstances where their actions are justifiable by virtue of the common law. Even then, the ‘arrest’ is limited to detaining the suspect until the public police arrive. That is, private citizens do not enjoy the immunities that public police officers have, and do not have a defence of reasonable suspicion or honest exercise of power if they make an incorrect judgment. Moreover, they cannot arrest any persons on suspicion of their being about to commit an offence.

The rules relating to citizen’s arrest in Australia are complicated. The arrest powers of citizens change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, the right of private citizens, security guards and police auxiliaries to make an arrest is limited to ‘felonies’ and not ‘misdemeanours’. In other jurisdictions, it is limited to ‘indictable’ matters as opposed to ‘summary’ offences. It is highly unlikely that a citizen or security guard or police auxiliary will know precisely which definitions apply in any given jurisdiction.

In South Australia, for example, the citizen’s arrest power is outlined in section 271 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935. Under this section, persons can arrest and detain any person whom they find in the act of committing (or having just committed) an indictable offence, larceny, offence against the person, or offences against property. In Victoria, section 462A of the Crimes Act 1958 allows any person the right to use force ‘not disproportionate to the objective as he believes on reasonable grounds to be necessary to prevent the commission, continuance or completion of an indictable offence or to effect or assist in effecting the lawful arrest of a person committing or suspected of committing any offence’. So, in both jurisdictions, private citizens would need to know the difference between indictable and non-indictable offences, and, in Victoria, would need to be able to establish whether the circumstances of the arrest could legitimately support their use of force.

It was only in 2004 that the parliament of Western Australia repealed the quaint provisions of the former section 47 of the Police Act 1892 which allowed any person to arrest without a warrant ‘any reputed common prostitute, thief, loose, idle or disorderly person, who, within view of such person apprehending, shall offend against this Act, and shall forthwith deliver him to any constable or police officer of the place where he shall have been apprehended, to be taken and conveyed before a Justice, to be dealt with according to law …’ A private citizen would have found it rather difficult to interpret the terms ‘loose’ or ‘idle’ with any degree of legal certainty. That jurisdiction now locates its citizen’s arrest powers in section 25 of the new Criminal Investigation Act (WA) 2006.

In New South Wales, the old section 352 of the Crimes Act 1900 has been repealed and replaced by section 100 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW). But the provisions are not dissimilar. A citizen can arrest another person where (a) the person is in the act of committing an offence under any Act or statutory instrument, or (b)
the person has just committed any such offence, or (c) the person has committed a serious indicible offence for which the person has not been tried.

By virtue of section 55(3) of the Police Offences Act 1935 in Tasmania, any person may arrest any other person whom they find offending where they have reasonable grounds to believe that the conduct will create or may involve substantial injury to another person, serious danger of such injury, loss of property or serious injury to property. Of especial interest is subsection (4) which could be interpreted to allow a citizen a pre-emptive arrest:

For the purposes of this section, an offence shall be deemed to involve any of the matters specified in subsection (3) if the person arresting has reasonable grounds for believing that such matter has been, or will be, the consequence of any act of the offender in committing such offence. [emphasis added]

But subsection 55(5) of the Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) appears to dispute any such interpretation by using the terminology ‘found offending’ and ‘committed an offence against this Act’ which is clearly in the past tense.

Section 546 of the Queensland Criminal Code Act 1899 allows for any person to arrest another person in circumstances where an offence has been committed or is being committed. It stops short of allowing a pre-emptive arrest. An arrest, too, can only occur ‘by night’ if a person has ‘reasonable grounds for believing that the other person is committing the offence, and ... does in fact so believe...’.

Under section 441(2) of the Criminal Code of the Northern Territory, any person can arrest another whom he or she finds committing an offence or behaving such that he or she believes on reasonable grounds that the offender has committed an offence and that an arrest is necessary for a range of specified reasons.

Finally, a provision is found in the criminal code of the Australian Capital Territory under their Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), section 218, permitting a citizen’s arrest.

Generally speaking we can safely conclude as follows regarding the law in Australia: where it is clear on the evidence that a private citizen, or security officer, in detaining a suspect, acted reasonably and the suspect unreasonably, then it is likely that the court will find in favour of the citizen or security officer and against the suspect if that suspect chooses, later, to sue the citizen for assault or false imprisonment. In other circumstances where, say, a property owner (or an agent) arrests a thief in a manner, and in circumstances, disproportionate to the likely harm to the victim, and in clear defiance of the rights of the suspect (for example, to be taken forthwith to a police station), then the court is very likely to find in favour of the suspect (guilty or otherwise). The courts may order compensation for such suspects in appropriate circumstances.

In the following case, the High Court has articulated the balancing act required. The case involved police officers, but the principles espoused could apply equally to cases involving citizen’s arrest:

“The jealousy with which the common law protects the personal liberty of the subject does nothing to assist the police in the investigation of criminal offences. ...The competing policy considerations are of great importance to the freedom of our society and it is not for the courts to erode the common law’s protection of personal liberty in order to enhance the armoury of law enforcement.” (Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 296 per Mason and Brennan JJ.)
The courts thus look for a middle path. They are required to weigh the perceived harm to victims and the means available to them to defend themselves and their property, against the scourge of vigilante ‘justice’ that affronts human dignity (Sarre, 2009). It is highly unlikely that a citizen or security guard will know precisely which definitions apply in any given jurisdiction, and, if they do apply, what the consequences might be.

**Other powers that may give rise to legal confusion**

Other possibilities for confusion emerge from the common law rights of persons to sue others for breach of their rights of liberty. For example, store detectives who detain shoplifters and thieves upon reasonable suspicion of theft have had damages awarded against them (paid to wrongly accused suspects) in some cases, but not in others. The outcome, it seems, depends upon the level of restraint, the length of time involved, and the extent to which the accused person was given an opportunity to allay suspicion. Sometimes the courts protect the public against invasions of privacy by private sector security personnel, but in other circumstances they do not. The legal reasoning is often unclear.

There are other examples in legislation in Australia that highlight the possibilities for confusion for private security officers seeking to exercise their powers. One of them can be found in s 17A of the *Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA)*. This section creates a criminal offence from what is simply a civil trespass. Section 17A(1) states that where a person trespasses on property such that the occupier’s enjoyment of that property is threatened, and where the trespasser is asked to leave by an ‘authorised person’ ‘the trespasser is, if he or she fails to leave the premises forthwith or again trespasses within 24 hours of being asked to leave, guilty of an offence.’ The section goes on to say that ‘[a] person who, while trespassing on premises uses offensive language or behaves in an offensive manner is guilty of an offence.’

A trespasser must also give his or her name to an authorised person if asked, otherwise he or she is guilty of another offence. Yet there is no explanation in the Act to instruct security personnel what their options are if their request is refused. What powers are they entitled to use once an offence has been committed? One assumes that they may make a citizen’s arrest, although that power is arguably present from the moment the person disobeys the order to leave private premises, which does not need legislation such as this. In other words, this type of statute adds little to our understanding of the sources of power that provide the legal basis for private security operations and operators. This law also varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and thus is confusing for the many security officers who work across state borders.

The confusion generally stems from the fact that the laws that apply to private personnel have developed over the years to apply not to those doing police-type work but to private citizens, landowners and employers. They translate into something potentially quite different in the hands of the agents of these individuals. There are thus some justifiable concerns: ‘If private security personnel are in reality no different from ordinary citizens, a law which treats them alike seems most appropriate. But if in reality they are not, and the law still treats them as they are, it becomes inappropriate’ (Stenning and Shearing 1979, 263).

Private security personnel are different from the public in general. On a daily basis they search bags, forbid entry, bar exits, ask probing questions, detain people, confiscate property, carry out inquiries and operate covert surveillance equipment, most significantly CCTV. Yet the powers under which they operate were designed for other purposes. Is there another way forward that can remedy the malaise?
Manifestations

There has been, in the past decade or so, some attempts by governments to grant powers to persons other than to the sworn officers. Some of these may be able to provide a model of legislation that could settle some ambiguities.

A Government-Hired Specialist Personnel

A common manifestation of empowerment is where a parliament or legislative body creates specific legislation giving the right to certain trained operatives, who have been employed for specific tasks, to engage in a particular state-sponsored task or role. These tasks carry with them specific, albeit limited, powers. There are a number of current examples that come to mind internationally as well as nationally.

i. Van Traa Officers: Netherlands

The City of Amsterdam has a Public Order and Safety Department, which operates in the Municipality of Amsterdam, especially in the ‘red light’ district and around the harbour. These officers are not part of the police structure but are employed as public administrators, coordinating partnerships, linking police, justice departments and the municipality in the fight against organized crime (City of Amsterdam, 2002).

ii. Auxiliary Police Forces: Singapore

The British, during their colonial rule in Singapore, established what have become known as Auxiliary Police Forces (APFs) for the protection and peacekeeping of various localities. APFs continue to this day, and are empowered by the Commissioner of Police of the Singapore Police Force to act with limited police powers within the limits of their own districts (Police Force Act 2006 section 86.). APF personnel are known as Auxiliary Police Officers (APOs). Each APO takes an oath to the APF and is subject to disciplinary proceedings under the Police Force Act 2006.

iii. The Australian Protective Service (APS)

The Australian Protective Service (APS) was established in 1984 as a government agency that provides specialist protective security to government departments on a contractual ‘fee-for-service’ basis. Its core business responsibility was and still is to provide security services at, for example, parliaments and government residences, foreign diplomatic missions, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization (ANSTO) and defence establishments, and to staff counter-terrorism units at major airports. Australian Protective Service officers are invested with specific protective security law enforcement powers beyond those enjoyed by private sector operatives. They are empowered under Commonwealth legislation (Australian Protective Service Act 1987; the Crimes Act 1914; and the Australian Federal Police Act 1979) to arrest without warrant any person contravening specific laws; for example, relating to the protection of Internationally Protected Persons (Crimes (International Protected Persons) Act 1976), and the protection of Commonwealth Territories, establishments and functions (Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971; Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991; Air Navigation Act 1920; Defence (Special Undertakings) Act 1952; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987).

In 2004, by virtue of the Australian Federal Police and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Cth), the responsibility for the APS was removed from the Federal Attorney-General’s Department and given to the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and thus the APS is now the
responsibility of the AFP Commissioner. Federal APS officers are now formally referred to as Protective Service Officers (PSOs). There are approximately 1400 in Australia currently.

iv. South Australia Police (SAPOL) Police Security Services Branch (PSSB)

The PSSB began within SAPOL as a publicly-funded body employing public servants (not sworn police officers), competing in the same market-place with private security firms in providing fee-for-service security advice, protective security risk reviews, alarm monitoring, and patrol and personnel services. After a review in 2003, the PSSB no longer competed in the market place. It shifted its emphasis to focus upon cost recovery protection of government clients such as school security. From 2009, SAPOL shifted the focus again with the advent of the Protective Security Officers (described below) who now sit within the PSSB as a second ‘tier’ of policing officers. These are sworn police officers. Some PSOs now have the power to wear and to deploy firearms. Other States have similar bodies, for example: VicPol has a protective security branch; NSW police have special constables (on an ad hoc, user-pays basis); and Queensland’s State Building Protective Security Act 1983 creates a State Government Protective Service that operates on a commercial basis too.

v. Maritime and Aviation Security Officers

Under the Maritime Services Act 1935 (Cth) and the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Cth), security officers (appropriately trained) can assume the powers that are created by the Acts. These officers are licensed private operators who are contracted (through the owners of the airports and ports) to carry out security roles especially designed to preserve the integrity of critical infrastructure. This has been the driving force in the face of the terrorism threats.

vi. Special Events ‘Rangers’

Some private security personnel, with appropriate security licences, but without specialised training, are given specific powers that derived from the legislation creating the particular authority itself. For example, the Security Industry (Olympic and Paralympic Games) Act 1999 (NSW) allowed security personnel to act in accordance with the wide powers vested in them by the Australian Olympic Committee ahead of the 2000 Olympics. The legislation expired on 1 December 2000. Other legislation remains in force, however. For example, the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority Act 1998 (NSW) created the Foreshore Authority which was not linked to the Olympics and continues to this day. The Foreshore Authority can appoint licensed security officers to be ‘rangers’ (section 32) and to empower them to exercise certain powers, including removal of unwanted persons from the Sydney Harbour Foreshore, search and seizure and ‘move on’ powers. These powers are found in Part 4 of the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority Regulation 2006 (NSW). The important thing to note here is that rangers are not public servants, but operatives who have an appropriate licence and who are contracted to the Authority to carry out the role, subject to their undertaking further training.

Allied to these officers are the growing numbers of state-based specialist officers who are employed for specific tasks, such as transit officers whose powers vary from task to task and from State to State. The powers vary too. In Queensland, for example, from 2009 transit officers have had the power to handcuff and detain unruly passengers. One might consider in this same context the various ‘policing’ operatives engaged in state security (such as immigration officials), special auxiliary constables (for example, transport security staff), departments of state officials (such as the fraud section of social security departments), municipal employees (for example, local authorities who regulate and manage waste
disposal), and regulatory and investigative personnel employed by both public and private corporations.

B **Government-Trained ‘2nd Tier Police’**

A second manifestation derives from legislation that creates a ‘second tier’ of policing. Operatives are trained generally for policing roles. They are not tied to any specific task or any specific employment arrangement. The most obvious example is the United Kingdom’s system of Community Support Officers.

i. **Community Support Officers (CSOs)**

In the United Kingdom in 2003, 4000 persons were appointed as CSOs under the *Police Reform Act 2002* (UK) (Johnston 2005, 2006, 2007; Johnston, Donaldson and Jones 2004). By March 2006, the London Metropolitan Police Service (the ‘Met’) had 2,500 CSOs (Blair 2007) and they are now found across every one of the 43 Home Offices police forces in England and Wales. A commitment has been made by the government to expand considerably the number of CSOs across the UK (Cooper et al 2006).

CSOs, carrying out ‘second-tier’ policing roles, have limited powers to deal with anti-social behaviour and disorderly conduct. These powers include the right to detain a person for up to 30 minutes.

Local authorities set down possible roles for CSOs, who are then empowered to carry them out, so long as the appropriate training has taken place. These roles include patrolling, collecting evidence, responding to low level incidents, advising on crime prevention, conducting house to house enquiries, giving witness support and undertaking CCTV surveillance.

The powers granted to CSOs are not standard, but are drawn from a list of over 40 powers. The evidence is that most police forces have delegated between 14-28 powers to CSOs, the main ones being the confiscation of alcohol and tobacco from underage consumers, the power of entry to save life and limb, and the ability of CSOs to seek names and addresses from persons whom they see engaging in anti-social conduct.

Other available powers include the power to issue penalty notices for truancy, disorder (curfews, property damage, and fireworks), dog fouling, graffiti, littering, riding on footpaths and so forth. CSOs may have bestowed upon them the power to disperse groups and to detain a person for up to 30 minutes pending the arrival of police. According to Cooper *et al*, 14 police forces have granted these special powers to CSOs.

The list of tasks available to some CSOs also includes the power to seize vehicles, to use reasonable force, to do road checks of car road-worthiness, to control traffic, to enforce cordon under specific anti-terrorism laws and to stop and search under these laws.

ii. **Protective Security Officers (South Australia)**

The model closest to the CSO in Australia is the ‘protective security’ officer implemented in South Australia in March 2007. The Rann Labor government introduced at the time, and the South Australian parliament later passed, the *Protective Security Act 2007* (SA). The Protective Security Officer (PSO) was created by this legislation. PSOs are not linked to any specific body of police, nor are they engaged for a specific event. PSOs are appointed and managed by the Police Commissioner, who has power to discipline them. They sit within the PSSB (discussed above). They are empowered to provide a first response to terrorist incidents and to protect buildings, vehicles, officials and designated places.
Consequently they are resourced with a range of tactical options that can include the use of firearms, batons and capsicum spray. PSOs are not expected, nor are they required, to become involved in complex police activities or investigations. But they do not have powers of a constable. PSOs have the authority to give reasonable directions, refuse entry, or direct a person to leave certain locations, require persons to state their reason for being at a certain location and require persons to state their name and address and to provide identification when requested. They are able to conduct searches on persons, vehicles or property (under certain circumstances), seize certain items and evidence; and detain a person for a ‘Protective Security Offence.’

Such an offence is committed if a person is caught failing to obey reasonable directions, failing to state his or her reason for being on certain premises, failing to give his or her correct name and address, failing to produce identification, hindering or assaulting or resisting a PSO in the execution of protective security duties, and impersonating a PSO.

C Commandeered Volunteer ‘Quasi-Police’

A third manifestation is where a jurisdiction enacts specific legislation that is designed to set out limited private security personnel rights and powers which are then matched with the specific training that has been undertaken, leaving specially-trained officers ‘on call’ should the need for specialised policing duties arise.

One manifestation that comes to mind is Project Griffin. The name is taken from the fictitious creature of eagle/lion that is the symbol of the City of London. In this project, certain privately-based security personnel are ‘on call’ for emergency responses. These officers remain employed principally in other ‘security’ occupations, usually as security managers of selected Central Business District (CBD) buildings. Project Griffin was developed by the City of London Police in 2004. The idea of the project was to have, at the ready, a significant number of private security officers, specifically ‘Griffin-trained’, available to help police if there was a major incident, such as a terrorist attack. According to anecdotal reports, there could be up to 4000 security officers working privately in the London CBD on any given day. The powers of these officers (and they are very limited powers indeed) only come into play when a terrorism incident occurs and they are called up for ‘critical incident management’ duty, principally to man police cordons and control access to areas affected by terrorist acts.

A variety of Project Griffin has been launched by Victoria Police (VicPol) and operates, in a limited fashion, around the Melbourne CBD under the auspices of VicPol’s Counter-terrorism Coordination Unit which was set up in 2005. In a similar move, SAPOL has initiated a Project Griffin Steering Group (made up of SAPOL representatives and a selection of private security managers) to progress the implementation of the initiative in the Adelaide metropolitan area. The Steering Group has identified about 20 major security providers plus the security from the three universities that might be interested in participating in the first round of training sessions for their security officers.

Other than these variations on a ‘Griffin’ theme, there are no Griffin-style programs currently running elsewhere in Australia.

Discussion

When exceptional authority is bestowed upon those who administer and enforce the law, it requires legislative action through parliamentary debate. For that reason, the rules regulating public policing are set out prospectively to authorise the taking of particular action, and also retrospectively to show interested others, such as the courts, parliaments and other accountability forums, that the action was justified in the circumstances (Ericson 1982).
public police have considerable powers to arrest, search and interrogate. Liberty is at stake if these powers are abused; hence they have been debated in parliaments and tested in courts for decades.

Private security personnel and private operatives are now undertaking many of the same roles, but the laws that apply to empower and restrict them are not in the same league. They are, for the most part, vague and inconsistent. Private security legal issues rarely come before the courts and there is little legislation that applies. This situation creates a rather opaque ‘policing’ world.

It is worrisome to many commentators that, in the private sector, many companies and firms engage in private justice (such as demotion of an officer caught in fraudulent activities) rather than engage in the time-consuming task of having the police (or other investigative agency) inquire into the conduct, with its attendant bad publicity for the company or firm (Sarre 1995, 294).

Where should we proceed from here? How can we best make more public the vast amount of policing that is now conducted by ‘private’ police? There is no broadly-based legislation giving specific powers to all licensed agents. Parliaments have avoided legislation other than to set up licensing regimes. They have not specifically set out immunities, preferring to infer that they apply once the powers under legislation (such as the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Cth)) have been exercised appropriately. One can sympathise. It is a difficult task to specify private police powers across the board, given the many forms and varieties of private operatives and the multitude of activities in which they may be engaged at any one time or over a period of time. In addition, many private security firms are, or are becoming, national and transnational corporations, and thus any general attempt to set legislated rules which transcend national and international boundaries would be difficult to do, let alone to implement and enforce.

This would explain why the most common option is the ‘do nothing’ option. There are common law provisions and ad hoc legislation that applies to issues such as citizen’s arrest, use of force, trespass to land, defence of property and defence of another’s property, search and seizure, covert surveillance, and breach of privacy which apply now to all people including security personnel. Leaving these areas legally ambiguous encourages fewer suits against ‘private’ police, forcing those aggrieved to negotiate more and litigate less.

But for those who find the level of uncertainty and anomaly unsettling there are other options. The most interesting development is the last one discussed above, that is the option based upon the ‘commandeering’ model. If such a model were to become more widespread, law-makers could place guidelines in the legislation setting out where and when ‘Griffin-trained’ personnel can safely rely upon immunities from suit more generally, for example, where they can demonstrate that they were engaging in a bona fide act of crime prevention. The idea of a person being protected from legal suit when exercising good faith is not novel. For example, s 74(2) of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) states that ‘[a] good Samaritan incurs no personal civil liability for an act or omission done or made in good faith and without recklessness in assisting a person in apparent need of emergency assistance.’ Perhaps a ‘reasonable suspicion and good faith immunity’ could be installed by legislation for all people who engage in ‘higher level’ licensed security functions. There is a similar provision is found in section 32 of the Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA):

(1) No civil or criminal liability will attach to the State Co-ordinator, an authorised officer or other person for an act or omission in good faith—
(a) in the exercise or discharge, or purported exercise or discharge, of a power or function under this Act; or

(b) in the carrying out of any direction or requirement given or imposed in accordance with this Act in relation to an emergency.

(2) A liability that would, but for subsection (1), lie against a person lies instead against the Crown.

Specifically-designed legislation for ‘Griffin-trained’ personnel (or other special emergency response personnel) has some appeal. It may be appealing to those seeking to set guidelines for monitoring private security sector activity; although one could note that the creation of specific legislation for public police does not guarantee their accountability. On that subject Philip Stenning is upbeat about the changing perceptions of accountability. He remarks that those who are tempted to pessimism about this might do well to remember that it took over 50 years to persuade Parliament to establish the ‘new police in the 19th Century. Patience and perseverance may yet eventually be rewarded (Stenning 2009, 31-32).

Would it be possible for ‘2nd tier’ or ‘Griffin-style’ empowerment legislation to be enacted to apply over and above the anti-terrorism activities that Project Griffin, for example, is designed to accommodate? It is possible to envisage legislation capable of matching and accommodating all of the circumstances in which private personnel could be called upon to assist and to specify what they can or should do in certain circumstances, what they are required to avoid doing, and when they can safely rely upon immunity from legal suit. There are, one should add, some concerns related to the often inadequate levels of training of private security personnel (Sarre and Prenzler 2009, 213). Clearly, any such legislation could only be activated once there was satisfaction that the required levels of training and accountability would accompany implementation.

Conclusion

As policing moves more and more into private hands, the traditional legal powers that apply to ‘policing’ are becoming out-dated. The powers and immunities of private security personnel are often unclear and inconsistent, dependent upon fine distinctions and differ markedly from those of the public police even though they are often carrying out many of the same tasks. What should be done to remedy this situation? There are two things that could be done immediately without too much difficulty.

There is a good argument to continue to explore the development of ‘2nd tier’-style private security laws with specific powers and immunities granted to certain personnel who have been suitably trained, whether as UK-style Community Support Officers or the Australian permutation, Protective Security Officers. This would require specific legislation for the States to draft.

There is a good argument to continue to expand the concept of ‘Griffin-trained’ personnel, drawn from the ranks of private personnel who could wear two security ‘hats’. To that extent, the South Australian and Victorian initiatives should be applauded and expanded.

Whatever path is chosen, the exercise in making the choices and debating the required legislation would, arguably, lift the profile of private operators and their associations, bolster training standards and accountabilities, improve public confidence, and enhance policing effectiveness and cooperation generally.
5. CHAPTER FIVE  HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES: How best can policies and laws be developed to ensure security officer safety and public safety?

Introduction

This component of the research enquired into safety issues for security officers utilising two research instruments. The first source was national workers’ compensation data provided by Safe Work Australia. The data provide for a comparison of police and security officer experiences of workplace violence and injury. Between 2000-01 and 2007-08 security officers and police in Australia made compensation claims for 17,231 work-related injuries. While the rate of police officers’ work-related injuries overall occurred at twice that for security officers, the rates of occupational violence were about equal and followed the same trend over time; rising during the mid-2000s and then declining steadily. However, injuries to security officers appeared more serious than those experienced by police. Security and police were also in the top three highest claiming occupations for work-related injuries and deaths from occupational violence, with security officers at number one in both instances.

The second data source was a survey of security personnel. The survey found that 57% of crowd controllers had experienced a major physical assault once or more in the past year compared to 24% of security officers. Eighty-six percent of crowd controllers had experienced a minor assault at least once and all crowd controllers had experienced verbal abuse. The large majority of both crowd controllers and security officers reported experiencing a verbal threat, or threatening or intimidating behaviour, in the past year. In terms of their experiences across their careers to-date, 58% of all respondents had experienced a major assault at least once. Just under one third reported anxiety as a result of workplace violence and just under 20% reported they experienced depression. On the whole, the majority also felt that the current system for training, licensing and regulating the security industry was ineffective in relation to safety for security personnel, but the majority also felt that the system was at least partially effective in reducing assaults by security personnel on members of the public. Suggestions for improving safety did not produce any large consensus positions. The largest percentage of respondents – 28% – wanted stricter requirements on training and fatalities.

The findings add to the very limited literature on injuries and violence experienced by security officers and provided some useful evidence of common experiences with police. Both research projects showed that security officers suffer unacceptably high rates of workplace injuries, violence and fatalities. Situational analyses of police deaths suggest that the majority of these are highly preventable, and it is likely that this also applies to security officer injuries and deaths. However, very little is known about the circumstances in which injuries to security officers occur and this demonstrates the need for research on specific situational factors, particularly in relation to workplace violence, and on what works in prevention.

Background

One review of workplace violence data reported that ‘the jobs at highest risk of “client-initiated” violence in the US, Britain, and Australia are: police, security and prison guards, fire service, teachers, health care and social security workers’ (Mayhew, 2003, p.3). However, there is considerable variability in estimates for police and security officers, and published research is heavily biased towards US sources and to homicides rather than
workplace violence or injuries more broadly. Available reports nonetheless consistently place police and security officers in the six highest groups for occupational homicide, often in the top three. They also typically show that security officers are the victims of work-related homicide at a lower rate than police officers. For example, a review of four papers that compared US rates of work-related homicides for ‘security guards’ and ‘police/detectives’ consistently showed lower rates of work-related homicide for security guards, who on average suffered 40 per cent fewer homicides than police (Kraus, Blander and McArthur 1995) – see Table 5-1.

Specific findings from other studies in the field included the following:

- In California, Kraus (1987) found the homicide rate for security guards was 16.5 per 100,000 employed persons, while police suffered homicides at a rate of 20.8 per 100,000 employed persons.
- A comparison of the rates of homicide across a number of law enforcement categories in the US showed that guards were killed at about half the rate of police (Castillo and Jenkins 1994).
- Warchol (1998) found that victimisation rates for homicide or non-fatal violence in the US were 117 per 1,000 security officers and 306 per 1,000 police officers.
- In Britain, Budd (1999) reported that 10.6 per cent of ‘security guards and related occupations’ were victims of violence while working compared with 28.4 per cent of police officers.
- In the US, Sygnatur and Toscano (2000) found that ‘police/detectives’ had the second highest fatality rate after taxicab drivers and chauffeurs at 4.4 persons per 100,000 workers, with security guards following closely at 4.1 persons per 100,000 workers.
- Also in the US, Duhart (2001) found that 87 per 1,000 security workers and 261 per 1,000 police officers were the victim of a work-related injury.

There are a number of obvious dangers in policing and security work which make sense of high rates of injuries and deaths. Officers from both groups have frequent contact with people who may be engaged in criminal activity or who may be mentally unstable, aggressive, under the influence of drugs and alcohol, or injured. This contact exposes officers to bodily fluids; physical injury due to manual handling, accidents or assaults; stress; fatigue; and psychological injury, among other things (e.g. Guthrie 2009, National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 2003, WorkCoverNSW 2007). Motor vehicle accidents also pose a high risk, especially for police engaged in patrols, vehicle stops and high speed pursuits (Allard and Prenzler 2009).

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**Table 5-1 Rates of work-related homicides per 100,000 employed persons, Four US studies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Study 2</th>
<th>Study 3</th>
<th>Study 4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security guards</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police/detectives</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from Kraus et al. 1995, p 368)
Research on the causes and prevention of officer deaths and injuries is more developed for police than for security officers. Typically research shows that two-thirds to three-quarters of police deaths are the result of accidents rather than attacks, and upwards of three-quarters of accidents are attributable to motor vehicle accidents (Allard and Prenzler 2009). However, despite the salience of fatal risks as a feature of police work, there is very little detailed research on this topic, especially in terms of prevention. Much of the literature on officer safety is focused on preventing non-fatal assaults, although this work has implications of relevance to fatalities. Kaminski and Sorensen’s (1995) study of assault-related injuries, for example, recommended correcting officers’ misleading perceptions about risk and improving training in unarmed defensive tactics. Smith, Kaminski, Alpert, Fridell, MacDonald and Kubu (2009) found that both suspect and officer injuries were significantly reduced when officers deployed capsicum spray and stun guns rather than using direct physical force. The small number of available studies of police homicides also makes some useful findings. For example, in a review article, Mayhew (2001) reported that police homicides frequently involved offenders with personality disorders and victims (police) who underestimated the risks they faced from offenders (relying too much on negotiation) or who breached procedures (such as failing to wait for back-up) (see also Chapman 1997, Kurby 2004).

In one of the few long-range national studies on police deaths available, Allard and Prenzler (2009) collected official data on all officer deaths in Australia from the establishment of police departments in the 19th century to 2007. Of the 643 cases identified, approximately three-quarters were found to be ‘accidental’ and one quarter the result of an ‘attack’. The researchers found that officer fatalities had been declining as a proportion of police numbers since the 1960s as a result of improvements in procedures and technology. At the same time, the research indicated that further reductions in fatalities were obtainable through stricter application of a wider range of prevention strategies. A focus on preventing police deaths would also most likely lead to reductions in injuries. Key recommendations included curtailing speeding in police vehicles; keeping police off the carriageway at vehicle stops and roadblocks; and better risk management procedures in arrests, executing warrants, raids and sieges.

In Australia, there are few studies comparing injury and fatality rates between occupations, and very few studies involve police and security officers. An extensive literature search located only three papers that included direct comparisons between security officers and police officers. An early Australia-wide study was commissioned by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (1999a), drawing on the Deaths Data List of the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), the National Deaths Index of the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, and the Northern Territory Deaths Index, covering four years of work-related fatalities from 1989 to 1992. In the study period there were 15 work-related security guard deaths (12 per 100,000 security officers per year), four of which involved murder (3.2 per 100,000 security officers per year). In comparison, there were 19 police deaths (11.3 per 100,000 police officers per year). Six of the 19 were murdered (3.0 per 100,000 police officers per year). This comparison highlighted that the risk of homicide was approximately equal for the two groups. The death rates were also just over twice the general workforce rate of 5.5 per 100,000.

A statistical release from WorkCover South Australia reported that the occupation of ‘security officer’ had the highest average payout for workers’ compensation claims amongst WorkCover registered occupations for a seven year period – AU$15,027 on average per annum compared to AU$6,951 for police (WorkCoverSA 2008). Security officers, however, lodged far fewer claims than police over the period – 64.5 on average per annum compared to
131.1 for police. Finally, Chambers and Lord (2000) examined the frequency of gunshot wounds in an urban Sydney emergency room in 1998. In this study, nine security guards and seven police officers required medical attention during the study period.

The international literature suggests that police are injured at higher rates than security officers and in, many cases, are fatally injured at twice the rate of security officers. The limited Australian research, on the other hand, indicates that rates of injuries and fatalities may be more equal, but that security officers may be injured more severely than police. Overall, available studies tend to lack detail about the nature and causes of injuries. Given the critical role of police and security officers in preventing crime, maintaining public order and providing emergency services it is imperative that more work be done in the field, especially with a view to developing implications for prevention. Interest in comparing police and security officers has been influenced by the dramatic growth of the private security sector.

This situation has thrown up a complex set of social issues and challenges for researchers and policy makers, including questions about the commonality of work and relations between the two groups. Currently it appears that security is still largely focused on providing a preventive presence; while police have a more dominant role in arrests, investigations and prosecutions and in high level interdictions in crisis situations – a role which may account for higher injury rates and fatalities reported in the international literature. Nonetheless, it has been argued that private security is increasingly taking on more traditional policing tasks (e.g., Pastor 2003). At the very least, similarities in work profiles, including areas such as injuries, support a case for greater cooperation in domains such as training, regulation and the development of a common science of policing (Sarre & Prenzler, 2009).

**Study 1: Workers’ Compensation Data on Police and Security Officer Experiences of Occupational Violence and Injury**

**Method**

The following study was designed to improve the knowledge base about the nature and causes of injuries to security officers and police by examining available Australian data on the topic. An in-depth scoping exercise was conducted to identify relevant sources. This exercise explored data held by Australia state and federal government departments, injury surveillance units, and deaths and compensation-based agencies by searching government websites, agency websites and by follow up telephone enquiries. The National Dataset on Compensation-Based Statistics, maintained by Safe Work Australia (a federal government statutory agency established in 2009), was deemed to be the most appropriate for this research given that it contained detailed data in a consistent format over the longest time period. Permission to access a de-identified subset of the data was obtained from all jurisdictions prior to Safe Work Australia providing the dataset.

In consultation with a Safe Work Australia representative the research team obtained de-identified claim-level data for eight years, from 2000-1 to 2007-08 by financial year. Coding changes precluded a longer observation period, while 2007-08 was the most recent complete year when the study commenced in 2010. The data included successful claims only. Rejected or pending claims were excluded from analysis. Security and police officers were identified by their industry and occupation coding using the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO) (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1997). In light of the range of workers’ compensation claim types, only relevant occurrences were included. Of the 11 major
groupings of injury/disease classifications, only ‘injury and poisoning’ and ‘mental disorders’ were obtained.\textsuperscript{19}

Variables obtained from the dataset included demographic information (sex, age) and occurrence characteristics. The latter included ‘type of injury’, ‘location of the injury’, ‘mechanism that caused the injury’, ‘severity indicator’ and ‘time lost due to injury/illness’. The coding for mechanism of injury/disease was adopted to identify harm arising from workplace violence. Within this variable, two mechanisms were relevant: ‘being assaulted by a person or persons’ and ‘exposure to workplace or occupational violence’. The former code relates to ‘physical injuries arising from intentional assaults, including assaults with weapons’, while the latter is used in cases where psychological injuries from a violent incident are more serious or debilitating than any physical injuries sustained (see National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 1999b). To account for the different number of employees and different working hours across the two occupations, rates per 100,000 workers and per million hours worked were created based on the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ annual occupation estimates provided by Safe Work Australia. Over the eight years the average number of police recorded was 46,448 and for security officers the number was 45,603.

It is probable that the data used in this study underestimate injuries. This is primarily due to underreporting. Recent efforts have identified several factors that decrease a worker’s likelihood of lodging a compensation claim. These include thinking the injury was too minor, uncertainty about eligibility or coverage, concern about future employability, and believing lodging a claim is not worth the effort (Safe Work Australia 2009). Furthermore, it is likely that underreporting is not equally distributed across different industries, occupations or over time. Despite these limitations the available data provide consistency over time and are likely to be fairly accurate in relation to injuries other than minor injuries.

Findings

Table 5-2 shows that between 2000-01 and 2007-08 security officers and police in Australia made compensation claims for 17,231 work-related injuries. Police claimed at almost twice the rate of security officers. In both occupations, males were overrepresented (Table 5-3). Age at the time of injury was similar (Table 5-4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-2 Work-related injuries by occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N /100,000 workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-3 Gender of claimants by occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{19} Other major groups are disease based and not directly relevant to police or security work.
Table 5-4 Age at the time of injury by occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>37.28 (11.63)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>37.26 (8.60)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-5 reports the causes or ‘mechanism’ of injuries experienced by security officers and police. Of a total 17,231 incidents, a minority of 2,878 or 17% were caused by occupational violence. In terms of incident numbers, a higher proportion of security officers’ claims (24%) resulted from harm suffered from occupational violence compared to police (12.6%). However, the rate of occupational violence was only slightly higher for security officers – 399 per 100,000 workers compared to 383 per 100,000 workers for police. This indicates that occupational violence occurred at similar rates for both occupations, but police tended to claim more frequently for injuries caused by ‘other mechanisms’.

Table 5-5 Mechanism of injury to security and police officers, by occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Security officers</th>
<th>Police officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational violence</td>
<td>1455</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other mechanism</td>
<td>4541</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falls trips and slips</td>
<td>1494</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitting objects with a part of the body</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being hit by moving objects</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound and pressure</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body stressing</td>
<td>1313</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat, radiation and electricity</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals and other substances</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological factors</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental stress</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other and unspecified</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanism not listed</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5996</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mechanisms other than violence accounted for 75.7% of injuries sustained by security officers and 87.3% by police. For security officers, the leading causes were falls, trips and slips, body stressing (e.g. ‘muscle, ligament or tendon damage due to manual handling’), and being hit by moving objects (e.g. ‘being hit by a person accidentally’). For police officers, leading causes were body stressing; falls, trips and slips; and mental stress (e.g. ‘exposure to a traumatic event’ and ‘work pressure stresses’). The claim rate per 100,000 employees was substantially larger for police in injuries resulting from mental stress and body stressing.

Injuries to the limbs and torso area dominated occupational violence claims by both security officers and police (Table 5-6). These injuries accounted for 46.0% of security officers’ claims, and 58.5% of police officers’ claims. Of additional note is the fact that security officers were 2.5 times more likely than police to report head injuries in an occupational violence claim. While the rate of claims per 100,000 security officers exceeded those of
police for ‘multiple locations’ and ‘unspecified’ locations, the rate of police officers’ injuries surpassed those of security officers for all other locations. Overall, however, the rates of injury for both occupations were similar across different locations.

Table 5-6 Location of injury/disease due to occupational violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of injury/disease due to occupational violence</th>
<th>Security officers</th>
<th>Police officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neck</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trunk</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper limbs</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower limbs</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-physical</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1455</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examining the amount of time lost as a result of injuries caused by occupational violence, security officers on average lost 237 hours more than police (see Table 5-7). This equates to almost six 40-hour working weeks. The average time lost due to injuries caused by other mechanisms also exceeded that of the average police officer but to a much lesser extent. The median cost for all claims was higher for police: $9,900 for police and $6,900 for security officers. However, Safe Work Australia informed the researchers that this is probably due to the better funding of the police compensation scheme. The median costs for workplace violence were similar: $9,900 for police and $6,800 for security officers.

Table 5-7 Lost time in hours due to occupational violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational violence</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Min-Max</th>
<th>Other mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Min-Max</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>823.9 (1795.0)</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0-19849.0</td>
<td>887.1 (1849.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>586.9 (1191.7)</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1-11848.8</td>
<td>814.2 (1696.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-8 shows that the rate of workplace violence leading to injury claims fluctuated over the observation period for both occupations: trending upwards in the early 2000s, peaking around the middle of the period and then declining. Claims due to occupational violence as a percentage of all incidents almost doubled amongst security officers from a low of 15.2% in 2001 to a high of 29.7% in 2005. For police officers, for the most part this figure varied between 10.7% and 15.3% over the observation period. For five of the eight years, security officers suffered injuries from occupational violence at higher rates than police officers, including the last three years of the study. Rates per million work hours were higher for security officers for five of the eight years. In the 2007-08 financial year occupational violence claims by security officers reached 371 per 100,000 employees, compared to 356 claims per 100,000 for police. Rates of occupational violence were nonetheless similar across the observation period.
Table 5-8 Occupational violence over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Security officers</th>
<th>Police officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N violence claims</td>
<td>N non-violence claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1455</td>
<td>4541</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When examining injuries from violence across occupations, security and police presented as two of the five occupations which most frequently made claims – standing at first and third respectively in the most recent statistics for 2007-08 (Table 5-9). In terms of overall numbers of work-related fatalities for the full eight years, the highest ranked occupation was truck drivers (N = 395). Police ranked 12th (N = 32), while guards and security officers ranked 22nd (N = 17). The highest ranked for fatal incidents of work-related violence, however, was guards and security officers (N = 5), followed by automobile drivers (N = 4), then police (N = 2). These figures were obtained from a dataset classified by ‘occupation’, which is slightly larger than the dataset organised by ‘industry’. Using the dataset, in the eight year study period claims were lodged for the deaths of 14 security officers (3.8 per 100,000 security officers) and 27 police officers (7.3 per 100,000 police). The rates indicate that police officers were almost twice as likely to suffer a fatal injury at work. In terms of causality, the majority of police deaths (N = 15) were caused by vehicle accidents. When fatalities caused by vehicle accidents are removed, however, security and police officers suffered the same number of work-related deaths (N = 12). Six of the fatalities were caused by occupational violence: four security officers and two police officers. These figures are too small to calculate rates, and indicate that fatalities caused by occupational violence are rare events.

Table 5-9 Five highest-claiming occupations for work-related violence, 2007-08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Rate per 1,000 employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Guards and security officers</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Prison officers</td>
<td>4.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Police officers</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Other professionals</td>
<td>4.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Welfare associate professionals</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ‘Registered developmental disability nurses’ and ‘Company secretaries’ had higher claims rates but are not included because of standard error rates above 50%.
Study 2: A Survey of Security Officers’ Experience of Safety and Violence

Method

A survey was conducted of security officers in operational roles. The questionnaire was developed in consultation with ASIAL staff and included questions ranging across security officers’ experiences of assaults and threats, types of injuries, psychological responses, views on the regulatory system in relation to safety, and recommendations for improvements. The questionnaire was completed online at the ASIAL website. The survey was advertised through the ASIAL magazine *Security Insider* and through ASIAL members encouraging their staff to participate. The survey site was open during September and October in 2010.

Findings

A total of 181 online surveys were submitted but 54 were removed due to an unacceptably high level of missing data. Table 5-10 shows that there were a total of 127 questionnaires completed with sufficient responses provided to be included in the analysis. The final sample consisted of 87.4% males and 12.6% females. The 18-30 age group accounted for 12.6% of participants, 31-40 29.9% and 41+ 57.5%. Almost half (48.0%) of all participants were males aged over 40. In terms of types of security work, as shown in table 5-11, the largest group represented in the sample were ‘Security officer (general duties/static/patrol)’ at 74.8%, with crowd controllers combined (n = 23) making up 18.1%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-10 Survey participants by gender and age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-11 Main area of work in the past 12 months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowd control (licensed premises)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowd control (special events/sports)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officer (general duties/static/patrol)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash-in-transit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officer (general duties/static/patrol) - Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following tables report respondents’ experiences in the past 12 months by main type of work. Crowd controllers for licensed premises (n = 15) and crowd controllers for special and sporting events (n = 8) were merged to form a combined crowd controllers group (n = 22), with one case of missing data. The categories of cash-in-transit (n = 1) and management (n =
8) were excluded due to low numbers. The category of security officers – general duties was not changed but did have 3 cases of missing data leaving 92 respondents. When asked about experiences of violence in the workplace over the past year the open-response nature of the survey design resulted in the responses ranging from text responses (e.g. ‘never’, ‘sometimes’, ‘everyday’, ‘occasionally’, ‘all the time’) and numerical responses in no sort of grouping. Responses were therefore coded into scales as shown in the tables.

Table 5-12 shows that 57.1% of crowd controllers had experienced a major physical assault once or more in the past year. The large majority of these experienced assault between one and five times – 47.6% of all crowd controllers. Only 23.9% of security officers had experienced a major physical assault once or more in the past year, with 16.3% experiencing a major assault between one and five times.

Table 5-12 Experiences of major physical assault in the past 12 months, by main area of work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1 - 5 times</th>
<th>6 - 10 times</th>
<th>11 - 20 times</th>
<th>21 - 99 times</th>
<th>100+ times</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crowd controllers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ‘other’ category captures responses that could not be numerically coded (e.g. ‘lost count’, ‘yes, all the time’).

Table 5-13 shows that only 13.6% of crowd controllers had not experienced minor physical assault in the past year, with 40.9% experiencing minor assaults 1 to 5 times. A very large proportion of crowd controllers – 86.3% – experienced a minor assault at least once. Almost one fifth (18.9%) reported experiencing minor assaults 21–99 times. Over half of the security officers (57.6%) had not experienced any minor physical assault in the past year; while just under a quarter (22.8%) had experienced minor assault 1 to 5 times.

Table 5-13 Experiences of minor physical assault in the past 12 months, by main area of work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1 - 5 times</th>
<th>6 - 10 times</th>
<th>11 - 20 times</th>
<th>21 - 99 times</th>
<th>100+ times</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crowd controllers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 The ‘other’ category captures responses that could be numerically coded (e.g. ‘lost count’, ‘yes, all the time’).
All crowd controllers had experienced verbal abuse in the past year (Table 5-14). Over a quarter (27.3%) had experienced verbal abuse 11-20 times, and just under one fifth (18.2%) 21-99 times, while 13.6% had experienced verbal abuse 100 times or more. Almost a quarter (22.8%) of security officers had not experienced verbal abuse in the past year. Just under one fifth (18.5%) had experienced verbal abuse 21-99 times and 15.2% 100 times or more.

Table 5-14 Experiences of verbal abuse in the past 12 months, by main area of work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1 - 5 times</th>
<th>6 - 10 times</th>
<th>11 - 20 times</th>
<th>21 - 99 times</th>
<th>100+ times</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowd controllers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The large majority of both crowd controllers and security officers reported experiencing a verbal threat at least once in the past year, with 28.7% of security officers reporting no such threats and only 4.8% of crowd controllers not experiencing such a threat (Table 5-15). Nearly one fifth of crowd controllers had experienced verbal threats 1-5 times (19.0%) and another fifth 21–99 times (19.0%). Just over one fifth (20.9%) of security officers had been verbally threatened 1-5 times in the past year, with 71.2% experiencing verbal threats at least once.

Table 5-15 Experiences of verbal threats in the past 12 months, by main area of work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1 - 5 times</th>
<th>6 - 10 times</th>
<th>11 - 20 times</th>
<th>21 - 99 times</th>
<th>100+ times</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowd controllers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 The ‘other’ category captures responses that could be numerically coded (e.g. ‘lost count’, ‘yes, all the time’).
Table 5-16 shows experiences of threatening or intimidating behaviour in the past 12 months, by main area of work. It indicates that only 4.5% of crowd controllers had not experienced threatening or intimidating behaviour in the past 12 months, while just under a quarter (22.7%) had experienced threatening or intimidating behaviour 1-5 times, and over a quarter (27.3%) 21–99 times. Nearly a quarter of security officers (24.2%) had not experienced any threatening or intimidating behaviour in the past 12 months, while approximately one fifth had experienced it 11-20 times, and 75.8% had experienced it at least once.

Table 5-16 Experiences of threatening or intimidating behaviour, past 12 months, main area of work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>0 times</th>
<th>1 - 5 times</th>
<th>6 - 10 times</th>
<th>11 - 20 times</th>
<th>21 - 99 times</th>
<th>100+ times</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crowd controllers</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ‘other’ category captures responses that could be numerically coded (e.g. ‘lost count’, ‘yes, all the time’).

The following table, Table 5-17, provides a summary of responses to questions about experiences of violence for all respondents over their career to-date. The large majority had experienced some type of aggression: 58.1% had experienced a major assault, 69.6% experienced a minor assault, 91.6% experienced verbal abuse, 86.7% experienced verbal threats, and 87.7% experienced threatening or intimidating behaviour.

Table 5-17 Experiences of violence over career

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>0 times</th>
<th>1 - 10 times</th>
<th>11 - 50 times</th>
<th>51 – 100 times</th>
<th>100+ times</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major physical assault</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor physical assault</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal abuse</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatening or intimidating behaviour</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-18 reports respondents’ observations of colleagues committing ‘major assaults’ in the previous 12 months, by main area of work. Only 14.1% of security officers reported observing security personnel committing at least one major assault in the past 12 months. Most of these were within 1-5 times. The proportion rose to 23.8% for crowd controllers (5 of 21). In total 19.0% of crowd controllers (or 4 of 21) reported observing a major assault between 1-5 times.

Table 5-18 Observation of assaults

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-5 times</th>
<th>6-10 times</th>
<th>11-20 times</th>
<th>21-99 times</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowd Controllers</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Officers</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: percentages in this table represent a proportion of that row. For example, 4 crowd controllers within 1-5 times represent 19% of all crowd controllers. N=11 with other types of work have been removed from analysis in this section to allow comparison between crowd controllers and security officers.

Types of physical injuries experienced are reported in Table 5-19, for all respondents, ranked ordered according to frequency. Cuts, scrapes, bruises and scars accounted for the majority of injuries (53.6%), with much lower rates for broken bones, dislocations, fractures (12.8%) and serious lacerations (10.4%). Only 4.8% reported permanent or on-going injuries.

Table 5-19 Types of physical injuries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuts, scrapes, bruises, scars</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken bones, dislocations, fractures</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious laceration (stabbing, stitches)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muscle strains</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glassings</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent/on-going injuries (breathing, sinus, shoulders, back)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concussion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacterial/viral infections, bodily fluid contact</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 125

Types of negative psychological experiences are reported in Table 5-20, for all respondents, rank ordered according to frequency. Anxiety was the most commonly reported response at 30.7%, followed by depression at 18.1%.
Table 5-20 Types of negative psychological experiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger/frustration/dissatisfaction</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low self-esteem</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of appetite, disturbed sleep patterns, phobias</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of trust, no confidence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 127

Very few work-related accidents were reported, as shown in Table 5-21, with ‘repetitive task, excessive weight and unsafe practices’ the largest grouping, but only at 7.8%, and ‘slips, trips and falls’ the second highest but only at 7.0%. A number of respondents answered with the term ‘assault’. These were excluded because assaults are assumed to be deliberate and should not be counted as ‘accidents’.

Table 5-21 Types of work-related accidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repetitive task, excessive weight, unsafe practices</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slips, trips, falls</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicle accident</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullying</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 127

Table 5-22 shows that opinions were divided about whether or not security work had become more dangerous in the last 2 to 3 years. One third of all respondents felt there had been no change. However, a majority of 51.9% thought that security work had become less safe or much less safe, compared to 14.9% who thought it had become safer or much safer.

Table 5-22 In the last 2-3 years security work in general has become

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No change</th>
<th>Much less safe</th>
<th>Less safe</th>
<th>Safer</th>
<th>Much safer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Opinions were also divided on the effectiveness of the current system for training, licensing and regulating the security industry in relation to safety. As shown in Table 5-23, ‘Effectiveness of the current system for training, licensing and regulating the security industry in (%)’, a majority (58.3%) felt that the system was effective or very effective in promoting safe work practices, compared to just over a third (37.7%) who felt the system was
ineffective or very ineffective. However these views were reversed in relation to reducing injuries to security personnel: 59.8% thought the system was ineffective or very ineffective in reducing injuries compared to just over a third (36.0%) who thought it was effective or very effective. Respondents were even more critical when it came to reducing assaults: almost three quarters (74.0%) thought the system was ineffective or very ineffective in reducing assaults on security personnel compared to one quarter (24.4%) who felt the system had helped reduce assaults. Respondent’s views were reversed on the impact of the system on public safety: just over one-third (36.5%) felt the system had been ineffective or very ineffective in reducing assaults by security personnel on members of the public compared to 57.2% who felt it had been effective to some extent.

When it came to ensuring company and venue managers supported safe practices in the security industry, a majority of 54.7% felt the system had been ineffective or very ineffective and 38.8% thought it had been effective or very effective. Just under half (48.0%) felt the system had not been effective in ensuring weapons training was adequate, while just under a quarter (23.0%) were unsure or didn’t know. A large majority of just under three-quarters (73.2%) believed the system had been ineffective or very ineffective in ensuring new entrants to the industry were properly assessed in physical skills and conflict management before being issued with a licence, compared to a fifth (20.5%) who felt it had been effective to some extent. The largest percentage response of 33.9% felt the system was very ineffective in this area. Finally, a majority of 52.0% felt that monitoring compliance with current legislation and standards in relation to safety was ineffective to some extent, compared to 44.1% who felt it had been effective or very effective.

Table 5-23 Effectiveness of the current system for training, licensing and regulating the industry(%) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very ineffective</th>
<th>Ineffective</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Very effective</th>
<th>Unsure/ Don’t know</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promoting safe work practices</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing injuries to security personnel</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing assaults on security personnel</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing assaults by security personnel on members of the public</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring company and venue managers support safe practices by front line security staff</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring weapons training is adequate</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ensuring new entrants to the industry are properly assessed in physical skills and conflict management before being issued with a licence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>44.9%</th>
<th>28.3%</th>
<th>12.6%</th>
<th>7.9%</th>
<th>6.3%</th>
<th>127</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Monitoring compliance with current legislation and standards in relation to safety

|                             | 25.2% | 26.8% | 36.2% | 7.9% | 3.9% | 127 |

Suggestions for improving safety in security work did not produce any large consensus positions. Free text responses were grouped and coded according to common themes as shown in Table 5-24. The largest percentage of respondents – just over one quarter or 31.4% – wanted stricter requirements on training and assessments. This was correlated somewhat with the view expressed in the section on system effectiveness that new entrants to the industry were not properly trained and assessed. Increasing audit and compliance checks attracted the next largest percentage, but this was only 11.8%. Just under 8% supported tougher laws for assaults against security officers and stronger powers for security officers – without specifying exactly what was envisioned.

**Table 5-24 Suggestions on how to improve the security industry**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggestions on how to improve the security industry</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stricter requirements on training and assessments</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased auditing and compliance checks</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tougher laws for assaults against security officers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger powers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision to carry personal protective equipment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management involvement with and support for staff</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self defence training</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better communication with guards (open dialogue)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the regularity and ensure consistency across training organisations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards shouldn’t work alone</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of security officer classification based on training and experience linked to pay and powers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved pay and conditions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

The first study in the research area of officer safety compared the frequency and types of injuries sustained by Australian security officers and police as evidenced in successful workers’ compensation claims. The findings indicate that rates of occupational violence amongst security officers and police were comparable, and that this trend was relatively stable over eight years. The findings support those of the earlier Australian National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (1999a) study, which used data from 1989 to 1992, as outlined in the background section of this chapter.

The findings are perhaps unsurprising considering similar risk profiles for the two occupations in close encounters with stressed and aggressive persons when dealing with problems of crime and disorder. The results, however, are different from the international (largely US-based) literature, which indicates that security officers suffer injuries and violent attacks at a lesser rate than police officers. And despite the similarity in rates of occupational violence, the nature of the injuries suffered by police and security officers differed considerably in this study. Australian security officers were more likely to sustain serious non-fatal injuries than police, as evidenced by the high rates of head injuries and substantial differences in the amount of time lost as a result of an incident.

This finding is not dissimilar from the figures in the WorkCover SA (2008) study. The South Australian research revealed that although security officers have fewer claims than police their claims are for more serious injuries. Again, it is difficult to say why this is the case but one possible explanation is a more prominent role for security officers in crowd control duties that involve direct confrontation with the public. It is also difficult to explain the rises and falls in rates of injuries from the data – although it is possible that enlarged regulation of the Australian security industry – including better selection and training – and slowly improving police safety procedures, might help account for the downward trend (Allard and Prenzler, 2009; Sarre and Prenzler, 2009).

The second study involving a survey of security personnel found that crowd controllers experienced much higher rates of violence than other security officers: 57% of crowd controllers had experienced a major physical assault once or more in the past year compared to 24% of security officers. Eighty-six percent of crowd controllers had experienced a minor
assault at least once and all crowd controllers had experienced verbal abuse. The large majority of both crowd controllers and security officers reported experiencing a verbal threat or threatening or intimidating behaviour in the past year. In terms of their experiences across their careers to-date, 58% had experienced a major assault, 70% experienced a minor assault, 92% experienced verbal abuse, 87% experienced verbal threats, and 88% experienced threatening or intimidating behaviour. The majority of respondents reported only minor injuries, with 5% reporting any permanent or ongoing injury. Anxiety was the most commonly reported response to violence at 30.7%, followed by depression at 18.1%. Just over half the sample – 52% – felt security work was becoming less safe.

On the whole, the majority also felt that the current system for training, licensing and regulating the security industry was ineffective in relation to safety for security personnel, but the majority felt that the system was at least partially effective in reducing assaults by security personnel on members of the public. Suggestions for improving safety did not produce any large consensus positions. The largest percentage of respondents – just over one quarter or 27.6% – wanted stricter requirements on training and assessments.

The data developed in these two projects were not particularly productive in providing information about situational factors involved in injuries and deaths which could be modified to reduce the incidence of these problems. Some clues are provided in relation to the salience of falls, trips and slips; body stressing; and being hit by moving objects. Improved training and procedures, and better debriefing and counselling, might be of assistance here.

The literature on police injuries indicates that methods to reduce body contact, through the deployment of capsicum spray or stun guns for example, can significantly reduce injuries (e.g., Smith, et al., 2009). This can be extended to correcting officer under-estimates of risk and improving skills in unarmed defensive tactics, including through maintenance of skills (Kaminski and Sorensen, 1995). The higher compensation claim rates for males over females for both police and security work suggest a culture of male risk-taking behaviour that might be amenable to modification. Greater use of body armour and a generally much more cautious approach to raids, sieges and traffic stops is likely to reduce fatalities in policing, but more work is need in applied research in these areas (Allard and Prenzler, 2009).

A common finding in research is that more research needs to be done. In the case of these studies of security and police injuries it is clear that the high rates of injuries and fatalities experienced by both groups point to the urgent need for better prevention oriented research. This should include studies that better capture situational variables which might be modified to reduce the injuries experienced by both security providers and members of the public.

Examples of data sources include Coroner reports, but purpose built studies using detailed surveys or systematic observations might be required. Research should also include intervention studies that trial innovative approaches to injury reduction (e.g. Smith et al 2009).

**Conclusion**

This research adds a new dimension to the work previously done on occupational injuries and violence experienced and security officers. The findings show greater similarities between security officers and police than normally reported. However, this research also supports the general finding that both occupations are subject to relatively high rates of violence and work-related fatalities.

The study therefore has important implications for those seeking to prevent injuries and violence in the workplace. Awareness of the risks goes no small way towards enhancing
policy-making in the field. Police and security officers provide an essential service in protecting people from crime and violence. But provision of this service comes at a high cost, as evidenced in these studies, and it is important therefore that greater efforts are put into protecting the welfare of officers engaged in the common tasks of crime prevention, order maintenance and law enforcement.
6. REFERENCES and EXTENDED READINGS


City of Amsterdam, (n.d.) *The Administrative Approach to (Organised) Crime in Amsterdam* Public Order and Safety Department, Netherlands.


7. RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE PROJECT

Conference papers presented

- R. Sarre: 2 November 2006, “Public and private police and preferred models of legal powers and immunities”; interest group presentation, American Society of Criminology annual conference, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
- R Sarre, 21 September, 2007, “Professionalism and Private Sector Policing: What is needed and what may be the consequences?” to TILES (Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies), University of Tasmania, Hobart.
- R Sarre, 30 January 2008 “The Legal Powers of Private Security Personnel” to a staff and student seminar of the Law School, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sha-tin, Hong Kong SAR.
- R Sarre, 5 June 2008, “Global Security: what role for the private sector” seminar for staff and students, Faculty of Law and Political Science, National University of Laos, Vientiane, Lao PDR.
- R Sarre, T Prenzler and K Earle, 13 June 2008, “Exploring Private Security Trends and Directions for Reform in the New Era of Plural Policing” to an ASIAL breakfast meeting of ACT members, Belconnen, ACT.


- Sarre R, 27 August 2008, ‘Strategic Security Imperatives’ to the Security Australia (ASIAL) conference, plenary address, Darling Harbour, Sydney, NSW.


- Sarre R, 23 October 2008, ‘Policy Options for the Greater Integration of Private Security Industries into Policing’ staff and student seminar for the Centre for Criminology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.


- Sarre, R. 11 June 2009, ‘The Role of the Private Sector in Enhancing Policing in Australia: report of a current study,’ to the 16th International Police Executive Symposium (IPES) convened by the Ministry of Interior, Republic of Macedonia, Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia.

• Sarre, R. 16 September 2009, ‘Planning the Future of Security,’ to a seminar of staff and students, Keele University, Centre for Criminological Research, Keele, Staffordshire, UK.

• Sarre, R. and Earle K. 24 November 2009, ‘Private Security and Public Interest: Regulation and Partnerships’ paper presented to parallel session at 22nd Annual Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology (ANZSOC) conference, Crime Research Centre, University of Western Australia, Perth.

• Sarre, R. 15 March 2010, ‘Policing and security for major sporting events: a cooperation model,’ Plenary paper presented to the 17th International Police Executive Symposium and Malta Police, Qawra, Malta.


• Sarre, R. 30 September 2010, ‘Public / private policing partnerships: report of an ongoing study’ paper for a parallel session at the 23rd Annual Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology (ANZSOC) conference, Alice Springs, NT.


• Sarre, R. 18 November 2010, ‘Police: can they do it all?’ Keynote address for the Tredje Nordisk polisforskningskonferens (Third Nordic Police Research Conference) Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden.


• Sarre, R. (with T Prenzler) 24 February 2011 ‘The Future of Policing: Results of an ARC study 2007-2010’ to CEPS and Regnet, ANU, Canberra.
Publications from the Project


Related publications


